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This thesis consists in four papers addressing the difficulties of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) when accessing banking finance in a context of high informational 
asymmetries , during a period of financial crisis and adjustments of the banking capital ratios. 
A central characteristic of SMEs is their dependence on bank credit for external financing 
(Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). Asymmetric information and agency costs, however, underlie 
the inadequate financing of these firms. Previous studies show that, due to the lack of 
information on individual borrowers, banks issue restrictive loan term contracts to reduce their 
default exposure. Banks can cause the interest rate to become inefficiently high such that 
worthy firms are driven out of the credit market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Alternatively, firms 
with negative net present value projects could obtain financial support in the credit market by 
taking advantage of cross-subsidization of borrowers with worthy projects (Mankiw, 1986; De 
Meza and Webb, 1987). In both cases, the reason for market failure is that banks are unable to 
assess the actual riskiness of SMEs and are forced to offer the same contract to them with a 
different probability of success. Hence, to overcome screening errors, lenders may reject part 
of a firm´s loan request (i.e., type I rationing) or simply turn down the credit (i.e., type II 
rationing) (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009a). 
Recent studies show that when borrowers’ wealth is large enough, banks may bypass 
informational asymmetries by offering a menu of contracts with collateral requirements which, 
acting as a sorting device, mitigates the screening errors and the credit rationing for good firms. 
In this case, risky borrowers will be self-selected by choosing contracts with high repayment 
(i.e., high interest rates) and low collateral, while safe borrowers will choose contracts with 
high collateral and low repayment (Han et al., 2009a). Thus, in the design of loan term 
contracts, collateral assumes a key role as a risk management instrument (Bonfim, 2005). Its 
role, however, has been little studied in the field of entrepreneurial finance and has been 
validated, particularly, in the context of a market-based system that gives to SMEs a wider 
range of funding sources (La Porta et al., 1998). Furthermore, it seems entirely plausible that 
the role of collateral differs within developed and less developed countries (Menkhoff et al., 
2012), surrounded by different levels of informational asymmetries (Hainz, 2003; Beck et al., 
2006; Menkhoff et al., 2006), and that their efficiency depends on its nature (i.e., business 
versus personal collateral – Mann, 1997b). 
The features of collateral also depend on the characteristics of the individual loan and 
the firm (Berger and Udell, 1998; Columba et al., 2010) as well as the legal procedures for loan 
recovery (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009). If SMEs are unable to post collateral while they have a 
short credit history, meet less rigorous reporting requirements and the availability of public 
information is scarce (Columba et al., 2010) or if the legal system is inadequate to protect 
creditor rights (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009), their access to bank credit would remain restricted 
especially during economic downturns, with negative effects on industry dynamics, 
vii 
 
competitiveness and growth (Beck and Demirgüc- Kunt, 2006). In this context, in almost half of 
countries around the world several types of loan guarantee funds have been created to help 
SMEs to gain easier access to the credit market (Green, 2003; Gonzàles et al., 2006; Beck et 
al., 2010; Cowling, 2010; Honohan, 2010). The importance of mutual guarantee schemes (MGS) 
is destined to further increase in the light of the Basel II and III Capital Accords which state 
that the guarantees of such institutions can, if granted in compliance with some requirements, 
allow banks to mitigate credit risk with small business lending, and thus, save regulatory capital 
(SPGM, 2007; Cardone-Riportella et al. 2008). In the recent years, the allocation of mutual 
guarantees gained a momentum, especially in Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. Since the onset of the crisis in the international financial 
sector, MGS have been the privileged instrument to extend credit for SMEs without 
compromising the capital requirements of banks (Uesugi et al, 2010). However, the question 
whether third-party guarantee is an effective instrument to promote lending to SMEs is a 
controversial issue in both academic and policy literature (Cowling, 2010; Honohan, 2010; 
Boschi et al., 2014). 
Traditionally, practitioners and policy makers have been concentrating much of their 
attention in those firms that apply for bank credit and specifically on the credit rationing 
problem, marginalizing those firms which do not apply for loans, even when they need external 
financing. These firms are the so-called “discouraged borrowers” (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002). 
Although the theoretical model of Kon and Storey (2003) for “discouragement” is, in principle, 
applicable to both developed and less developed economies, it is expected that discouragement 
is higher in less developed countries due to lower business traceability (e.g., Chakravarty and 
Xiang, 2013; Brown et al., 2011; Cole and Dietrich, 2012). Empirical literature on the 
discouragement problem in less developed countries is, however, limited providing a fertile 
ground for the study of the causes for the existence of discouraged borrowers. 
Based on this theoretical and empirical framework, this thesis critically approaches 
underexplored dimensions of banking lending activity targeted to SMEs financing, such as: the 
collateralization policy; the role of mutual guarantees; and the discouraged demand for credit. 
In the first chapter we examine the simultaneous impact of observed characteristics and private 
information on SMEs´ loan contracts, using data from a major commercial bank operating in 
Portugal, gathered between January 2007 and December 2010. Using a multiperiod setting, this 
paper provides the first analysis of the sorting by signalling and self-selection (SBSS) model in 
a bank-based system. Furthermore, this chapter provides empirical evidence of the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on loan contracts during credit crunch and recession periods. Using 
12,666 credit approvals, the main results show that borrowers with good credit scores and a 
high probability of success as they are unlikely to default, are more willing to pledge collateral 
in return for lower interest rate premium (IRP). In an interactive and sequential event, we 
confirm that lenders tailor the specific terms of the contract, based on the observable 
characteristics, increasing both collateral requirements and IRP, for observed risky borrowers, 
in line with Han et al (2009a)´s SBSS model. However, we reject the positive effect of loan 
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size, predicted by the SBSS model, in terms of loan price negotiation. We argue that loan size 
decreases the probability of collateralization and the loan interest rates, suggesting that larger 
loans increase the potential payoff for banks and are assigned to borrowers with good 
observable characteristics. As loan maturity increases, in contrast, the lender is more likely to 
demand collateralization and IRP, especially if the borrower is bad or unobservably good, in 
line with moral hazard arguments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Boot et al., 1991). This paper 
shows that our findings are robust when we predict the degree of collateralization offered by 
the borrower, adding strength to the SBSS model and contributing to overcome its empirical 
gaps underlined by Lambrecht (2009). 
The second chapter scrutinizes the role of mutual guarantees in Portuguese bank 
lending activity. Using data provided by the same bank, covering 11,181 loans granted to SMEs 
between January 2008 and December 2010, this paper provides the first appraisal of Portuguese 
MGS in response to the financial crisis. We examine the characteristics of firms benefiting from 
mutual guaranteed loans and analyzes the impact of mutual guarantees in loan pricing as well 
as on the ex-post performance of borrowers. The findings provide a comprehensive insight 
confirming the value of mutual guarantees to improve Portuguese banking loan activity, 
especially for good SMEs operating in a stressful context, reducing the costs of borrowing and 
improving the ex post default of borrowers. Thus, we suggest that mutual guarantees could be 
used to raise the loan´s recovery rate allowing banks to meet their commitments with banking 
regulation and supervision in the context of financial crisis. We also argue that these effects 
are especially noticeable by combining third-party guarantees and collateral. 
The third chapter extends the empirical evidences on the determinants of the collateral 
in loan contract terms in countries characterized by low  informational traceability and low 
creditor protection. It uses the fourth-round database of the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) carried out between 2007 and 2009, covering 3,403 
ultimately banking credit approvals for SMEs, operating in Eastern European and Central Asia 
less developed countries. This paper examines the incidence of business and personal collateral 
and its level reporting first-hand evidence regarding the impact of the recently reformed credit 
environment on collateral requirements. The findings endorse the importance in producing and 
sharing private information between lenders to reduce informational asymmetries and 
consequently the need to provide collateral to receive a loan. Moreover, we find that market 
concentration increases banks´ lazy-behavior by asking for collateral not to mitigate observable 
risk but to reduce screening efforts. We also prove that reforms around the depth of 
information-sharing instruments by public credit registries only have practical effects 
mitigating credit constraints and reducing the collateral requirements when coupled with 
public reforms on its coverage. In addition, this chapter shows that business and personal 
collateral have distinctive values addressing moral hazard and adverse selection problems, 
especially relevant in the context under study, advising caution on the practitioners’ 
extrapolations when modeling the determinants of bank loans collateralization. 
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The fourth chapter examines the conditions that favor the existence of discouraged 
borrowers, using data provided by the fourth-round of the BEEPS. This paper selects 6,307 loan 
seekers, among which 2,207 SMEs are typed as discouraged borrowers and 4,280 are classified 
as loan applicants. We prove that whereas the firm´s opaqueness, demographic issues and 
distance between borrower and lender better explains the discouragement by tough loan price 
and/or loan application procedures, the firm´s risk and the banking concentration explains the 
incidence of discouraged borrowers by fear of rationing. Nonetheless, we argue that in a higher 
concentrated banking system, those firms with a closer and more intensive relationship with 
the bank are more likely discouraged to apply for a loan than distant borrowers. This is 
reasonable if we assume that these firms are more likely to rely on banks as their primordial 
source of finance, getting locked by the superior bargaining power of the credit provider in a 
context of low competition (Sharpe, 1991; Detragiache et al. 2000). In turn, this bargaining 
power may discourage the business to apply for new loans. The innovator status, the legal 
protection of borrowers and lenders in a default event and the coverage of information sharing 
instruments help to explain the discouragement in a transversal way.  
 
 
Keywords: SME, Entrepreneurship signaling, Private information, Collateral, Personal 
collateral; Business collateral, Level of personal and business collateral, Public mutual credit 
guarantees; Financial crisis, Bank capital ratios, Asymmetric Information; Ex-post default; Less 
developed countries; Discouraged borrowers; Self-selection 
 







Esta tese é composta por quatro artigos que abordam as dificuldades enfrentadas pelas 
Pequenas e Médias Empresas (PMEs) no acesso ao financiamento bancário num contexto de 
elevada assimetria de informação e/ou reduzida rastreabilidade de informação, durante um 
período de crise financeira e de ajustamentos nos rácios de capital do sector bancário. Uma 
das características centrais das PMEs é a sua dependência do crédito bancário no que diz 
respeito ao seu financiamento externo (Degryse e Van Cayseele, 2000), sendo frequentemente 
atribuídas as suas fragilidades no acesso a fontes externas de capital, maioritariamente dívida 
bancária, à assimetria de informação e aos custos de agência. A literatura evidencia que, devido 
à falta de informação sobre os mutuários, os bancos emitem contratos de empréstimo com 
cláusulas restritivas para reduzir a sua exposição ao risco e ao incumprimento. Os bancos 
tendem a exigir, por exemplo, taxas de juro tão elevadas que afastam empresas sustentáveis e 
saudáveis do mercado de crédito (Stiglitz e Weiss, 1981). Em alternativa, as empresas com 
projetos de valor atual líquido (VAL) negativo poderão obter apoio financeiro, no mercado de 
crédito bancário, aproveitando a subsidiação cruzada dos mutuários com projetos viáveis 
(Mankiw, 1986; De Meza e Webb, 1987). Em ambos os casos, a origem destas imperfeições de 
mercado reside na incapacidade dos bancos avaliarem corretamente o grau de risco efetivo das 
PMEs, e dos seus projetos, sendo forçados a oferecer o mesmo contrato para empresas com 
probabilidade de sucesso distintas. Assim, com o objetivo de mitigar os erros na triagem dos 
diferentes projetos, os credores podem ser levados a racionar o montante dos empréstimos a 
conceder a essas empresas (i.e., racionamento de tipo I) ou simplesmente a rejeitar o pedido 
de crédito (i.e., racionamento de tipo II) (Steijvers e Voordeckers, 2009a). 
Estudos recentes sugerem que quando a qualidade dos mutuários é elevada (isto é, 
quando apresentam bons ratings), os bancos podem superar a assimetria de informação 
oferecendo um menu de contratos que prevê a prestação de garantias bancárias que agem como 
um dispositivo de triagem, mitigando os erros de “screening” e, consequentemente, o 
racionamento do crédito para as empresas rentáveis. Neste caso, os mutuários com risco 
elevado optam por escolher contratos com taxas de juro mais elevadas e garantias bancárias 
mais reduzidas, enquanto que os mutuários com maior qualidade creditícia optam por contratos 
mais exigentes do ponto de vista dos requisitos ao nível das garantias bancárias em troca de 
taxas de juro mais baixas (Han et al., 2009a). Assim, na negociação dos contratos de 
empréstimos bancários, as garantias bancárias assumem um papel fundamental como um 
instrumento de sinalização e gestão de riscos (Bonfim, 2005). O seu papel, no entanto, tem sido 
pouco estudado no contexto das finanças empresariais e foi validado, em particular, no 
contexto “market-based system” que oferece às PMEs uma ampla gama de fontes de 
financiamento (La Porta et al., 1998). Além disso, assume-se como plausível o argumento de 
que o papel das garantias bancárias varia entre países desenvolvidos e países menos 
desenvolvidos, em função dos diferentes níveis de assimetria de informação que se colocam à 
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atividade bancária (Hainz, 2003; Menkhoff et al, 2012; Beck et al, 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2006). 
Simultaneamente, reconhece-se que a eficiência das garantias bancárias depende da natureza 
dos ativos usados para garantir o empréstimo, o que pressupõe uma análise cuidada e singular 
sobre o valor intrínseco das garantias bancárias reais versus garantias pessoais (Mann, 1997). 
As características das garantias bancárias dependem igualmente das características 
individuais do empréstimo e da própria empresa (Berger e Udell, 1998; Columba et al, 2010), 
bem como do enquadramento legal em caso de incumprimento (Zecchini e Ventura, 2009). Se 
as PMEs forem incapazes de prestar garantias bancárias, se estas apresentarem um curto 
historial de crédito, se adotarem políticas de reporte de informação financeira pouco rigorosas 
e se a informação pública sobre si mesmas for reduzida (Columba et al., 2010), ou mesmo se o 
sistema legal for insuficiente para proteger os direitos dos credores (Zecchini e Ventura, 2009), 
o seu acesso ao crédito bancário permanecerá restrito, especialmente em períodos de recessão 
económica, com efeitos negativos sobre a dinâmica da economia, a sua competitividade e 
crescimento (Beck e Demirgüc- Kunt, 2006). Neste contexto, em quase metade dos países em 
todo o mundo, vários tipos de fundos de garantia mútua foram criados com o objetivo de 
facilitar o acesso ao crédito bancário por parte das PMEs (Green, 2003; Gonzàles et al., 2006; 
Beck et al., 2010; Cowling, 2010; Honohan, 2010). A importância das garantias mútuas é cada 
vez mais relevante devido aos Acordos de Capital de Basileia II e III, na medida em que estas 
permitem, se concedidas em conformidade com alguns requisitos, mitigar a exposição ao risco 
de crédito associado aos empréstimos concedidos às PMEs, de tal forma que podem promover 
a atividade de concessão de crédito garantindo em simultâneo o cumprimento dos rácios 
regulamentares de capital (SPGM, 2007; Cardone-Riportella et al., 2008). Com efeito, nos 
últimos anos, a atribuição de garantias mútuas ganhou um novo impulso, especialmente nos 
países que compõem a Organização para a Cooperação Económica e para o Desenvolvimento 
(OECD),uma vez que, no âmbito da crise no setor financeiro internacional, estas têm sido o 
instrumento privilegiado para estender o crédito às PMEs sem comprometer os requisitos de 
capital dos bancos (Uesugi et al, 2010). Não obstante, a eficiência das garantias mútuas 
prestadas por uma terceira entidade enquanto instrumento promotor da concessão de 
empréstimos às PMEs é ainda uma questão controversa na literatura política e académica 
(Cowling, 2010; Honohan, 2010; Boschi et al,2014). 
Tradicionalmente, os académicos e os decisores políticos têm vindo a concentrar 
grande parte da sua atenção nas empresas que solicitam empréstimos bancários e, 
especificamente, no problema do racionamento de crédito, marginalizando as empresas que 
não apresentam pedidos de crédito bancário, mesmo quando admitem necessitar de algum tipo 
de empréstimo. Estas empresas são designadas de “mutuários desencorajados” (“Discouraged 
borrowers”) (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Kon and Storey, 2003). Apesar da base teórica de Kon e 
Storey (2003) para o "desencorajamento" ser, em princípio, aplicável a economias desenvolvidas 
e a economias em desenvolvimento, existem evidências empíricas que sugerem que o problema 
do desencorajamento de crédito é maior em países menos desenvolvidos (por exemplo, 
Chakravarty e Xiang, 2013; Brown et al, 2011; Cole e Dietrich, 2012). No entanto, a literatura 
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empírica sobre este problema nos países menos desenvolvidos é ainda limitada oferecendo um 
terreno fértil no que diz respeito ao entendimento sobre a existência deste tipo de mutuários. 
Com base no enquadramento teórico e empírico, esta tese aborda, de forma crítica, 
algumas dimensões pouco exploradas sobre a atividade de crédito bancário especificamente 
direcionada ao financiamento das PMEs, tais como: a política de garantias bancárias (reais e 
pessoais); o papel de garantias mútuas e o desencorajamento da procura de crédito bancário. 
Com efeito, no primeiro capítulo desta tese examinamos o impacto simultâneo das 
características observadas e da informação privada sobre os termos do contrato de crédito 
bancário das PMEs, usando dados recolhidos entre janeiro de 2007 e dezembro de 2010 sobre a 
atividade bancária de um grande banco comercial a operar em Portugal. Usando uma 
configuração de dados multi-período, este capítulo fornece a primeira abordagem ao modelo 
“Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection” (SBSS) num contexto de “Bank-based System”. Para 
além disso, fornece evidências empíricas sobre o efeito das condições macroeconómicas sobre 
os termos dos contratos de crédito bancário durante o período de crise financeira e de recessão 
económica. Usando 12,666 pedidos de crédito aprovados, os principais resultados mostram que 
os mutuários com um bom rating estão mais dispostos a oferecer garantias bancárias em troca 
de uma redução percentual das taxas de juro, sabendo que têm uma elevada probabilidade de 
sucesso, não sendo, por isso, suscetíveis de entrar em incumprimento. Num processo interativo 
e sequencial, os resultados confirmam que os credores adequam os termos específicos do 
contrato de crédito em função das características observadas, aumentando quer os requisitos 
de garantias bancárias quer a taxa de juro para mutuários com maior risco observado, de acordo 
com o modelo SBSS proposto por Han et al (2009a). No entanto, rejeitamos a relação positiva 
entre o montante do empréstimo, prevista neste modelo, e o preço do crédito negociado. Neste 
capítulo, argumentamos que o montante do empréstimo diminui a probabilidade de prestar 
garantias bancárias reduzindo igualmente as taxas de juro exigidas para a obtenção do 
empréstimo, o que sugere que os empréstimos de maior montante aumentam o retorno 
potencial para os bancos e são atribuídos a mutuários com melhor qualidade creditícia. Em 
contrapartida, à medida que a maturidade dos empréstimos aumenta, torna-se cada vez mais 
provável que o credor exija garantias bancárias e taxas de juro mais elevadas, especialmente 
se o credor possui informações públicas negativas acerca do mutuário ou se a qualidade do 
mutuário do crédito não é observável, com o objetivo de reduzir o risco moral - “moral hazard” 
- e os riscos inerentes à substituição de ativos no período subsequente à concessão de crédito 
(“ex-post shifting behavior”) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Boot et al., 1991).Este capítulo 
mostra que estes resultados são robustos quando analisado o rácio de cobertura das garantias 
bancárias, reforçando as conclusões do modelo SBSS e contribuindo para ultrapassar as suas 
limitações empíricas sublinhadas, de resto, por Lambrecht (2009). 
O segundo capítulo analisa o papel das garantias mútuas na atividade de crédito 
bancário Português. Usando dados fornecidos pelo mesmo banco, cobrindo 11,181 empréstimos 
concedidos às PMEs entre janeiro de 2008 e dezembro de 2010, este artigo fornece a primeira 
avaliação do sistema de garantias mútuas português em resposta à crise financeira. O estudo 
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examina as características das empresas que beneficiaram de empréstimos garantidos por uma 
terceira entidade e analisa o impacto das garantias mútuas no preço dos empréstimos, bem 
como sobre o desempenho futuro dos mutuários. Os resultados fornecem uma visão abrangente 
confirmando o valor destas garantias na melhoria da atividade de concessão de crédito dos 
bancos em Portugal, especialmente para as PMEs com boa classificação de risco e que operam 
em contexto de “stress financeiro” (nomeadamente por pressões ao nível de liquidez), 
reduzindo os custos dos empréstimos, bem como o rácio de empresas em incumprimento no 
período pós-concessão de crédito. Assim, sugerimos que as garantias mútuas sejam usadas para 
aumentar a taxa de recuperação dos empréstimos permitindo que os bancos cumpram os seus 
compromissos com a regulação e supervisão bancária num contexto de crise financeira. 
Argumentamos ainda que os efeitos positivos das garantias mútuas sobre a atividade bancária 
são potenciados através da combinação entre estas e as garantias bancárias (pessoais). 
Com base nos dados recolhidos do quarto questionário do “Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey” (BEEPS), realizado entre 2007 e 2009, abrangendo 3,403 
pedidos de crédito aprovados para as PMEs que operam em países menos desenvolvidos da 
Europa de Leste e na Ásia Central, no terceiro capítulo estendemos as evidências empíricas 
sobre os determinantes das garantias bancárias examinando simultaneamente os determinantes 
das garantias bancárias reais e pessoais. Controlando a cobertura das garantias bancárias 
prestadas, este capítulo fornece resultados únicos sobre o impacto do ambiente de crédito 
recentemente sujeito a um conjunto de reformas (por exemplo, ao nível dos centros públicos 
e privados de recolha e partilha de informação - DBR, 2010). Concluímos que as empresas jovens 
usam as garantias pessoais como sinal da sua capacidade creditícia e de compromisso para 
aceder ao crédito bancário. Este efeito de sinalização é alcançado através da prestação de 
ativos pessoais como garantia do empréstimo bancário. Os resultados reforçam ainda a 
importância em recolher e partilhar informações privadas sobre os mutuários entre credores, 
reduzindo deste modo a necessidade de prestar garantias bancárias. Sugerem também que o 
aumento da concentração bancária promove um comportamento ocioso dos bancos, que se 
traduz num aumento das exigências de garantias pessoais, não para mitigar o risco, mas sim 
para reduzir os custos de “screening” e monotorização do risco. Os resultados indicam ainda 
que reformas relativamente à “profundidade” dos instrumentos de partilha de informação por 
parte de registos públicos de crédito apenas têm efeitos práticos sobre a atenuação de 
restrições de crédito e redução das exigências de garantias bancárias quando acompanhadas de 
reformas públicas sobre a sua cobertura. Este estudo revela ainda várias diferenças entre os 
determinantes: da incidência de garantias bancárias; do tipo de ativos usados para garantir a 
obtenção de crédito e do valor da(s) própria(s) garantia(s) prestada(s). 
O quarto capítulo examina as condições que justificam a existência de mutuários 
desencorajados (“discouraged borrowers”), usando dados fornecidos pelo quarto questionário 
do BEEPS. Este artigo seleciona 6,307 PMEs com assumida necessidade de crédito, de entre as 
quais 2,207 PMEs são classificadas como “discouraged borrowers”, e 4,280 como empresas que 
solicitaram empréstimos bancários. Com base nos dados recolhidos, verificamos que: enquanto 
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a rastreabilidade sobre a qualidade das empresas, as questões demográficas e a distância entre 
devedor e credor explicam o problema do desencorajamento baseado numa perceção negativa 
sobre o preço do crédito ou sobre a complexidade dos procedimentos para obtenção do 
empréstimo; o risco das PMEs e a concentração do mercado bancário explicam a existência de 
problemas de desencorajamento motivado pelo medo de racionamento do crédito. No entanto, 
os resultados demonstram que num sistema bancário mais concentrado, as empresas com uma 
relação mais estreita e intensa com o banco (main bank) têm uma tendência maior em “cair” 
em situação de desencorajamento comparativamente a mutuários mais distantes do seu credor. 
Estes resultados sugerem que essas empresas, que têm os bancos como principal fonte de 
financiamento, ficam reféns do poder informacional superior dos seus credores conferindo-lhes 
uma posição privilegiada numa situação de mudança de credor (i.e.,“superior bargaining power 
effect”) (Sharpe, 1991; Detragiache et al., 2000). Por sua vez, esta posição privilegiada pode 
desencorajar a empresa a solicitar novos empréstimos para evitar os “switching costs”. A 
capacidade de inovação, a proteção legal dos mutuários e dos credores num cenário de 
incumprimento, bem como a cobertura pública/privada por registos de crédito da informação 
sobre as empresas, ajudam a explicar o desencorajamento de crédito de uma forma transversal. 
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The role of collateral in the credit acquisition process: Empirical 




We test the simultaneous impact of observed characteristics and private information 
on debt term contracts in a multiperiod setting, using a data set of 12,666 credit approvals by 
one major Portuguese commercial bank during 2007–2010. The main results show that borrowers 
with good credit scores that know they have a high probability of success and are unlikely to 
default are more willing to pledge collateral in return for lower interest rate premium (IRP). 
Furthermore, lenders tailor the specific terms of the contract, increasing both collateral 
requirements and IRP from observed risk, for borrowers operating in riskier industries and with 
less credit availability. The results are robust to controls for joint debt terms negotiation and 
the degree of collateralization offered by the borrower. 
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Este artigo testa o impacto simultâneo das características observadas e da informação 
privada nos contratos dívida bancária num contexto multi-período, utilizando uma base de 
dados que cobre informação sobre 12,666 créditos aprovados, entre 2007- e 2010, por um 
grande banco comercial Português. Os principais resultados mostram que os mutuários com um 
bom score de crédito, aqueles que sabem que têm uma alta probabilidade de sucesso e os que 
não tendem a entrar em incumprimento estão mais dispostos a prestar garantias bancárias em 
troca de uma menor taxa de juro. Além disso, os resultados demonstram que os credores 
adequam os termos específicos do contrato, aumentando ambos os requisitos de garantias 
bancárias e a taxa de juro com base no risco observado, nomeadamente nos empréstimos 
concedidos a mutuários que operam em indústrias de maior risco e com menor disponibilidade 
de crédito. Os resultados são robustos quando controlado o montante das garantias bancárias 
no estudo da relação conjunta dos termos da crédito. 
 
 
Palavras-Chave: PMEs, sinalização, finanças empresariais, informação privada, garantias 
bancárias 




A central characteristic of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is their 
dependence on bank credit for external financing (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). 
Asymmetric information and agency costs underlie the inadequate financing of SMEs; therefore, 
banks issue restrictive loan term contracts to reduce their default exposure. Thus, in the design 
of loan term contracts, collateral assumes a key role as a risk management instrument, 
especially for SME lending (Bonfim, 2005). 
To analyze the role of collateral in debt term contracts, Han et al. (2009) propose a 
“sorting by signaling and self-selection” (SBSS) model that emphasizes two unique views on how 
collateral can mitigate credit risk better than sorting by observed risk (SBOR) (e.g., Berger and 
Udell, 1990) or sorting by private information (SBPI) (e.g., Bester, 1985). In the SBOR model, 
borrowers’ risk types are observable, so lenders require collateral and higher interest rate 
premium (IRP) on the basis of borrowers’ observed characteristics (demand-side argument). In 
the SBPI model, good borrowers instead offer collateral as a reliable signal of their low risk, 
and in return, they expect a loan contract with lower IRP (supply-side argument). Combining 
features of these existing paradigms, the SBSS model introduces borrowers’ observable 
characteristics (i.e., SBOR) to design an incentive-compatible menu of loan contracts that 
works as a self-regulating mechanism (i.e., SBPI). With this model, both demand- and supply-
side factors guide the design of loan contracts negotiated with banks. 
 In testing the simultaneous impacts of observed characteristics and private information 
on debt term contracts, we extend Han et al.’s (2009) model in three ways. First, because loan 
term contracts (i.e., collateral and IRP) are jointly determined (Brick and Palia 2007), we test 
the signaling value of collateral and consider the determinants of IRP, with the assumption that 
they can be determined endogenously, as predicted by the SBSS model (Godlewski and Weill, 
2011). Second, our analysis spans a multiperiod setting, which allows us to control for the 
survivor bias effect, that is, by including not only surviving firms but also default firms. Third, 
unlike previous studies, our unique data set permits us to conduct the analysis with a continuous 
variable for collateral; thus, we test the SBSS model by controlling for not just whether 
collateral was provided but also the amount pledged. These extensions in turn lead to three 
main contributions to extant literature. 
First, though some empirical studies examine the role of collateral in mitigating 
informational asymmetries in loan contracts (e.g., Berger et al., 2011; Jimenez et al., 2006; 
Menkhoff et al., 2006; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006), few explore the interdependencies of 
collateral and IRP. Those that do generally use U.S. data (e.g., Brick and Palia, 2007; Han et 
al., 2009), which reflect market-based financial systems (La Porta et al., 1998). The current 
study instead analyses the role of collateral in loans granted to SMEs in Portugal, a country 
characterized by a bank-based system and an economy dominated by SMEs. This issue is 
particularly relevant considering the structural differences in the size and importance of U.S. 
and EU banking sectors relative to their respective overall financial sectors (Schildbach and 
Wenzel, 2013). Specifically, in the United States, financial firms other than banks have grown 
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more quickly in recent decades, such that the so-called shadow banking system overtook the 
traditional banking system in size by the 1990s. In Europe, most financing still moves through 
traditional credit institutions, so even though the economies are roughly comparable in size, 
the EU’s banking sector has more than four times as many total bank assets as the U.S. sector, 
which has important repercussions for how SMEs find external funding.. European banks’ 
relatively limited capacity to provide credit to private and public sectors thus determines the 
economy’s overall financial strength far more in Europe than in the United States, where actors 
other than banks are equally relevant.1 In Portugal, this issue is critical: It suffers the third 
worst credit conditions within the European Union (Gaspar, 2012). 
In addition, the effect of creditor protection on bank lending to small businesses is 
largely unexplored, despite the fact that small businesses constitute a crucial sector of virtually 
all economies (Banco de Portugal 2013). The differences in Portuguese and U.S. bankruptcy 
codes are best viewed from the perspective of super-priority financing, automatic stays, and 
the legislation goals in general; in the United States, both liquidation (Chapter 7) and 
reorganization (Chapter 11) are legal under bankruptcy code, and thus, the country is 
characterized as debtor friendly. In contrast, Portugal’s 2004 bankruptcy code not only moves 
away from debtor protection but also explicitly emphasizes the liquidation of firms over their 
rescue and recovery. As part of this protection of creditors’ rights, Portugal’s legislation does 
not allow for automatic stays from creditors, whereas under U.S. legislation, Chapter 11 allows 
firms in reorganization to postpone all repayments of capital and interest until reorganization 
is complete as a way of preserving the company as an operating concern. Finally, super-priority 
financing under the Portuguese system only occurs if an insolvency plan expressly provisions for 
it or if the firm has any collateral assets free to bank this potential claim; in contrast, under 
the U.S. system, firms can use super-priority financing without such limitations. 
Second, our sample covers 2007–2010, so we provide empirical evidence of the effect 
of macroeconomic conditions on loan term contracts during credit crunch and recession 
periods. We control for this effect by balancing the number and amount of loans granted before 
and after the 2008 financial crisis and using a censored model to predict the determinants of 
the amount of collateral required (Lambrecht, 2009).  
Third, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first authors to focus on the Portuguese 
loan market. According a survey conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB), SME access to 
finance in the euro area has remained broadly unchanged; however, substantial cross-country 
differences are evident, and in general, financing is more difficult for SMEs than for large 
                                                          
1 The differences between the U.S. and EU banking markets grew after the financial crisis. Previously, 
both U.S. and European banks reported profits; currently, only U.S. banks do so, while their European 
peers struggle to stay above this line consistently. In addition, U.S. lending is growing, and loan loss 
provisions have returned to 2007 levels. In contrast, loan growth remains weak in Europe, and loan loss 
provisions remain elevated. European banks’ greater need to raise capital ratios and stronger deleveraging 
and shrinking has put them at a competitive disadvantage compared with their U.S. counterparts 
(Schildbach and Wenzel, 2013). 
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companies (ECB 2015). Using 12,666 credit approvals by one of the largest commercial banks in 
Portugal, we show that risky borrowers must provide collateral and pay higher IRP to obtain a 
loan, in line with the SBOR (demand-side) model. Sharing private information between lenders 
and borrowers also exerts an impact, such that borrowers with good credit scores, which know 
they have a high probability of success, are more willing to pledge collateral in return for lower 
IRP, in line with the SBPI (supply side) model. The results are robust when we control for joint 
debt term negotiation and the degree of collateralization pledged by the borrower. Thus, SBSS 
sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt contracts in Portugal, due the high incidence of 
collateral at origin of the contract (i.e., the moral hazard [MH] effect). 
The next section provides an overview of the role of collateral in mitigating agency 
costs. In Section 1.3, we describe the data, variables, and method; section 1.4 reports the 
discussions of the results. Section 1.5 shows several robustness tests. Finally, section 1.6 
concludes with some implications and avenues for further research. 
 
1.2. The role of collateral in debt term contracts: An overview 
Bank loans are the most widely used form of SME financing (Berger and Udell, 1995), 
though these exchange relationships often suffer from market imperfections, such as 
information asymmetries. Information asymmetries occur because the lenders lack reliable 
information about the default risk of the applicants. The mostly unlisted SMEs also tend to lack 
audited financial statements, so they have difficulty signaling their quality to financial 
institutions. Such information asymmetries can be so severe that they eventually lead to credit 
rationing. 
The aim of using collateral in the credit acquisition process is to reduce banks’ exposure 
to loss and thereby mitigate credit rationing for SMEs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Yet the 
question of why some loans occur without collateral, while other loans require securitization, 
continues to plague scholars (Steijvers et al. 2010). Several theories suggest collateral is an 
information asymmetry–reducing instrument, whether because it provides an incentive that 
reduces MH problems or because it serves as a screening device that resolves the adverse 
selection (AS) problem. Consistent with MH theory, empirical studies generally indicate a 
positive relation between collateral and borrowers’ risk (e.g., Jiménez et al. 2006). Thus, banks 
sort borrowers on the basis of information they have about credit quality (SBOR) and then 
charge riskier borrowers higher interest rates premium and demand collateralized loans from 
them. Screening models instead consider the effects of asymmetric information on the relation 
between risk and collateral (cf. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As Bester (1985) shows, if borrowers’ 
riskiness is hidden information, a bank can use collateral as a screening device to distinguish 
between high- and low-risk borrowers and thus mitigate its AS problem. Borrowers with a low 
probability of bankruptcy are more inclined to accept higher collateral requirements if doing 
so reduces their interest rate premium, compared with SMEs with a high probability of failure. 
Therefore, the various contracts provide a self-selection mechanism to separate borrowers with 
different risk profiles, implying that collateral and interest rate premium act as substitutes 
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(Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Bester, 1985). Accordingly, a lender offers each borrower a set of 
incentive-compatible contracts, and collateral serves as a mechanism to reveal the borrower’s 
private information about its ex ante risk preference (SBPI)2. 
 
1.2.1. SBSS 
The SBSS model derives from entrepreneurial rather than corporate finance models, 
which Han et al. (2009) justify with three rationales. First, following Bolton Committee (1971) 
they assume that a small business is owned and managed by the same individual; thus, the 
personal characteristics and wealth of SME owner-managers have a stronger influence on firm 
performance than in large companies (e.g., Tirole, 2010). Because the owner’s personal wealth 
cannot be separated entirely from the assets of the business, it frequently serves as a means 
to access bank loans (Ang et al. 1995); thus, the availability of collateral is mainly determined 
by the business owner’s personal wealth. Second, the downside risk associated with loan 
defaults due to business closures is much higher among SMEs than for mature, large firms (e.g., 
Hart and Oulton, 1999). Third, rating agencies and the financial press seldom monitor SMEs, so 
information asymmetries are more significant. For example, in comparison with large firms very 
little information about small firms and their owners is in the public domain. Thus, collecting 
information is more costly for this group of firms, particularly in proportion to the amount 
borrowed (Ang 1991)3. Taking these features in account, Han et al. combine features of the 
SBOR paradigm and the SBPI paradigm to present the SBSS model4. 
The borrower’s risk type is private information and unknown to the lender. Whereas 
Bester (1985) draws all borrowers from the same distribution, Han et al. (2009) suggest that, 
on the basis of observable characteristics, borrowers can represent two possible distributions: 
good and bad. The SBSS model assumes a one-period setting and perfect competition in the 
lending market, such that in equilibrium, by offering two different contracts to any given 
borrower, the lender can separate good borrowers from bad ones. That is, a low (high) interest 
and high (low) collateral contract is preferable to good (bad) borrowers. Then the specific 
terms of the contract (i.e., precise IRP and collateral requirements) can be tailored according 
                                                          
2 For reviews of theoretical models and empirical studies on the use of collateral, see Coco (2000) and 
Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009a), respectively. 
3 Here in after, we use the terms “small business” and “business owner” interchangeably, in line with the 
entrepreneurial literature. 
4 Han et al.’s (2009) use of the signaling concept differs from that of Bester (1985). According to Han et 
al., signaling is the process by which a lender makes a lending decision by collecting information from an 
“observable signal” transferred by a borrower. In contrast, Bester uses signaling as a mechanism by which 
a borrower discloses his or her unobservable quality to the lender by pledging collateral on loans. 
However, Lambrecht (2009) notes that Han et al.’s use of the term “signaling” (2009) is confused because 
in information economics this concept refers to (usually costly) action undertaken by an agent to credibly 
reveal information about his or her type. Therefore, he suggests that Han et al should more accurately 
call their model “sorting by characteristics and self-selection” (Lambrecht, 2009, p. 457).  
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to the borrower’s observable characteristics. In this sense, the SBSS captures two important 
features of bank lending: (1) Banks offer an array of standardized loan products from which 
customers may choose, and (2) the specific terms of any particular loan can be modified in 
accordance with the borrower’s creditworthiness. 
 
1.2.2. Research hypotheses and empirical implications  
The SBSS model suggests three specific hypotheses. The first is consistent with 
screening models, in which borrowers that are unlikely to undergo bankruptcy are more inclined 
to accept higher collateral requirements to reduce their IRP than are those with a high 
probability of bankruptcy, because their risk of losing their collateral is low (Chan and Kanatas, 
1985). Therefore, collateral and IRP act as substitutes (Bester, 1985). To categorize borrower 
types (private information), Han et al. (2009) use ex post profits at the time of the loan decision 
and predict: 
 
H1: Less risky borrowers choose a contract with more collateral and a lower interest 
rate premium, whereas risky borrowers choose a contract with less collateral and a 
higher interest rate premium. 
 
The next two hypotheses derive from Han et al.’s (2009, p. 431) corollaries 1 and 2, 
respectively. That is, larger loans should go to less risky borrowers with low probabilities of 
default, such that larger loans also should increase the likelihood of an exchange of collateral 
for lower IRP. Furthermore, borrowers that transmit low risk signals obtain better contract 
terms (i.e., lower collateral requirements and/or low IRP). Such observable signals reflect the 
characteristics of the business (e.g., profitability, total liabilities, total assets) and the owner 
(e.g., age, experience, court judgment history). Thus,  
 
H2: Loan size relates positively to the amount of collateral and negatively to interest 
rates premium. 
 
H3: Borrowers who transfer low risk signals obtain lower interest rates premium 
and/or put up lower collateral. 
 
1.3. Data, variables, and method 
1.3.1. Data and information environment 
We use data from a major commercial bank operating in Portugal, gathered between 
January 2007 and December 2010.5 These data represent the Portuguese banking environment 
reasonably well, in that they represent a long-term credit decision period and cover most of 
this bank’s credit portfolio for various geographical regions; thus, we do not expect regional 
                                                          
5 We guaranteed this bank confidentiality and anonymity for it and its customers. 
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biases in credit policy. Interviews with account managers also revealed that the bank maintains 
a single general credit policy, according to which account managers may approve credit 
requests below certain threshold on their own; if the credit request surpasses this threshold, 
the decision occurs at a central bank level. The degree of market concentration, measured by 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, was 1303, indicating a moderately concentrated market (APB 
2012, pp. 29, 63)6. 
In Portugal, SMEs represent 99.6% of businesses and create 75.2% of private employment 
and 56.4% of trade (Banco de Portugal, 2013). Accordingly, the data set is large, including 
12,666 loans to SMEs. We define SMEs in line with the European Commission (2003/361/EC), as 
well as the Basel II agreement, as firms with fewer than 250 employees and annual business 
volumes less than €50 million or assets that do not exceed €43 million. Most of the loans were 
issued in 2009 (34.65%) and 2010 (38.47%), rather than 2007 (10.45%) or 2008 (16.43%). Previous 
research reveals that loan terms can differ as a function of the type of business operation 
(Berger and Udell, 1998), so we sought to focus on financial loans7 and excluded unincorporated 
business, for which the assets are not separate from the owner’s (such businesses usually are 
classified as households). 
 
1.3.2. Variables 
1.3.2.1. Dependent variables 
In line with the SBSS model, we aim to examine the simultaneous impacts of observed 
characteristics and private information on debt term contracts. Thus, the dependent variables 
are collateral, collateralization, and IRP. Collateral is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm 
posts collateral and 0 otherwise. Collateralization reflects the collateralized percentage of the 
loan granted, according the bank’s internal evaluation. Finally, IRP is the interest rate premium 
percentage beyond the indexer (i.e., Euribor 12 months) that the bank charges. 
 
1.3.2.2. Independent variables 
According to the SBSS model, the key determinants of loan contract terms are 
observable signals transmitted by borrowers to the lender and the borrower’s credit quality, 
which is private information. Empirically, we use two variables to measure observed risk: 
industry risk and credit availability. Industry risk is the ratio of the default loans to total loans 
                                                          
6 Values of this ratio below 1000 suggest little bank concentration; values between 1000 and 1800 indicate 
moderate concentration, and values greater than 1800 imply a highly concentrated market. 
7 We exclude loans that are mainly transaction driven (e.g., mortgages, equipment loans, motor vehicle 
loans, loans based on the purchase of fixed assets) because they are typically granted on a (business) 
collateral basis; in asset-based lending of this type (Steijvers and Voordeckers 2009b; Berger and Udell, 
2002), it is frequently mandatory to provide the assets funded by the loan as collateral independently of 
the observable or private borrower´s information. Thus, including these loans in the sample would likely 
skew the global results. 
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granted, by average industry. Because information regarding the characteristics of the firms 
and their owners is scarce in our data set, we also include credit availability, or the difference 
between the loan credit available throughout the financial system and the loan amount 
approved for the firm8. For a given loan size, reduced credit availability indicates relative 
financial distress. Han et al. (2009) instead employ industry risk, industry profitability, and 
owner experience in the business. 
Tests of the SBPI paradigm require insight into the private information about borrower 
credit quality, which the lender does not know precisely at the time it grants the loan. We use 
the credit score defined by the lender at the time it grants the loan. This score combines data 
about the personal credit history of the small business owner with firm financial data. In 
response to the Basel II Accord, banks often compute minimum capital requirements using an 
internal ratings–based approach. Therefore, we include four dummy credit score variables: 
Credit Score AAA:BB equals 1 if the score is classified as AAA to BB; Credit Score BB- equals 1 
if the loan is classified with an internal credit score of BB-; Credit Score B+:B- equals 1 if the 
loan is classified with an internal credit score of B+ to B-; and Credit Score CCC:C equals 1 if 
the loan is classified with an internal credit score of CCC to C. Each variable equals 0 otherwise. 
To assess the borrower’s private information, we use ex post default, a variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the borrower did not have any loan in default at the time the loan was 
granted but then defaults after obtaining the loan (Jiménez et al., 2006). In this sense, it 
supports a test of SBSS in a multiperiod setting. Han et al. (2009) employ an ex post profitability 
index on equity return, which restricts their analysis to a one-period setting. 
Regarding the loan characteristics, we introduce LoanSize (measured in euros) and 
LoanMaturity (number of months between loan origination and maturity) variables. To isolate 
borrower risk from transaction effects (because large firms tend to have large loans and thus 
are more likely to supply collateral), we also use loan size bands: LoanSize1q takes a value of 
1 if the loan is less than €25,000 [ ≤1st quartile (Q)]; LoanSize2q equals 1 if the loan is greater 
than €25,000 but less than €50,000 (]1stQ;2ndQ]); LoanSize3q assumes the value of 1 if the loan 
size is above €50,000 but less than €200,000 (]2ndQ;3rdQ]); and LoanSize4q is 1 if the loan is 
greater than €200,000 (>3thQ). Each variable equals 0 otherwise. Because the sample period 
includes the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, we use GDPpc to proxy for economic 
development (Beck et al., 2006). The dummy variable Financial stability also takes a value of 
1 if the loan was granted before the international crisis (i.e., before 2008). 
In the SBSS model, collateral and IRP are jointly determined, so we rely on an 
instrumental probit estimator to determine the probability of collateralization. The 
instrumental variable (IV) for the IRP is the Euribor rate at 12 months (i.e., a variable that 
                                                          
8 Portuguese law mandates that all institutions report monthly to the Banco de Portugal all loans above 
50 euros. This information is maintained in the Central Credit Register (CRC). Thus, when granting a new 




affects the price of the credit but not collateralization), the variable Euribor. The choice of 
this IV relates to evidence that the adjustments made in the financial market by the Euribor 
rate (inversely) influenced the mean of the IRP on banks’ loan portfolios. To assess IRP, we use 
a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. For the collateral we use Project finance (i.e., a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan was granted to finance a project and 0 otherwise; 
e.g., Godlewski and Weill, 2011). We use this variable because the loan risk evaluation is a 
function of the cash flow generated by the project alone rather than by the wealth of the 
borrower (Yescombe, 2002). Because the probability of repayment for a loan depends on its 
purpose, we can assume that the loan purpose influences the lender’s requirement for 
collateral (Godlewski and Weill, 2011). Table 1.1. contains all the variable definitions as well 
the descriptive statistics. Appendix 1.1. contains descriptive statistics by subsample.
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9 Regarding the collateralization statistics, if we consider the sample with collateral provided (i.e., Collateral = 1), hence the mean of collateralization is 0.882, the 
median = 1, the standard deviation = 0.203. 
Table 1.1. Variables definition and descriptive statistics 
This table present variables definition and descriptive statistics. Industry risk is calculated using the ratio of the default loans to total loans granted, by average industry. 
Credit availability is or the difference between the loan credit available throughout the financial system and the loan amount approved for the firm, and the Ex-post 
default variable is based on information available in the Central Credit Register. Credit Scores are the internal scores assigned by the risk department of the bank to the 
loan applicant. 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables       
Collateral Equals 1 if borrower has pledged collateral (0,1) 12,666 0.753 0.432 0 1 
IRP Difference between the contractual interest rate for the loan and 
the prime rate 
12,666 2.889 1.172 0.5 13.78 
Collateralization9 Collateralized percentage of the loan granted according the internal 
evaluation of the bank 
12,666 0.663 0.422 0 1 
Observable Characteristics      
Industry risk Ratio of the default loans divided by total loan granted by industry 12,666 4.454 1.862 0.05 7.075 
Credit availability 
Difference between credit available in the entire financial system 
for the firm and loan amount approved by the bank to the firm (€) 
12,666 1,700,295.00 8,513,603.00 0 185,000,000.00 
Private Information      
Credit Score AAA:BB Equals 1 if the loan is classified with an internal credit score of AAA 
to BB (0, 1) 
12,666 0.515 0.500 0 1 
Credit Score BB- Equals 1 if the loan is classified with an internal credit score of BB- 
(0,1) 
12,666 0.190 0.393 0 1 
Credit Score B+:B- Equals 1 if the loan is classified with an internal credit score of B+ to 
B- (0, 1) 
12,666 0.256 0.437 0 1 
Credit Score CCC:C Equals 1 if the loan is classified with an internal credit score of CCC 
to C (0,1) 
12,666 0.040 0.193 0 1 
Ex-post default 
Equals 1 if borrower did not default previously but defaulted after 
the loan was granted (0,1) 
12,666 0.189 0.391 0 1 
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Table 1.1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (Continuation) 
GDP is available in the World Bank Indicators. Euribor is based in information available in the European Money Markets Institute. 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Loan Characteristics      
LoanSize Loan amount measured in euros 12,666 315,413.10 1,696,316 5,000 67,000,000 
LoanMaturity Number of months between loan origination and maturity 12,666 44.048 29.530 1 336 
LoanSize1Q Equals 1 if loan size is less than €25,000€ (≤1st quartile (Q)) (0,1) 12,666 0.349 0.477 0 1 
LoanSize2Q Equals 1 if loan size is between €25,000€ and €50,000(]2nd Q; 3rd 
Q]) (0,1) 
12,666 0.232 0.422 0 1 
LoanSize3Q Equals 1 if loan size is between €50,000 and €200,000 (]3rd Q;4th Q]) 
(0,1) 
12,666 0.196 0.397 0 1 
LoanSize4Q Equals 1 if loan size is more than €200,000 (>3th Q) (0,1) 12,666 0.223 0.416 0 1 
Macroeconomic Conditions      
GDPpc Gross domestic product per capita, in euros (constant price) 12,666 17,421.1 210.714 17,186.06 17,742.67 
Financial Stability Equals 1 if the loan is granted before the international crisis (before 
2008) (0,1) 
12,666 0.105 0.306 0 1 
Interaction effects      
INTER1 Ln (LoanSize+1) * Ex post default 12,666 2.088 4.389 0 17.569 
INTER2 LoanSize 1Q * Ex post default 12,666 0.058 0.234 0 1 
INTER3 LoanSize 2Q * Ex post default 12,666 0.047 0.212 0 1 
INTER4 LoanSize 3Q * Ex post default 12,666 0.042 0.202 0 1 
INTER5 LoanSize 4Q* Ex post default 12,666 0.039 0.195 0 1 
Instrumental Variables      
Project finance Equals 1 if loan is to finance a project (0,1) 12,666 0.085 0.280 0 1 





To test the SBSS model, we examine the role of both observable signals transmitted by 
the borrower to the lender10 and private information. A consensus across screening models 
(Bester, 1985) and self-selection models (Han et al., 2009) is that IRP and collateral act as 
substitutes in the presence of informational asymmetries. Therefore, both loan price terms are 
jointly determined, which may promote endogenous problems caused by the correlation 
between endogenous variables and the error term. If endogeneity prevails, a probit (ordinary 
least squares [OLS]) model for collateral (IRP) will provide biased results. Accordingly, we 
employ a simultaneous equation method to estimate the separate impacts of the collateral and 
the loan interest rates premium (e.g., Brick and Palia, 2007). 
To test for endogeneity, we follow Rivers and Vuong (1988) and Wooldridge’s (2010) 
method, relying on the IV approach: First, we regressed all possible endogenous variables on 
all independent and control variables, including IVs, to obtain the reduced form of the 
residuals. Then, the OLS regression expands to the IRP and probit regression to Collateral on 
all exogenous variables, including the residuals obtained in the first step. If the residual t-
statistics are not statistically significant, the results do not reject the null hypothesis; that is, 
the contract terms are exogenous. If we find evidence of endogeneity, we perform the Durbin 
(1954) and Wu-Hausman (Wu, 1974; Hausman, 1978) tests - Ho: Collateral (IRP) is exogenous. 
If these tests show that one (or both) contract terms are endogenous, we next check the validity 
of the IVs (by regressing the instrumented variable on IVs) and replace the OLS (Probit) model 
with a 2SLS (Instrumental Probit) model for IRP (Collateral). To conduct these tests, we use 
two IVs: the Euribor rate at 12 months for IRP and Project Finance for Collateral. 
We conducted postestimation tests to determine validity of estimations and 
instruments: (1) Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests expand to Wooldridge’s (1995) robust score test 
and robust regression-based test (see Baum, 2006); (2) The F-test, Cragg test, and Stock and 
Yogo (2005) test are conducted for weak identification (H0: IVs are weak; i.e., Corr (x, z) = 0). 
The simultaneous equation system is as follows: 
 
Collaterali=αi+β1IRP̂i+β2Industry Riski+β3Credit Availabilityi+β4Credit score (AAA:BB)i+ 
β5Credit score (BB‐)i+β6Credit score(B+:B‐)i+β7Credit Score(CCCC:Ci) 
+β8Ex‐PostDefaulti+β9Loan Sizei+β10Loan Maturityi+β11Wi+εi    (Eq.1) 
 
IRPi=αi+β1Collateral̂ i+β2Industry Riski+β3Credit Availabilityi+β4Credit score (AAA:BB)i 
+β5Credit score (BB‐)i+β6Credit score(B+:B‐)i+β7Credit Score(CCCC:Ci) 
                                                          
10 Because Portuguese financial institutions must report data to the CRC, they can also consult information 
about current and prospective borrowers. Therefore, no financial institutions grant credit to any borrower 
that, at the time of loan negotiation, has any credit overdue or has defaulted in the six months previous 
according the reports of the CRC.  
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+β8Ex‐PostDefaulti+β9Loan Sizei+β10Loan Maturityi+β11Wi+εi    (Eq.2) 
 
where IRP̂i and Collateral̂ i are the fitted values obtained in the first step; Wi is the vector of 
control variables, and εi is the error term uncorrelated with the endogenous and instrumental 
variable. 
 
Han et al. (2009) developed their model based on the amount of collateral pledged by 
the borrower. However, empirically most studies employ a binary variable, which implies that 
the model can only tested indirectly. To overcome this data limitation, our unique data set 
allows us to use both: Collateral as a binary variable and Collateralization as a continuous 
variable measured by the collateral-to-loan ratio (%). To examine these issues, we regress 
Collateralization in the same set of explanatory variables used in eq. (1). When the variable 
Collateralization contains a cluster of zeros (which might lead OLS estimators to provide biased 
and inconsistent estimators; Menkhoff et al., 2006), we rely on the censored regression model 
(Tobit), which is an extension of the probit model (e.g., Elsas and Krahenen, 2000; Lehman and 
Neuberger, 2001; Hanley, 2002; Menkhoff et al., 2006). With this method (for censored 
samples11), the regressand (collateral-to-loan ratio) divides the firms in two groups: one 
consisting of firms about which we have information on the regressor as well the regressand 
and another consisting of firms about which we have information on only the regressor and not 
the regressand12. 
 
To validate the potential endogeneity between IRP and Collateralization, we follow the 
steps described for eq. (2) and (3). If we do not accept the exogeneity between these variables, 
we must use an instrumental Tobit estimator:  
 
Collateralizationi=αi+β1IRP̂i+β2Industry Riski+β3Credit Availabilityi+β4Credit score (AAA:BB)i 
+β5Credit score (BB‐)i+β6Credit score(B+:B‐)i+β7Credit Score(CCCC:Ci) 
+β8Ex‐PostDefaulti+β9Loan Sizei+β10Loan Maturityi+β11Wi+εi    (Eq.3) 
 
                                                          
11 For an extensive overview on censored samples, see Gujarati (2010) and Green (2003). 
12 Hanedar et al. (2014) argue that the Tobit could be restrictive if the data-generating process determines 
both the binary and continuous dependent variables. Therefore, if the bank assumes that the first decision 
is to require (or not require) collateral on a loan contract and then decides the amount of collateral, using 
a two-part model (as a truncated regression model) seems more appropriate theoretically than using a 
single Tobit model. Nonetheless, because in this study we aim to examine the level of Collateralization 
in the context of SBSS theoretical predictions rather than to analyze the collateralization steps, we may 
assume that the cluster of zeros represent a corner solution and not a cluster that should be dropped for 




where IRP̂i is the fitted value of the loan interest rate premium percentage obtained in the first 
step; Wi is the vector of control variables, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term uncorrelated with endogenous 
and instrumental variable. 
 
1.4. Empirical results 
1.4.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
Descriptive statistics (Table 1.1.) show that 75.3% of loans were collateralized. To 
compare these values with the United States, Han et al. (2009) and Brick and Palia (2007) report 
values of 63.07% and 57.2%, respectively. The sample firms paid a mean rate of 2.889% in IRP. 
The collateralization ratio is 66.3%, across all loans granted by the lender. For only those firms 
that provide collateral, this ratio increases to 88.2% of the loan amount. Appendix 1.1 reports 
the descriptive statistics by Collateral, IRP median, and Collateralization median subsamples. 
Table 1.2 contains the results of the univariate tests for Collateral, IRP, and 
Collateralization variables. For the collateral variable, the results indicate that firms that 
provide collateral paid lower IRPs (2.723% versus 3.390%; p < .01). This result is confirmed by 
the IRP mean variable, which shows that firms that provide collateral paid an IRP lower than 
the median (62% versus 89.8%; p < .01). For the variable Collateralization, the association is 
positive; that is, a higher ratio of collateralization implies a higher IRP (2.775% versus 2.602%; 
p < .01). In addition, firms that provide collateral and are given an IRP above the mean tend to 
belong to riskier industries (collateral: 4.570 versus 4.104; IRP: 4.581 versus 4.314). However, 
when we control for the amount of collateral pledged, we observe an opposite result: Firms 
that pledged more collateral belong to less risky industries (4.394 versus 4.979; p < .01). The 
findings also show that credit is readily available for firms that pay higher IRPs and have a low 
incidence of collateral. Nonetheless, the results show a positive relation between credit 
availability and collateralization ratio. These results only partially support H3, which posits 
that lenders require more collateral (and higher IRP) from borrowers that transfer bad signals. 
Univariate tests also confirm that collateralized loans tend to give firms with higher 
credit scores (Credit Score AAA:BB) an IRP below the median (collateral: 52.9% versus 47.1%; p 
< .01; IRP: 45.8% versus 57.7%; p < .01). Nonetheless, the findings also show that, after the 
decision to provide collateral is made, those firms provide a lower collateral-to-loan ratio 
(51.3% versus 56.7%; p < .01). Furthermore, those firms that have pledged collateral and paid 
IRP below the median are less likely to be in ex post default (collateral: 16.3% versus 26.3%, p 
< .01; IRP: 15.9% versus 21.3%; p<.01). 
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Table 1.2. Univariate Tests (nonparametric)       
This table presents univariate tests for independent variables. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is conducted for continuous variable on mean; a z-test applied to 
binary variables at the median. H0: mean (y = 0) = mean (y = 1). DIFF = mean (y = 1) – mean (y = 0). Median (IRP) = 2.625; Median (Collateralization) = 1. Univariate 
test by Collateralization applied for the subsample of SMEs that provided collateral (i.e., SMEs reporting “Collateral = 1”) 
*** p. < .01. ** p. < .05. * p. < .1 
 
 























IRP 3.390 2.723 -0.667***    2.602 2.775 0.173*** 
Collateral    0.898 0.620 -0.278***    
Observable characteristics       
Industry risk 4.104 4.570 0.466*** 4.314 4.581 0.267*** 4.979 4.394 -0.585*** 
Credit availability 3,317,916 1,167,088 -2,150,827*** 1,309,208 2,056,232 747,024*** 944,452 1,262,275 317,823 





0.458 -0.119*** 0.567 0.513 - 0.055*** 
Credit Score BB- 0.213 0.183 -0.030*** 0.173 0.206 0.033*** 0.177 0.185 0.008 
Credit Score B+:B- 0.274 0.251 -0.023*** 0.221 0.289 0.068*** 0.236 0.257 0.021** 
Credit Score 
CCC:C 
0.041 0.038 -0.003 0.029 0.047 0.018*** 0.020 0.045 0.025*** 
Ex post default 0.263 0.163 -0.100*** 0.159 0.213 0.054*** 0.111 0.185 0.074*** 
Loan Characteristics       
LoanSize 504,839.2 252,973.7 -251,865.6*** 292,238 336,505.2 44,267.2*** 291,759.1 236,391.2 -55,367.96 




However, table 1.2 shows a positive relation between ex post default likelihood and collateral-
to-loan ratio (18.5% versus 11.1%; p < .01). These results only partially support H1, which posits 
that less risky borrowers choose a contract with collateral in return for lower IRP. When we 
look for the collateral-to-loan ratio, we find that less (more) risky borrowers with collateralized 
loans provide a lower (higher) amount of collateral. In contrast to Han et al. (2009), we find 
that collateralized loans and loans granted with lower interest rate premium in our sample 
tended to belong to firms that received less credit (i.e., lower LoanSize, p < .01), so we must 
reject H2 (we examine this finding further in the context of SBSS model). However, in summary, 
the univariate tests confirm that collateralized loans are associated with higher maturities (p 
< .01). 
The correlation matrix reveals a negative correlation (p < .01) of collateral (and 
collateralization) with IRP. Both private information and observed signals influence the loan 
price terms. Moreover, the correlation values for the independent variables are less than .5, 
which indicates that multicollinearity was not a problem (Gujarati and Porter, 2010), as 
confirmed by the variance inflation factors (these results are available upon request)). 
 
1.4.2. Validity of IVs 
To establish a benchmark to evaluate simultaneous equation system results, Appendix 
1.2. (Appendix 1.3.) reports the single probit estimator (OLS estimator) for Collateral (IRP) on 
all exogenous variables, including the possibility of an IRP (Collateral) endogenous variable, 
plus the residuals of IRP (Collateral) obtained in the first step. For all single estimations, the 
residual t-statistics (of IRP and Collateral) indicate significance (p < .01), rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the contract terms are exogenous. The significance of Durbin and Wu-Hausman 
tests (p < .01) confirms that both IRP and Collateral are endogenous. Thus, the simultaneous 
equation system may provide more consistent results. The right-hand column [i.e., right-hand 
specification] of Appendix 1.2. (Appendix 1.3.) checks the validity of Project Finance (Euribor) 
as an IV of Collateral (IRP).The results report coefficients statistically significant at 1%, 
indicating that they are good IVs (Ono and Uesugi, 2009). 
Although loan size and loan maturity are potentially endogenous, the number of 
endogenous variables the model can handle is constrained by the difficulties of conceiving of 
instruments for loan maturity and loan size that would not also be related to Loan Interest Rate 
Premium and/or Collateral variables (Brick and Palia, 2007). To address this difficulty in our 
data set, we rely on Brick and Palia’s (2007) suggestion; that is, the results do not change 
significantly when the LoanMaturity and LoanSize are moved into and out of the test of the 
SBSS model. 
 
1.4.1. Probability of collateralization 
The SBSS model tests feature of the full sample, including companies that default after 
obtaining the loan, so we use an additional variable to measure asymmetric information 
between the lender and the borrower, namely, ex post default. Therefore, the discussion of 
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the empirical results focuses on this model, as shown in table 1.3. The results in the first 
specification of table 1.3 present the basic model, the second specification controls for the 
macroeconomic variables, and other three models control for transaction effects with loan size 
(LoanSize1q, LoanSize3q, LoanSize4q; specification [3]; Ln(LoanSize+1) and INTER1; 
specification [4]) and loan size dummies and their interactions (INTER2, INTER4, and INTER 5; 
specification [5]) with ex post default, the key determinant of the SBSS model. 
The results confirm the SBOR model: higher IRP is associated with a higher probability 
of collateralization (p < .01), and borrowers that belong to less risky industries or are less 
financially distressed (p < .01) benefit from a low incidence of collateral. These results are 
consistent with Han et al. (2009), who show that lenders more often request collateral from 
firms that report past delinquency episodes, and thus provide observable signals that they are 
bad. Furthermore, because Portugal has low credit protection (e.g., Bonfim et al. 2012) at the 
time of loan origination, collateral requirements will directly reflect a bank’s ability to realize 
assets upon default. As a consequence, banks’ adjustments can reduce, but not fully eliminate, 
the effect of the bankruptcy code on default outcomes. 
Regarding credit score variables, the results indicate a positive coefficient (p < .01) of 
the highest credit score category included in the model (i.e., Credit Score AAA:BB), in line with 
the SBPI model. When we include ex post default, we uncover negative coefficients (p < .01) 
in all specifications, as predicted by SBSS. In other words, borrowers of good quality - 
information that is known only imperfectly by the lender before the loan contract—provide 
collateral to signal their creditworthiness (Bester, 1985). In exchange, they benefit from lower 
IRP, in support of H1. Moreover, ex post defaulted firms opt not to provide collateral, to reduce 
the risk that they must surrender their assets to the lender in the event they default. These 
results provide empirical support for the SBSS model and H1 and H3. However, the positive 
coefficients (p < .1) for INTER1 (specification [4]) and INTER5 (specification [5]) reveal that for 
nonobserved low-risk borrowers, the lender requests more collateral to grant large amounts of 
credit, as predicted by the SBOR model (demand-side collateral). Han et al. (2009) report a 
positive coefficient for interactions of loan size and the high loan size band with the profit 
variable (proxy for nonobserved low-risk borrowers), but their results are not statistically 
significant. 
Consistent with univariate tests, the coefficients of Ln(LoanSize+1), loan size3Q, and 
loan size4Q are negative and statistically significant (p < .01), which contradicts H2. 
Apparently, larger loans are assigned to observably good borrowers. Moreover, long-term loans 
tend to be collateralized more than short-term loans. These combined results indicate that the 
specific terms of any particular loan can be modified to reflect the borrower’s actual 
creditworthiness, as predicted by the SBSS model. The results remain unchanged for the other 
variables (i.e., GDPpc+1 and financial stability; p < .01). For example, for periods of recession 




1.4.2. Interest rate premium  
Unlike Han et al. (2009), we adopt the method employed by Godlewski and Weill (2011) 
such that our analysis includes the incidence of collateralization as key variable to explain the 
level of IRP charged by the lender (for the results from the test of the SBSS model for IRP, see 
Table 1.4). On the basis of the Durbin and Wu-Hausman exogeneity results (i.e., both collateral 
and IRP are endogenous), we rely on 2SLS to confirm the influences of both supply - and 
demand-side factors on IRP (Brick and Palia 2007). 
Table 1.4 shows the results: the first specification tests the basic model, the second 
specification controls for the macroeconomic variables, and the last three specifications control 
for transaction effects between loan size (i.e., LoanSize1q, LoanSize3q, and LoanSize4q), loan 
size dummies, and the interactions with the ex post default variable (i.e., INTER1, INTER2, 
INTER4, and INTER5).  
We find a negative coefficient for the collateral variable in all IRP specifications (p < 
.01), which contradicts the findings reported in Table 1.3 but matches the adverse selection 
hypothesis (Godlewski and Weill, 2011; Arouri et al, 2014). Overall, collateral appears to 
represent an important informative device prior to the negotiation of the IRP. At the moment 
borrowers offer collateral, the lender interprets it as a commitment gesture that the lender 
weights when it negotiates the IRP. Subsequently, borrowers benefit from a discounted interest 
rate premium. Furthermore, the positive (negative) coefficient of Industry Risk (Credit 
Availability) (p < .01) confirms that lenders weight observable information about the borrower 
to determine the interest rate offered, requiring higher IRP from observed riskier borrowers, 
in line with H3. The negative (positive) coefficient of the Credit Score AAA:BB (Credit Score 
CCC:C) variable confirms that borrowers with high (low) credit scores may choose contracts 
with more (less) collateral and lower (higher) IRP, in line with H1. The positive coefficient for 
ex post default (p < .05 in specification [2] and [3]) confirms that unobservable high-risk 
borrowers choose contracts with no collateral in exchange for a higher IRP, as predicted by H1. 
Thus, these results emphasize the role of private information in reducing IRP for good 
borrowers. Han et al. (2009) report that larger and older firms with experienced owners 
exchange collateral for lower interest rate premium. The negative coefficient of 
Ln(LoanSize+1), LoanSize3Q, and LoanSize4Q (p < .01) rejects H2 and suggests that larger loans 
are assigned to observably good borrowers. Nevertheless, the positive coefficient of 
Ln(LoanMaturity+1) (p < .01) suggests that as the maturity of the loan increases, borrowers pay 
higher IRP to receive these long-term loans, reflecting MH considerations. The results for the 
variables GDPpc+1 and financial stability (p < .01) confirm previous results; that is, during 
recession periods, banks also charge more collateral as well as a high IRP on loans granted.
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Table 1.3. –Simultaneous System Estimations for Collateral - SBSS model 
 
This table reports the IV Probit estimations for Collateral based on the SBSS model, including proxies 
for both observable characteristics and private information. The fitted values of the instrumented 
variable IRP was obtained from the first step equation using Euribor as the IV. Standard errors are 
reported between brackets.*** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
Second stage - IV Probit Regression 
Dependent variable: Collateral; Instrumented variable: IRP; IV: Euribor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IRP (fitted values) 0.195*** 0.167*** 0.163*** 0.166*** 0.161*** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Observed Characteristics     
Industry risk 0.068*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ln(Credit availability+1) -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.038*** -0.048*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Private Information      
Credit Score AAA:BB 0.134*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Credit Score BB- 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.053 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Credit Score CCC:C -0.052 -0.028 -0.025 -0.032 -0.031 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Ex post default -0.117*** -0.084** -0.078** -0.536** -0.132** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.259) (0.067) 
Other Variables      
Ln(LoanSize+1) -0.085*** -0.081***  -0.089***  
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.013)  
Ln(LoanMaturity+1) 0.693*** 0.679*** 0.666*** 0.677*** 0.665*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
LoanSize1q   -0.012  -0.014 
   (0.037)  (0.041) 
LoanSize3q   -0.171***  -0.188*** 
   (0.040)  (0.046) 
LoanSize4q   -0.227***  -0.262*** 
   (0.045)  (0.050) 
INTER1    0.040*  
    (0.023)  
INTER2     -0.004 
     (0.088) 
INTER4     0.068 
     (0.095) 
INTER5     0.172* 
     (0.096) 
Ln(GDPpc+1)  -7.191*** -6.614*** -7.165*** -6.552*** 
  (1.333) (1.344) (1.334) (1.346) 
Financial stability  -0.194*** -0.197*** -0.196*** -0.199*** 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Constant -1.202*** 69.248*** 62.947*** 69.093*** 62.367*** 
 (0.190) (13.024) (13.137) (13.031) (13.154) 
Observations 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 
Wald chi squared 3,179.69 3,178.30 3,163.19 3,174.47 3,160.02 
Prob. > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Table 1.4 –Simultaneous System Estimations for IRP - SBSS model 
 
This table reports the 2SLS estimations for IRP based on SBSS model, including proxies for both 
observable characteristics and private information. The fitted values of the instrumented variable 
Collateral were obtained from the first step equation using Project Finance as IV. Standard errors 
are reported between brackets. *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
Second stage – 2SLS 
Dependent variable: IRP; Instrumented variable: Collateral; IV: Project Finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Collateral (fitted values) -3.839*** -4.340*** -4.669*** -4.392*** -4.788*** 
 (0.633) (0.803) (0.906) (0.818) (0.937) 
Observed Characteristics     
Industry risk 0.140*** 0.113*** 0.120*** 0.114*** 0.122*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
Ln(Credit availability+1) -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.097*** -0.086*** -0.099*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
Private Information      
Credit Score AAA:BB -0.208*** -0.187*** -0.175*** -0.186*** -0.170*** 
 (0.038) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.048) 
Credit Score BB- 0.013 0.015 0.020 0.015 0.020 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.050) (0.048) (0.051) 
Credit Score CCC:C 0.264*** 0.287*** 0.291*** 0.281*** 0.279*** 
 (0.078) (0.084) (0.089) (0.085) (0.091) 
Ex post default 0.051 0.081* 0.086* -0.593* -0.079 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.350) (0.091) 
Other Variables      
Ln(LoanSize+1) -0.127*** -0.136***  -0.149***  
 (0.025) (0.028)  (0.031)  
Ln(LoanMaturity+1) 0.716*** 0.808*** 0.871*** 0.818*** 0.896*** 
 (0.152) (0.188) (0.208) (0.191) (0.215) 
LoanSize1q   0.003  -0.012 
   (0.044)  (0.050) 
LoanSize3q   -0.263***  -0.342*** 
   (0.074)  (0.085) 
LoanSize4q   -0.460***  -0.533*** 
   (0.096)  (0.109) 
INTER1    0.060*  
    (0.031)  
INTER2     0.054 
     (0.113) 
INTER4     0.342*** 
     (0.127) 
INTER5     0.338** 
     (0.134) 
Ln(GDPpc+1)  -5.286** -4.986* -5.379** -5.100* 
  (2.476) (2.576) (2.508) (2.639) 
Financial stability  -0.418*** -0.447*** -0.424*** -0.458*** 
  (0.083) (0.091) (0.085) (0.094) 
Constant 5.147*** 57.089** 52.907** 58.140** 54.074** 
 (0.231) (24.393) (25.216) (24.726) (25.834) 
Observations 12666 12666 12666 12666 12666 
F stat 54.41 38.81 29.71 35.00 23.49 





1.5. Robustness Tests 
Han et al.’s (2009) model depends on the amount of collateral the borrower provides, which 
they test using a binary variable that could bias the results (Hanley, 2002). For example, a 
niche market exists for low-quality borrowers that cannot provide collateral, so lenders in that 
market may not demand collateral but instead charge an extremely high IRP, knowing that only 
the worst quality borrowers will opt for this type of loan (Lambrecht, 2009). In addition, the 
role of collateral and the level of collateral provided may not represent identical screening 
devices for SMEs (Menkhoff et al. 2006). To examine these issues in depth, we re-estimated our 
model using a collateralization variable that indicates the collateralized percentage of loans 
granted, according to the bank’s internal evaluation. Because this variable contains a cluster 
of zeros, we apply a Tobit model as an extension of a censored regression model (Hanley, 2002). 
Table 1.5 presents the results for a SBSS model with a collateralized subsample, using a 
censored Tobit approach. The Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests confirm that IRP is endogenously 
determined in the Collateralization model. Thus, we use an instrumental Tobit estimator: 
Euribor is the IV13. In so doing, we obtain four insights. 
First, in contrast to the results provided in the table 1.3, this table shows a (negative) 
nonsignificant relation between IRP and collateralization. This result might suggest that when 
the bank has made the decision to require collateral, the negotiation of the ratio of collateral 
is independent of the IRP charged. Accordingly, this evidence suggests that banks use the 
decision to require collateral rather than the negotiation of collateral-to-loan ratio to signal 
their commitment and manage credit risk (e.g., Hanedar et al 2014, p. 117). Second, lenders 
require a greater degree of collateralization from borrowers operating in high-risk industries 
and a lesser degree for firms that are less financially distressed (Ln(credit availability+1)), in 
line with H3. Third, the positive coefficient of Credit Score AAA:BB (p < .05 or p < .1) supports 
H1. Fourth, Ex post default exhibits a statistically significant (negative) effect (p < .05) in 
specification [4]) only when we include the variable INTER1 in the model. These results suggest 
that when the bank decides it is necessary to collateralize the loan, the value of private 
information in collateral-to-loan ratio negotiation decreases. The other results are unchanged 
compared with our previous findings. 
Overall, observable characteristics appear to offer the most important determinants of 
the degree of collateralization. The provision of collateral thus is regarded as a signal. When 
collateral has been provided, private information has a smaller impact on negotiations of debt 
                                                          
13 Appendix 1.4 establishes a benchmark to evaluate simultaneous equation system results, reporting the 
single Tobit estimator for Collateralization on all exogenous variables, including the possibility of an IRP 
endogenous variable, plus the residuals of IRP obtained in the first step. For all single estimations, the 
residual t-statistics (of IRP and Collateral) indicate significance (p < .01), rejecting the null hypothesis 
that the contract terms are exogenous. The significance of Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests (p < .01) 
confirms that both IRP and Collateral are endogenous.  
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term contracts, confirming that the role of collateral and the level of collateral provided do 
not represent identical screening devices for SMEs (Menkhoff et al. 2006). Regarding loan 
characteristics, our results confirm that more credit reduces the degree of collateralization, 
whereas this degree increases with loan maturity as a means to mitigate MH problems, in 
contrast with H2. We also acknowledge that these findings could suggest that lenders increase 
their screening and monitoring of larger loans, using instruments other than price, and they 
consider increased credit offers viable opportunities for increased payoffs. Moreover, the 
results for the INTER5 variables (p < .05) indicate that for nonobserved high-quality borrowers, 
lenders require high collateralization ratios before they will grant high amounts of credit. 
We also performed postestimations for IV estimators (i.e., Collateral, IRP, and 
Collateralization). Wooldridge’s (1995) robust scores and robust regression-based calculations 
confirm that Collateral and IRP as well as Collateralization and IRP are endogenously 
determined (p < .01) in line with the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests. The F-statistic for the 
significance of IVs (statistically significant at 1% in all specifications) is higher than 10, 
confirming that the IVs are not weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002). Stock and Yogo (2005) tests also 
reject the null hypothesis of weak IVs (for a 10% rejection rate) as we confirm that the Cragg 
and Donald (1993) Minimum Eigenvalue Statistics are higher than the critical value obtained by 
the 2SLS Wald test14. 
                                                          




Table 1.5 –Simultaneous System Estimations for Collateralization - SBSS model 
This table reports the IV Tobit estimations for Collateralization, left censored for the null value 
of the dependent variable) based on SBSS model, including proxies for both observable 
characteristics and private information. The fitted values of the instrumented variable IRP were 
obtained from the first step equation using Euribor as instrumental variable. Standard errors are 
reported between brackets. *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
Second stage - IV Tobit Regression 
Dependent variable: Collateralization; Instrumented variable: IRP; IV: Euribor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IRP (fitted values) -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Observed Characteristics    
Industry risk 0.016*** 0.005* 0.006** 0.005* 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(Credit 
availability+1) 
-0.014*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Private Information      
Credit Score AAA:BB 0.022* 0.024** 0.026** 0.024** 0.026** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Credit Score BB- 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Credit Score CCC:C 0.020 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.030 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ex post default -0.002 0.012 0.013 -0.197** -0.007 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.094) (0.023) 
Other Variables      
Ln(LoanSize+1) -0.059*** -0.056***  -0.059***  
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005)  
Ln(LoanMaturity+1) 0.305*** 0.297*** 0.291*** 0.296*** 0.290*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
LoanSize1q   -0.021*  0.022* 
   (0.012)  (0.013) 
LoanSize3q   -0.069***  -0.052*** 
   (0.014)  (0.015) 
LoanSize4q   -0.171***  -0.161*** 
   (0.015)  (0.016) 
INTER1    0.019**  
    (0.008)  
INTER2     -0.002 
     (0.030) 
INTER4     0.026 
     (0.033) 
INTER5     0.069** 
     (0.033) 
Ln(GDPpc+1)  -2.993*** -2.777*** -2.981*** -2.765*** 
  (0.458) (0.463) (0.458) (0.464) 
Financial stability  -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.079*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant 0.264*** 29.544*** 26.950*** 29.467*** 26.814*** 
 (0.074) (4.463) (4.517) (4.461) (4.518) 
Observations 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 
Left-censored obs. 3,140 3,140 3,140 3,140 3,140 
Wald chi squared 3,505.49 3,605.70 3,574.25 3,611.76 3,581.09 
Prob > chi squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




1.6. Concluding remarks 
Contractual relationships between lenders and borrowers are characterized by agency 
costs due to AS and MH problems. In the presence of asymmetric information, a lender offers a 
loan contract menu that acts as a self-selection mechanism to distinguish good from bad 
borrowers. Han et al. (2009) describe these processes in a SBSS model, which they confirm 
empirically in the U.S. market-based system. We investigate its applicability in Portugal, a 
country characterized by a bank-based system. The findings show that borrowers operating in 
riskier industries and with less credit availability must provide collateral and pay higher IRP to 
obtain a loan, as predict by SBOR (i.e., demand-side argument). Because borrower quality is 
not completely observable by lenders, borrowers with good credit scores willingly offer 
collateral in exchange for lower IRP. In addition, borrowers that know they have a high 
probability of success and strong project returns, such that they are unlikely to default on their 
loan, will pledge collateral in return for lower IRP, as predicted by the SBSS model (i.e., supply-
side argument).  
However, we reject the effects of loan size and loan maturity predicted by SBSS (i.e., 
H2). Instead, our results show that loan size decreases the probability of collateralization and 
IRP, suggesting that larger loans increase the potential payoff for banks and are assigned to 
borrowers with good observable characteristics. As loan maturity increases, in contrast, the 
lender is more likely to demand collateralization and IRP independently, especially if the 
borrower is bad or unobservably good, in line with MH arguments. These results are robust even 
when we control for the degree of collateralization. Furthermore, by examining the 
determinants of the explicit loan price, assuming joint negotiations in debt term contracts (not 
tested by Han et al., 2009), we reveal a substitute effect between collateral and IRP that 
confirms the signaling value of collateral predicted by the SBSS model. Therefore, SBSS sheds 
more light on entrepreneurial debt contracts than does SBOR. 
These findings suggest a caveat for SMEs: If a good borrower cannot signal its 
creditworthiness with observed signals or collateral, it may suffer credit rations. In addition, 
by providing collateral to signal its creditworthiness, the SME incurs important opportunity 
costs, because those assets could be applied to other profitable projects. Additional research 
should consider the role of public and private mutual loan guarantees for SMEs, especially 
during recessions. In fact, another important dimension of the costs of corporate default is the 
losses incurred directly (and indirectly) by banks. The implementation of Basel III reforms 
proposed by the G20 and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision contributed to some 
expansion of the literature on recovery rates and loss given default. Indeed, Basel III represents 
a crucial step in strengthening the capital rules underlying banking operations, aimed at 
reducing the probability and severity of a systemic crisis (e.g., Bruche and González-Aguado, 
2010; Bastos 2010). With this study we highlight the need to use instruments to increase the 
information shared among borrowers, lenders, and the market, if the goal is to reduce loan 
costs (i.e., collateral requirements and IRP), especially for good borrowers. Our results also 
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confirm that collateral is a substitute for loan spreads. Thus, it would be worthwhile to test 
the role of relationship lending between lenders and borrowers in the context of the SBSS 
model. 
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Appendix 1.1. Descriptive statistics by subsample 
This table reports the descriptive statistics by subsample: Collateral=0 vs. Collateral=1 
 Collateral = 0 Collateral = 1 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Observable Characteristics 
Industry risk 3,140 4.10 1.80 0.05 7.08 9,526 4.57 1.87 0.05 7.08 
Credit availability 3,140 3,317,916.00 12,900,000.00 0.00 185,000,000.00 9,526 1,167,088.00 6,362,571.00 0.00 177,000,000.00 
Private Information 
Credit Score AAA:BB 3,140 0.47 0.50 0 1 9,526 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Credit Score BB- 3,140 0.21 0.41 0 1 9,526 0.18 0 0 1 
Credit Score B+:B- 3,140 0.27 0.45 0 1 9,526 0.25 0 0 1 
Credit Score CCC:C 3,140 0.04 0.20 0 1 9,526 0.04 0 0 1 
Ex-post default 3,140 0.26 0.44 0 1 9,526 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Loan Characteristics 
LoanSize 3,140 504,839.20 2,573,771.00 5000.00 67,000,000.00 9,526 252,973.70 1,275,651.00 5,000.00 65,000,000.00 
LoanMaturity 3,140 29.29 39.72 1 336.00 9,526 48.91 23.33 1 240.00 
LoanSize1Q 3,140 0.29 0.45 0 1 9,526 0.37 0.48 0 1 
LoanSize2Q 3,140 0.21 0.41 0 1 9,526 0.24 0.43 0 1 
LoanSize3Q 3,140 0.26 0.44 0 1 9,526 0.18 0.38 0 1 
LoanSize4Q 3,140 0.24 0.43 0 1 9,526 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Macroeconomic Conditions 
GDPpc 3,140 17,489.45 233.16 17,186.06 17,742.67 9,526 17,398.58 197.67 17,186.06 17,742.67 
Financial Stability 3,140 0.21 0.41 0 1 9,526 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Interaction effect 
INTER1 3,140 2.90 4.92 0 17.57 9,526 1.82 4.16 0 16.81 
INTER2 3,140 0.09 0.28 0 1 9,526 0.05 0.22 0 1 
INTER3 3,140 0.06 0.24 0 1 9,526 0.04 0.20 0 1 
INTER4 3,140 0.07 0.25 0 1 9,526 0.03 0.18 0 1 
INTER5 3,140 0.05 0.22 0 1 9,526 0.04 0.19 0 1 
IVs 
Project finance 3,140 0.03 0.16 0 1 9,526 0.10 0.31 0 1 









Appendix 1.1. Descriptive statistics by subsample (Continuation) 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics by subsample: IRPi < Median (IRP) vs. IRPi≥ Median (IRP) 
 IRP < Median (i.e., <2.625) IRP ≥ Median (i.e.,≥2.625) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Observable Characteristics 
Industry risk 6,035 4.31 1.77 0.05 7.08 6,631 4.58 1.94 0.05 7.08 
Credit availability 6,035 1,309,208.00 6,924,989.00 0 185,000,000.00 6,631 2,056,232.00 9,723,562.00 0 177,000,000.00 
Private Information 
Credit Score AAA:BB 6,035 0.58 0.50 0 1 6,631 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Credit Score BB- 6,035 0.17 0.38 0 1 6,631 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Credit Score B+:B- 6,035 0.22 0.41 0 1 6,631 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Credit Score CCC:C 6,035 0.03 0.17 0 1 6,631 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Ex-post default 6,035 0.16 0.37 0 1 6,631 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Loan Characteristics 
LoanSize 6,035 292,238.00 1,566,961.00 5,000.00 67,000,000.00 6,631 336,505.20 1,805,869.00 5,000.00 67,000,000.00 
LoanMaturity 6,035 45.43 26.54 1 324.00 6,631 42.79 31.96 1 336.00 
LoanSize1Q 6,035 0.35 0.48 0 1 6,631 0.35 0.48 0 1 
LoanSize2Q 6,035 0.25 0.43 0 1 6,631 0.22 0.41 0 1 
LoanSize3Q 6,035 0.17 0.38 0 1 6,631 0.22 0.41 0 1 
LoanSize4Q 6,035 0.23 0.42 0 1 6,631 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Macroeconomic Conditions 
GDPpc 6,035 17,398.32 228.72 1,7186.06 17,742.67 6,631 17441.84 190.54 1,7186.06 1,7742.67 
Financial Stability 6,035 0.10 0.30 0 1 6,631 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Interaction effects 
INTER1 6,035 1.78 4.12 0 17.57 6,631 2.37 4.60 0 15.78 
INTER2 6,035 0.05 0.21 0 1 6,631 0.07 0.25 0 1 
INTER3 6,035 0.05 0.22 0 1 6,631 0.04 0.21 0 1 
INTER4 6,035 0.03 0.17 0 1 6,631 0.05 0.23 0 1 
INTER5 6,035 0.03 0.18 0 1 6,631 0.04 0.21 0 1 
IVs 
Project finance 6,035 0.12 0.33 0 1 6,631 0.05 0.22 0 1 




Appendix 1.1. Descriptive statistics by subsample (Cont.) 
This table reports the descriptive statistics by subsample: Collateralizationi < Median (Collateralization) vs. Collateralizationi≥ Median (Collateralization) 
 Collateralization < Median (i.e.,< 1) Collateralization ≥ Median (i.e.,≥ 1) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Observable Characteristics 
Industry risk 5,993 4.52 1.83 0.05 7.08 6,673 4.39 1.89 0.05 7.08 
Credit availability 5,993 2,188,015.00 989,9825.00 0 185,000,000.00 6,673 1,262,275.00 7,011,642.00 0 177,000,000.00 
Private Information 
Credit Score AAA:BB 5,993 0.52 0.50 0 1 6,673 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Credit Score BB- 5,993 0.20 0.40 0 1 6,673 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Credit Score B+:B- 5,993 0.26 0.44 0 1 6,673 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Credit Score CCC:C 5,993 0.03 0.17 0 1 6,673 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Ex-post default 5,993 0.19 0.39 0 1 6,673 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Loan Characteristics 
LoanSize 5,993 403,401.30 2,260,146.00 5,000.00 67,000,000.00 6,673 23,6391.20 928,063.50 5,000.00 30,000,000.00 
LoanMaturity 5,993 38.91 32.67 1 336.00 6,673 48.66 25.53 1 240.00 
LoanSize1Q 5,993 0.36 0.48 0 1 6,673 0.34 0.47 0 1 
LoanSize2Q 5,993 0.22 0.42 0 1 6,673 0.24 0.43 0 1 
LoanSize3Q 5,993 0.18 0.39 0 1 6,673 0.21 0.41 0 1 
LoanSize4Q 5,993 0.24 0.43 0 1 6,673 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Macroeconomic Conditions 
GDPpc 5,993 17,422.04 212.42 17,186.06 17,742.67 6,673 17,420.26 209.18 17,186.06 17,742.67 
Financial Stability 5,993 0.12 0.32 0 1 6,673 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Interaction effects 
INTER1 5,993 2.12 4.42 0 17.57 6,673 2.06 4.36 0 15.89 
INTER2 5,993 0.06 0.24 0 1 6,673 0.05 0.22 0 1 
INTER3 5,993 0.04 0.21 0 1 6,673 0.05 0.22 0 1 
INTER4 5,993 0.04 0.20 0 1 6,673 0.04 0.20 0 1 
INTER5 5,993 0.04 0.20 0 1 6,673 0.04 0.19 0 1 
IVs 
Project finance 5,993 0.09 0.29 0 1 6,673 0.08 0.27 0 1 










Appendix 1.1. Descriptive statistics by subsample (Cont.) 
Descriptive statistics by subsample: Collateralizationi < Median (Collateralization)|Collateral=1 vs. Collateralizationi≥ Median 
(Collateralization)|Collateral=1 
 
Collateralization < Median (i.e.,< 1) 
(subsample Collateral=1) 
Collateralization ≥ Median (i.e.,≥ 1) 
(subsample Collateral=1) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Observable Characteristics 
Industry risk 2,853 4.98 1.76 0.05 7.08 6,673 4.39 1.89 0.05 7.08 
Credit availability 2,853 944,451.80 4,485,276.00 0 102,000,000.00 6,673 126,2275.00 7,011,642.00 0 177,000,000.00 
Private Information 
Credit Score AAA:BB 2,853 0.57 0.50 0 1 6,673 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Credit Score BB- 2,853 0.18 0.38 0 1 6,673 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Credit Score B+:B- 2,853 0.24 0.42 0 1 6,673 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Credit Score CCC:C 2,853 0.02 0.14 0 1 6,673 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Ex post default 2,853 0.11 0.31 0 1 6,673 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Loan Characteristics         
LoanSize 2,853 291,759.10 1,848,691.00 10,000.00 65,000,000.00 6,673 236,391.20 928,063.50 5,000.00 30,000,000.00 
LoanMaturity 2,853 49.51 17.08 4.00 240.00 6,673 48.66 25.53 1 240.00 
LoanSize1Q 2,853 0.43 0.50 0 1 6,673 0.34 0.47 0 1 
LoanSize2Q 2,853 0.23 0.42 0 1 6,673 0.24 0.43 0 1 
LoanSize3Q 2,853 0.10 0.30 0 1 6,673 0.21 0.41 0 1 
LoanSize4Q 2,853 0.23 0.42 0 1 6,673 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Macroeconomic Conditions 
GDPpc 2,853 17,347.85 156.39 17,186.06 17,742.67 6,673 17,420.26 209.18 17,186.06 17,742.67 
Financial Stability 2,853 0.02 0.12 0 1 6,673 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Interaction effects           
INTER1 2,853 1.26 3.59 0 16.81 6,673 2.06 4.36 0 15.89 
INTER2 2,853 0.04 0.20 0 1 6,673 0.05 0.22 0 1 
INTER3 2,853 0.03 0.16 0 1 6,673 0.05 0.22 0 1 
INTER4 2,853 0.01 0.11 0 1 6,673 0.04 0.20 0 1 
INTER5 2,853 0.03 0.17 0 1 6,673 0.04 0.19 0 1 
IVs 
Project finance 2,853 0.17 0.37 0 1 6,673 0.08 0.27 0 1 




Appendix 1.2-Probit estimation for Collateral, Exogeneity test for IRP and Validity of IV for Collateral - 
SBSS model 
This table reports the Probit estimations for Collateral and the exogeneity test for IRP based on SBSS model, 
including proxies for both observable characteristics and private information. The right-hand column 
provides the first stage estimation for the validity of Project Finance as IV for Collateral. Standard errors 
are reported between brackets. Euribor is the IV for Resid_IRP. *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
Probit estimation 
Dependent variable: Collateral 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) IV 
Validity IRP -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.259***  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
Observed Characteristics 
Industry risk 0.102*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.070***  
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
Ln(Credit availability+1) -0.064*** -0.060*** -0.069*** -0.060*** -0.069***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
Private Information  
Credit Score AAA:BB 0.006 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.021  
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)  
Credit Score BB- 0.045 0.041 0.042 0.041 0.042  
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)  
Credit Score CCC:C 0.083 0.102 0.104 0.096 0.095  
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)  
Ex post default -0.064* -0.031 -0.025 -0.578** -0.119*  
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.273) (0.071)  
Other Variables      
Ln(LoanSize+1) -0.098*** -0.092***  -0.102***   
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.014)   
Ln(LoanMaturity+1) 0.690*** 0.668*** 0.655*** 0.666*** 0.653***  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  
LoanSize1q   -0.013  -0.018  
   (0.039)  (0.044)  
LoanSize3q   -0.182***  -0.220***  
   (0.043)  (0.049)  
LoanSize4q   -0.277***  -0.325***  
   (0.047)  (0.052)  
INTER1    0.049**   
    (0.024)   
INTER2     0.015  
     (0.093)  
INTER4     0.161  
     (0.100)  
INTER5     0.237**  
     (0.101)  
Ln(GDPpc+1)  -6.608*** -5.982*** -6.579*** -5.885***  
  (1.436) (1.444) (1.436) (1.445)  
Financial stability  -0.253*** -0.255*** -0.255*** -0.258***  
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)  
Project Finance      0.770*** 
      (0.057) 
Constant 0.547*** 65.216*** 58.305*** 65.048*** 57.377*** 0.632*** 
 (0.129) (14.022) (14.111) (14.023) (14.121) (0.013) 
Observations 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 
Log-likelihood -5,147.79 -5,107.59 -5,110.60 -5,063.29f -5,065.05 -6,983.67 
LR chi-squared 3,890.98 3,971.38 3,965.36 4,059.96 4,056.45 219.22 
Prob > chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.274 0.280 0.280 0.286 0.286 0.020 
Exogeneity test for IRP 
Resid_IRP -0.507*** -0.471*** -0.465*** -0.468*** -0.463***  
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)  
Durbin chi-squared 131.215*** 118.285*** 114.398*** 117.479*** 113.522***  





Appendix 1.3 - OLS estimation for IRP and Exogeneity test for Collateral and Validity of Instrumental 
Variable for IRP - SBSS model 
This table reports the OLS estimations for IRP and the exogeneity test for Collateral based on SBSS model, 
including proxies for both observable characteristics and private information. The right-hand column provides 
the first-stage estimation for the validity of Euribor as IV for IRP. Standard errors are reported between 
brackets. Project Finance is the IV for Resid_Collateral. *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
OLS regression 
Dependent variable: IRP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) IV Validity 
Collateral -0.674*** -0.675*** -0.676*** -0.676*** -0.678***  
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)  
Observed Characteristics 
Industry risk 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.069***  
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
Ln(Credit availability+1) -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.046***  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
Private Information  
Credit Score AAA:BB -0.279*** -0.280*** -0.278*** -0.280*** -0.277***  
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  
Credit Score BB- -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024  
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)  
Credit Score CCC:C 0.297*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.299***  
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)  
Ex post default 0.131*** 0.134*** 0.136*** -0.028 0.048  
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.208) (0.051)  
Other Variables      
Ln(LoanSize+1) -0.024*** -0.026***  -0.028***   
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.010)   
Ln(LoanMaturity+1) -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.042***  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
LoanSize1q   0.009  -0.002  
   (0.027)  (0.030)  
LoanSize3q   -0.024  -0.071**  
   (0.031)  (0.034)  
LoanSize4q   -0.113***  -0.137***  
   (0.033)  (0.036)  
INTER1    0.015   
    (0.018)   
INTER2     0.044  
     (0.068)  
INTER4     0.219***  
     (0.074)  
INTER5     0.125*  
     (0.074)  
Ln(GDPpc+1)  3.407*** 3.620*** 3.414*** 3.706***  
  (1.015) (1.023) (1.015) (1.023)  
Financial stability  -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.156*** -0.159***  
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)  
Ln(Euribor+1)      -0.790*** 
      (0.030) 
       
Constant 4.187*** -29.051*** -31.424*** -29.086*** -32.239*** 3.856*** 
 (0.090) (9.909) (9.995) (9.909) (9.996) (0.038) 
Observations 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 
F stat 174.18 144.50 122.85 132.51 100.52 684.29 
Prob > F-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.110 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.113 0.051 
Adj. R-squared 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.112 0.051 
Exogeneity test for Collateral 
Resid_Collateral 3.18*** 3.67*** 4.00*** 3.73*** 4.12***  
 (0.438) (0.514) (0.549) (0.519) (0.558)  
Durbin chi-squared 52.543*** 51.159*** 53.100*** 51.550*** 54.557***  
Wu-Hausman F-stat 52.372*** 51.006*** 52.941*** 51.398*** 54.400***  
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Appendix 1.4 - Tobit estimation for Collateralization, Exogeneity test for IRP and Validity of IV for 
Collateralization - SBSS model 
This table reports the Censored Tobit estimations for Collateralization and the exogeneity test for IRP based on 
SBSS model, including proxies for both observable characteristics and private information. The right-hand column 
provides the first stage estimation for the validity of Project Finance as IV for Collateralization. Standard errors 
are reported between brackets. Euribor is the IV for Resid_IRP. *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
Tobit estimation 
Dependent variable: Collateralization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) IV Validity 
IRP  -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.088***  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
Observed Characteristics     
Industry risk 0.021*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***  
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
Ln(Credit availability+1) -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.022***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)  
Private Information       
Credit Score AAA,BB -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
Credit Score BB- 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
Credit Score CCC:C 0.046* 0.053** 0.056** 0.051** 0.054**  
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)  
Ex post default 0.011 0.023* 0.025** -0.191** -0.001  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.092) (0.022)  
Other Variables       
Ln(LoanSize+1) -0.059*** -0.056***  -0.060***   
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)   
Ln(LoanMaturity+1) 0.288*** 0.281*** 0.275*** 0.280*** 0.274***  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
LoanSize1q   -0.020*  -0.022*  
   (0.012)  (0.013)  
LoanSize3q   -0.068***  -0.077***  
   (0.013)  (0.015)  
LoanSize4q   -0.176***  -0.189***  
   (0.015)  (0.016)  
INTER1    0.019**   
    (0.008)   
INTER2     0.002  
     (0.030)  
INTER4     0.042  
     (0.033)  
INTER5     0.077**  
     (0.033)  
Ln(GDPpc+1)  -2.553*** -2.320*** -2.544*** -2.304***  
  (0.442) (0.447) (0.442) (0.447)  
Financial stability  -0.085*** -0.089*** -0.086*** -0.090***  
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  
Project Finance      0.170*** 
      (0.017) 
Constant 0.604*** 25.564*** 22.801*** 25.517*** 22.649*** 0.580*** 
 (0.042) (4.319) (4.367) (4.319) (4.368) (0.005) 
Observations 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 12,666 
Left-Censored obs. 3,140 3,140 3,140 3,140 3,140 3,140 
LR chi squared 4,135.82 4,232.32 4,205.92 4,237.78 4,213.66 96.65 
Prob > chi squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R squared 0.185 0.189 0.188 0.190 0.188 0.004 
Log likelihood -9,114.50 -9,066.25 -9,079.45 -9,063.52 -9,075.58 11,134.08 
Exogeneity test for IRP 
 
Resid_IRP -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.072***  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
Durbin Chi-squared 194.678*** 186.663*** 166.157*** 186.618*** 166.153***  
Wu-Hausman F-stat 190.995*** 183.321*** 163.562*** 183.297*** 163.608***  
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Appendix 1.5. Postestimations – Validity of Instrumental Variables 
This table reports the exogeneity tests and the inferences for the validity of instrumental variable(s). *** p 
< .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A      
Dependent Variable: Collateral     
Endogenous Variable: IRP, IV: Euribor     
Robust Exogeneity Tests 
Wooldridge’s (1995) test       
Robust score chi-squared stat 125.867*** 112.804*** 108.530*** 112.015*** 107.571*** 
Robust regression F stat 128.898*** 113.388*** 108.997*** 112.612*** 107.028*** 
Weak Instruments Inference      
F-statistic 850.65*** 839.70*** 843.12*** 839.57*** 840.74*** 
Minimum Eigenvalue statistic 850.65 839.70 843.12 839.57 840.74 
Wald Test (for 10% of rejection rate) 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Panel B      
Dependent Variable: IRP      
Endogenous Variable: Collateral; IV: Project Finance  
Robust Exogeneity Tests 
Wooldridge´s (1995) test       
Robust score chi-squared stat 81.653*** 80.040*** 83.085*** 80.540*** 85.184*** 
Robust regression F stat 86.393*** 84.103*** 87.341*** 84.627*** 89.588*** 
Weak Instruments Inference      
F-statistic 48.24*** 35.37*** 30.88*** 34.66*** 29.92*** 
Minimum Eigenvalue statistic 48.24 35.37 30.88 34.66 29.92 
Wald Test (for 10% of rejection rate) 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Panel C      
Dependent Variable: Collateralization     
Endogenous Variable: IRP, IV: Euribor     
Robust Exogeneity Tests 
Wooldridge’s (1995) test       
Robust score chi-squared stat 181.591*** 174.059*** 156.165 *** 174.468 *** 156.378 *** 
Robust regression F stat 191.460*** 182.215*** 162.902*** 182.567 *** 163.060*** 
Weak Instruments Inference      
F-statistic 1044.88*** 1010.00*** 1005.76*** 1009.79 *** 1003.71*** 
Minimum Eigenvalue statistic 1044.88 1010.00 1005.76 1009.79 1003.71 
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In this study we scrutinize the role of mutual guarantees for Portuguese banks lending 
to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). With data provided by one of the largest 
Portuguese banks, this article provides an initial appraisal of Portuguese mutual guarantee 
schemes (MGS) in response to the recent financial crisis. In particular, the analysis identifies 
the characteristics of the firm accessing mutual guaranteed loans and investigates the impact 
of MGS in loan pricing and on the ex post performance of borrowers. The findings provide 
comprehensive insights, confirming the value of MGS to improve Portuguese loan activity, 
especially for good SMEs operating in stressful contexts, by reducing the costs of borrowing and 
improving the ex post default rate. Mutual guarantees also can improve the loan recovery rate 
and enable banks to meet their commitments to banking regulation and supervision. Finally, 
these effects are especially notable with the combination of third-party guarantees and 
collateral. 
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Este estudo examina o papel das garantias mútuas nos empréstimos concedidos a pequenas e 
médias empresas (PMEs), por parte dos bancos portugueses. Com base em dados fornecidos por 
um dos maiores bancos portugueses, este artigo fornece uma primeira apreciação dos sistemas 
portugueses de Garantia Mútua em resposta à recente crise financeira. Em particular, a análise 
identifica as características das empresas que têm acesso a empréstimos garantidos por este 
sistema e investiga o impacto deste nos preços dos empréstimos bancários bem como sobre o 
desempenho ex post dos mutuários. Os resultados fornecem evidências assinaláveis 
confirmando o valor das garantias mútuas na melhoraria da atividade de empréstimos em 
Portugal, especialmente para as PMEs com boa notação de risco que operam em contextos de 
stress, reduzindo os custos dos empréstimos e reduzindo a taxa de incumprimento ex post. Os 
resultados sugerem que as garantias mútuas podem melhorar a taxa de recuperação de crédito, 
permitindo aos bancos cumprir os seus compromissos perante a regulação e supervisão 
bancárias. Finalmente, os resultados demonstram que estes efeitos são especialmente 
assinaláveis através da combinação entre garantias mútuas e garantias bancárias. 
 
Palavras-Chave: Garantias mútuas públicas, Financiamento às PMEs, Crise Financeira, Rácios 
de capital bancário, garantias bancárias, Incumprimento 




















2.1. Introduction  
Asymmetric information between banks and borrowers leads to significant 
misallocation in credit markets. A lack of information about individual borrowers can prompt 
banks to raise interest rates inefficiently high, such that even worthy borrowers get driven out 
of the credit market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Yet firms with negative net present value 
projects could obtain financial support by taking advantage of the cross-subsidization of 
borrowers with worthy projects (Mankiw, 1986; De Meza and Webb, 1987). In both cases, the 
market fails, because banks cannot assess the actual riskiness of borrowers and are forced to 
offer the same contracts, with varying probabilities of success. When borrowers’ wealth is 
sufficient, banks may bypass information asymmetries by offering a menu of contracts, in which 
collateral requirements act as a sorting device. Risky borrowers self-select, by choosing 
contracts marked by high repayment demands (i.e., high interest rates) and low collateral, 
while safe borrowers choose contracts with high collateral and low repayment demands (Bester, 
1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). 
Providing collateral can lessen the credit rationing that firms face, especially among 
small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Beck et al., 2010; Berger and Udell, 1998). First, it 
decreases lenders’ risk in the event of default (Coco, 2000). Second, collateral rectifies credit 
market imperfections related to adverse problems (Deelen and Molenaar, 2004). Third, it 
reduces the costs of monitoring (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003). However, these features also 
depend on unique characteristics of the individual loan and firm (Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Columba et al., 2010), as well as on the legal procedures available for loan recovery (Zecchini 
and Ventura, 2009). If firms, especially smaller, younger ones, cannot post collateral and also 
have only a short credit history, they cannot meet rigorous reporting requirements, and public 
information about them is scarce (Columba et al., 2010). In this scenario, or when the legal 
system is inadequate to protect creditor rights (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009), SMEs’ access to 
bank credit likely remains restricted, especially during economic downturns, with negative 
effects on industry dynamics, competitiveness, and growth (Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt, 2006). 
In almost an half of countries, loan guaranteed funds have been created to help small 
and micro-enterprises gain access to the credit market (Green, 2003; Gonzàles et al., 2006; 
Beck et al., 2010; Cowling, 2010; Honohan, 2010). Europe has a long tradition diffusing mutual 
guarantee associations (AECM, 2010), and mutual guarantee schemes (MGS) are increasingly 
well developed in South and North America (Oehring, 1997; Riding and Haines, 2001), East Asia 
(Hatekayama et al., 1997), and North Africa (De Gobbi, 2003). These MGS are multilateral 
agreements that allow lenders, guarantors, and borrowers to interact with one another. The 
lenders are generally private financial intermediaries; guarantors may be private or public in 
nature. Both institutions interact to promote loan access for borrowers that typically have been 
underserved by formal credit markets. In this multi-party environment, guarantors facilitate 
borrowers’ access to debt capital by distributing (costly) credit guarantees, which creates 
helpful conditions for firms, in terms of their investment and business activity cycles. The MGS 
appear likely to gain importance in the aftermath of the Basel II (and III) Capital Accords, which 
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note that such guarantees, as long as they comply with certain requirements, can serve to help 
banks mitigate credit risk in their small business lending and thus save regulatory resources 
(SPGM, 2007; Cardone-Riportella et al., 2008). The allocation of mutual guarantees thus has 
gained momentum recently, especially in Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries onset of the international financial sector crisis. In this context, 
MGS represent preferred instruments to extend credit to SMEs, without compromising banks’ 
capital requirements (Uesugi et al., 2010). 
However, whether third-party guarantees are effective instruments to promote lending 
to SMEs remains unclear, in both academic and policy literature. Some articles indicate the 
effectiveness of MGS for providing additional credit (e.g., Boocock and Shariff, 2005; Gale, 
1991; Riding et al., 2007) or decreasing the costs of borrowing (e.g., Zecchini and Ventura, 
2009; Columba et al., 2010). But others argue that their effect on ex post performance is 
ambiguous (e.g., Cowling, 2010; Boschi et al., 2014). Moreover, it is not clear that MGS offer 
perfect substitutes for collateral, considering their distinctive value as signaling instruments 
(Honohan, 2010). Noting this lack of consensus about the efficiency of MGS as instruments to 
promote lending to small firms (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009), we consider the types of 
borrowers covered by a MGS, the relation between mutual guarantees and loan 
collateralization, and the impact of third-party guarantees on loan prices and ex post firm 
performance. With these assessments, we contribute to policy makers and practitioners related 
to the evaluation of credit operations under MGS. 
With data from one of the major commercial banks operating in Portugal, covering 
11,181 loans granted to SMEs (54.61% granted under MGS, 78.52% collateralized by owner or 
business assets) between 2008 and 2010, we provide consistent answers to those questions in a 
scenario marked by economic and financial adversity. During this period, the economy and 
Portugal’s financial market suffered from the international financial crisis, which laid bare the 
structural weaknesses of the nation’s economy and the failures in bank supervision. The 
Portuguese government therefore instituted a set of actions to prevent bank freezes, including 
the exploitation of MGS, in line with recommendations to OECD countries. The events during 
this period greatly deteriorated the credit conditions for small businesses, increasing interest 
in the value of MGS. Some key influences, according to both OECD (2014) and BdP (2010) 
surveys, were the increase of sovereign debt and deep economic recession, which had the 
potential to invoke a crowding out effect on financial markets; the increase of nonperforming 
loans, which may have led to decreased credit activity by nonfinancial firms; and adjustments 
to bank capital ratios, in line with the Basel II (III) Capital Accord, which revealed banking 
supervision failures, such as those related to the bankruptcy of the Banco Privado Português 
and the public bailout of the Banco Português de Negócios (both unlisted on stock exchanges). 
With these analyses, we make several contributions. First, this article provides an initial 
study of Portuguese MGS for SME lending in the context of the financial crisis. Second, the data 
source does not support a panel data analysis, but it provides information about borrowers after 
they received loans, namely, whether they defaulted or not. With this information, we can 
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examine the “effectiveness” of MGS in an adversity setting (Uesugi et al., 2010). Third, we use 
data about the financial institution to control for the effect of the adjusted banking capital 
ratios imposed by the Basel Capital Accord on third-party guarantees. Fourth, we are the first 
testing explicitly the relation between mutual guarantees and (business and personal) 
collateral, such that it helps clarify their potential substitution effect. To the best of our 
knowledge, this assumption has not been tested previously (e.g., Honohan, 2010). 
Therefore, Section 2.2. reviews the relevance of mutual guarantees for SMEs, and 
Section 2.3 characterizes Portuguese MGS specifically. Section 2.4 describes the data, method, 
and variables, followed by Section 2.5, which reports the results, and Section 2.6, which 
contains robustness tests. Section 2.7 summarizes the main conclusions. 
 
2.2. The relevance of mutual guarantees: An overview 
In the past two decades policy tools aimed at providing credit guarantees to SMEs have 
become extremely popular forms of public intervention to promote growth in the private 
sector, in both advanced and emerging economies (Boschi et al., 2014). A survey by the OECD 
(2013) noted that 19 of 23 countries had strengthened or introduced credit guarantee programs 
following the onset of the financial crisis.  
The vast dissemination of MGS is based on the argument that mutual guaranteed loans 
reduce inefficiencies in banking markets for granting loans to SMEs. The MGS can help mitigate 
asymmetric information problems in the credit market for opaque borrowers, because the 
borrowers’ creditworthiness is better known to a well-capitalized guarantor than to a lender 
(Honohan, 2010). With MGS, private information about the firm, beyond what the bank can 
normally see, is easily accessible: if MGS offer its guarantee to a firm they implicitly reveal to 
the bank that private information about the firm is good (Bartoli et al., 2013). That is, banks 
can interpret the MGS as a signal of the good quality of the borrower (Columba et al., 2010; 
Bartoli et al., 2013). Furthermore, MGS may help firms achieve joint responsibility, through 
increased peer monitoring, because members incur a penalty in the case of default by any 
single member (Columba et al., 2010). As a consequence, loan guarantee schemes may 
substitute for loan collateralization (Busetta and Zazzaro, 2012) and help small businesses avoid 
moral hazard or adverse information problems that can lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981). Accordingly, the participation of a third-party in a loan contract may lead to 
reduced interest rates and increased credit availability for previously unfunded but potentially 
profitable projects (e.g., Gale 1990, 1991; Boocock and Shariff, 2005; Riding et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the MGS alleviates some of the financial constraints of undercapitalized banks, 
which tend to miss profitable lending opportunities in uncertain settings (Diamond, 1989), such 
that they can better fund profitable projects. Overall then, the ex post performance of program 
participants should improve. 
However, if MGS receive contributions from government agencies, mutual guarantees 
instead could exacerbate information problems and worsen credit conditions, such that they 
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would reduce the incentives for financial institutions to monitor guarantee users or smooth 
collateral requirements (Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Uesugi et al., 2010). Prior literature also 
provides evidence that managers of firms that have pledged no collateral are less likely to exert 
managerial effort (Boot et al., 1991) and tend to make riskier investments (Stulz and Johnson, 
1985). If the bank loan is granted under MGS, the ex post performance of borrowers thus might 
worsen (de Meza 2002).  
If the firms requesting mutual guarantees are not a random sample but rather represent 
a subsample that particularly needs the certification effect provided by MGS, third-party–
guaranteed loans may attract firms that were rejected by banks (Columba et al., 2010) or 
discouraged borrowers (for a discussion of discouragement, see Kon and Story, 2003). Hence, 
it can be argued that these firms tend to be riskier than average (adverse selection). Honohan 
(2010) thus argues that during credit appraisals, lenders do not see a third-party guarantee as 
a perfect substitute for collateral. Under competitive pressure for bank loans, MGS instead 
might be used inefficiently, in the presence of self-selecting contracts, when borrowers cannot 
provide collateral to signal their information and credit quality. Furthermore, valuable 
collateral can act as a deterrent to moral hazard, reducing the likelihood of default (as is well 
established by theoretical literature; e.g., Besanko and Thakor, 1987a,b). Because MGS also do 
not cover the lender's entire exposure to risk, the bank has little incentive to grant attractively 
priced loans to the borrower (Boschi et al., 2014). Lenders thus may have no real interest in 
replacing collateral with mutual guarantees, because this substitution does not allow them to 
raise the loan’s recovery rate in the case of default (Columba et al., 2010). Alternatively, the 
bank could establish the value of the guarantee offered by the MGS to the borrowing firm, 
which would reduce both the probability of default and the loss given default (Vogel and Adams, 
1997). In this sense, the MGS acts as collateral available to the bank rather than to the borrower 
(Bartoli et al., 2013). If the purpose of mutual guarantees is not to allow the lender to bring an 
otherwise insufficiently secured loan into compliance with regulatory requirements but rather 
to reduce the lender’s risk exposure pre funded projects and the loss due to default for the 
lender, the benefits of MGS, in terms of social welfare, may be minimal (Honohan, 2010).15 
Empirically, Zecchini and Ventura (2009) and Columba et al. (2010) find that small firms 
affiliated with Italian MGS pay less for credit and that banks benefit from the willingness of 
MGS to post collateral, because it implies better screening and monitoring of firms. Boschi et 
al. (2014) caution though that guarantees below 25% of the loan amount are ineffective, 
because the Italian Partial Guarantee Scheme does not allow lenders to require additional 
business collateral or personal commitments against the portion of the loan backed by the fund 
guarantee. These authors therefore advise firms to decline guarantees and avoid the related 
costs if the coverage ratio is below the 25% threshold. By examining the effects of a massive 
                                                          
15 Studying MGS in Malaysia, Boocock and Shariff (2005) find that the requirement for collateral is almost 
compulsory, which suggest the instruments are not substitutes. In such cases, the credit availability 
proved by mutual guarantees may diminish or be null (NERA, 1990). 
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credit guarantee program implemented by the Japanese government from 1998 to 2000, Uesugi 
et al. (2010) show that the ex post performance of participants, with the exception of firms 
with sizable net worth, deteriorated relative to that of their nonparticipating counterparts. 
Furthermore, the availability of loans did not increase for these program participants. Rather, 
major banks frequently used the MGS to replace non-guaranteed loans with guaranteed loans, 
to reduce their exposure to risky assets. 
The cloud of doubt hovering over the actual social welfare of mutual guarantees may 
thicken during financial crises or while the banking market adjusted to the capital requirements 
of the Basel II (III) Capital Accords. Bartoli et al. (2013) study the role of MGS in affecting the 
lending policies undertaken by banks at the peak of the 2007–2009 crisis in Italy. Small firms 
supported by MGS were less likely to experience financial tensions, even at that time of utmost 
financial stress. Furthermore, MGS served a signaling function, beyond the simple provision of 
collateral, so the information provided was significant in enhancing bank–firm relations, 
through scoring and rating systems (for surveys of MGS, see Bosworth et al., 1987; Gudger, 
1998). 
 
2.3. Characteristics of Portuguese mutual guarantee systems 
Mutual guarantee systems first emerged in Portugal in 1992, due to a public initiative 
by the Institute to Support Small and Medium Enterprises and Innovation (IAPMEI). Similar to 
other European Union (EU) countries, where alternative SMEs financing systems already existed 
(e.g., Germany, France, Italy, Spain; Columba et al., 2010; AECM 2010), the Portuguese Society 
of Mutual Guarantees (SPGM)16 was created to implement quality assurance operations and 
other services to SMEs. In 2003, three MGS were introduced, Garval, Lisgarante, and 
Norgarante, which took over all SPGM operations associated with guarantee provisions. In 2007, 
Agrogarante was introduced specifically to support the primary sector. 
In Portugal, three parties are involved in credit guarantee transactions: the small 
business borrower, a financial institution, and (at least) one mutual guarantee society that 
represents the national "reinsurance" fund (i.e., Mutual Counter Guarantee Fund), which itself 
is backed mainly, but not exclusively, by the government, using public funds to cover part of 
the risk of MGS and leverage their ability to support SMEs. Other institutions may participate, 
such as the IAPMEI or Portuguese Institute of Tourism.  
Most guarantee applications are filed by banks or financial institutions on behalf of the 
borrowers, though some firms opt to file the application on their own. In the former case, the 
financial institution may conduct a preliminary screening before actually submitting the 
application to a mutual guarantee society. The society examines the application and makes a 
credit decision, on the basis of the track record of the firm and its shareholders; the conditions 
                                                          
16 The SPGM’s activity is regulated by legal norms listed in the Decreto-Lei nº. 309-A/07 published by 
the Diário da República Portuguesa. 
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for growth for the firm’s activity; the market in which it operates; its financial and economic 
situation; and its direct or indirect relationships with other firms. The maximum amount 
guaranteed to a borrower from the entire system is €1,000,000.00, conditional on a maximum 
of €500,000.00 provided by each society. The mutual guarantee covers 50–75% of bank loans or 
other financial products (e.g., leasing contracts, factoring). For example, for bank loans with 
a maturity of at least three years granted to smaller companies (fewer than 100 employees), 
the ratio could reach 75% of capital, benefiting from a counter-guarantee provided by the 
European Investment Fund (SPGM, 2007). 
If the application is approved and there is an institution available to provide the loan, 
the credit granting process starts immediately (otherwise, the SPGM can collaborate to seek a 
lender). First, to obtain guaranteed loans, SMEs must become shareholders in the SPGM. Their 
share position corresponds to 2% of the issued guarantee they acquire from the promoter or 
from another mutualist (i.e., shareholder), which can be sold at their nominal value to SPGM 
or another firm, after the maturity of the guarantee. The mutualist character of these 
agreements helps support the SMEs and their development on favorable terms. The SMEs are 
not mere customers but also shareholders, which helps ensure strong customization and a real 
emphasis on assessing and meeting their needs. Second, the borrower must pay a guarantee 
commission annually, usually corresponding to minimum of 0.5% and a maximum of 4.5% of the 
outstanding amount of the guarantee, depending on the type of guarantee and the firm’s own 
risk assessment. Third, the SPGM, or a debt collection institution, collects the loan. 
 
2.4. Data, method, and variables 
2.4.1. Data 
We use data from one of the major commercial banks operating in Portugal, gathered 
between January 2008 and December 2010.17 These data represent the Portuguese banking 
environment reasonably well, in that they came from a long-term credit decision period and 
cover most of this large bank’s credit portfolio for different geographical regions. Interviews 
with account managers also revealed that the bank maintains a single general credit policy, 
according to which account managers may approve credit requests below a certain threshold 
on their own; if the credit request surpasses this threshold, the decision occurs at a central 
bank level. The degree of market concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 
was 1303, which indicated a moderately concentrated market (APB 2012: 29, 63).18 
In Portugal, SMEs represent 99.6% of businesses and create 75.2% of private 
employment and 56.4% of trade (BdP, 2013). Accordingly, the data set comprises 11,181 loans 
                                                          
17 We guaranteed this bank confidentiality and anonymity for it and its customers. 
18 Values of this ratio below 1000 suggest little bank concentration, values between 1000 and 1800 indicate 
moderate concentration, and values greater than 1800 imply a highly concentrated market. 
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granted to SMEs.19 Most of the loans were issued in 2010 (43.08%) and 2009 (38.72%), rather 
than 2008 (18.20%). Previous research reveals that loan terms can differ as a function of the 
type of business operation (Berger and Udell, 1998), so we sought to focus on financial loans20 
and excluded unincorporated business, for which the assets are not separate from the owner’s 
(usually classified as households). 
 
2.4.2. Method 
First, we investigate the determinants of the incidence of third-party guarantees. On 
the basis of our literature review and the characteristics of the Portuguese MGS, we consider 
the role of the borrower risk type and the impact of the lender’s capital ratios on the decision 
to grant mutual guaranteed loans (e.g., SPGM, 2007; Cardone-Riportella et al., 2008; Ono et 
al., 2013). To test for the controversial substitution effect between collateral and mutual 
guarantees (Honohan, 2010), we also include the borrower´s collateralization profile, which 
controls for the different types of assets provided to secure the loan. We also control for the 
loan size and sector of activity. By including interactions between risk type variables, we note 
the potential cross-effect between observed risk and private information on mutual guaranteed 
loans. Therefore, we test the following model with a Probit estimator: 
y
i 
= β1borrower risk typei + β2collateralization profilei + β3
lender characteristicsi +  
β4control variablesi + β5 interactions variablesi + εi for i = 1, …, N, (Eq.1) 
where y
i
 is a binary variable (MG) that takes a value of 1 if the firm receives a mutual 
guaranteed loan and 0 otherwise. 
Second, in line with Columba et al. (2010), we examine the effect of MGS on the explicit 
loan price (i.e., interest rate premium). Because the negotiation of the interest rate premium 
may depend on the borrower’s characteristics, we include borrower risk type in this model. We 
also analyze bank loans granted during a period of adjustment (Basel II), so we include the 
lender’s financial characteristics in the model too. We control for loan size and the sector of 
activity. Additionally, we control for the cross-effect between mutual guarantees and collateral 
availability on the loan interest rate premium, because the cost of borrowing frequently 
                                                          
19 We define SMEs in line with the European Commission (2003/361/EC) and the Basel II agreement, as 
firms with fewer than 250 employees and annual business volumes less than €50 million or assets that do 
not exceed €43 million (EC, 2003) 
20 We also exclude loans that are mainly transaction driven (e.g., mortgages, equipment loans, motor 
vehicle loans, loans based on the purchase of fixed assets), because they are typically granted on a 
(business) collateral basis; in asset-based lending of this type (Steijvers and Voordeckers 2009; Berger and 
Udell, 2002), it is frequently mandatory to provide the assets funded by the loan as collateral, 
independent of the observable or private borrower’s information. Including these loans in the sample 




depends on the presence of MGS (Columba et al. 2010) and the collateral pledged (Zecchini and 
Ventura, 2009). The model is: 
y
i
= β1MGi+ β2borrower risk typei+ β3lender characteristicsi+ β4control variablesi 
  + β5interaction effecti+εi for i=1, …, N,  (Eq. 2) 
where y
i
 is the interest rate premium (IRP) charged by the bank, beyond the index (i.e., 
Euribor 12 months). 
When testing for the effect of mutual guarantees (and the interaction effect of mutual 
guarantees and collateralization) on the loan interest rate premium paid, we assume the 
possibility that these variables are jointly determined,21 which may promote endogeneity 
concerns, caused by the correlation between the endogenous variables and the error term. We 
therefore followed the instrumental variables (IV) method proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988) 
and Wooldridge (2010). First, ordinary least squares (OLS) serve to regress the mutual guarantee 
(and collateral variables) as possible endogenous variables on all independent and control 
variables, including IVs, to obtain the reduced form of the residuals (i.e., reduced form 
regression). Second, the OLS estimation expands to the IRP on all exogenous variables, including 
residuals obtained in the first step (e.g., Ono and Uesugi, 2009). If the residual t-statistics are 
not statistically significant, the results do not reject the null hypothesis that the contract terms 
are exogenous. If we find evidence of endogeneity, we perform Durbin (1954) and Wu-Hausman 
(Wu, 1974; Hausman, 1978) tests of the null hypothesis that the MG (Collateral) is exogenous. 
If the contract terms are endogenous, we must replace the OLS model with a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) model for IRP. As checks on the validity of the estimations and instruments, we 
used the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests expanded to Wooldridge’s (1995) robust score and 
robust regression-based tests (see Baum, 2006), as well as the F-test and Cragg and Stock and 
Yogo (2005) test for weak identification (H0: The instrumental variable is weak, such that Corr 
(x, z) = 0). 
Finally, to investigate the socio-economic welfare effect of MGS (Honohan, 2013) we 
explicitly test the outcome of mutual guarantees in terms of the firm’s ex post performance. 
The ex post performance of a borrower likely is linked to its current risk, so we include borrower 
risk type; the model also controls for the loan size and sector of activity. Again, we test the 
cross-effect between mutual guarantees and the incidence of collateral on the ex post 
performance of the firm, thus extending the investigation to its relation.22 We use a Probit 
estimator to test the following model: 
y
i
= β1MGi + β2borrower risk typei + β3interaction effect i+εi for i = 1, …, N. 
(Eq. 3) 
                                                          
21 Brick and Palia (2007) proved that loan interest rate negotiation and collateral requirements are jointly 
determined. See also Columba et al. (2010). 
22 We do not include the lender’s characteristics in this model, because theoretically, bank capital ratios 
should not influence the borrower’s ex post performance. 
88 
 
Because our data set does not include information about the financial performance of 
borrowing firms, we focus on loan performance (Uesugi et al., 2010; Cowling, 2010). That is, y
i
 
is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the borrower does not have any loans in default 
at the time the loan was granted but defaults after obtaining the loan. 
 
2.4.3. Variables  
2.4.3.1. Dependent variables 
The dependent variable MG in Equation 1 is binary; it is equal to 1 if the firm receives 
a mutual guaranteed loan and 0 otherwise. In Equation 2, IRP is the dependent variable, 
reflecting the interest rate premium charged by the bank, beyond the index (i.e., Euribor 12 
months). Default is the dependent variable in Equation 3, and it takes a value of 1 if the 
borrower does not have any loan in default at the time the loan was granted but then defaults 
after obtaining the loan and 0 otherwise (Jiménez et al., 2009). 
2.4.3.2. Independent variables 
The lender and MGS examine the application for mutual guaranteed loans and make 
credit decisions, on the basis of their risk perceptions of the borrower, the market conditions 
in which the firm operates, its financial and economic situation, and the firm’s track record 
(SPGM, 2007). Therefore, to analyze borrowers’ risk type, we rely on industry risk (Han et al., 
2009), financial tension (Bartoli et al., 2013), and credit score (Ono et al., 2013).23 Industry 
risk is the ratio of the defaulted to total loans granted by the average industry.24 Financial 
tension is the ratio between the loan amount approved by the bank to the firm and the total 
credit available in the entire financial system for this firm (as a percentage).25,26 For a given 
loan size, high ratio values indicate relative financial distress for further funding rounds. Credit 
                                                          
23 Age and size are commonly used to measure the informational asymmetries (i.e., opacity) of an SME 
and firm sales or profitability to measure firm risk. However, our data set comprises substantial 
information about the loan granted to a borrower, without much information about the borrower firm 
(such as age and firm size). 
24 Han et al. (2009) use industry profitability and industry risk to predict the incidence of collateral and 
the loan interest rate premium. Industry profitability is measured by industry average pre-tax income to 
total assets, and industry risk is measured by the standard deviation of profitability. 
25 Portuguese law mandates that all institutions report, on a monthly basis to the Banco de Portugal (BdP), 
all loans above 50 euros. This information is maintained in the Central Credit Register (CRC). Thus, when 
granting a new loan, a bank can observe the total amount borrowed from other banks, as well if the 
applicant has any credit overdue. 
26 Bartoli et al. (2013) define Financial tension as binary variable, equal to 1 if in December 2008, the 
firm was using more than 70% of its line of credit granted by the banking system and if in March 2009 (the 
peak of the crisis) it was using more than 80% (i.e., increase of more than 10%). It takes a value of 0 
otherwise. Data limitations prevent us from using this measure, because we do not know the evolution of 
available credit in the banking system for the firm during the maturity of the loan. 
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score is defined by the lender at the time it grants the loan, using an internal ratings–based 
approach. This score combines data about the personal credit history of the small business 
owner with firm financial data, then allows for the definition of three binary credit score 
groups: high credit score equals 1 if the score is classified as AAA to BB; medium credit score 
equals 1 if the score if classified as BB- to B-; and low credit score is 1 for scores of CCC and C. 
Each variable equals 0 otherwise.27  
Academic and empirical literature suggests that a mutual guarantee replaces the need 
to provide collateral, at least to some extent. By legal imposition, MGS limits the percentage 
of the loan that can be secured by a third-party guarantee though. This limitation can make 
mutual guarantees inefficient and unattractive for lenders and borrowers in the absence of 
collateral (Boschi et al., 2014). Furthermore, by posting their own collateral, borrowers provide 
a more credible signal of their creditworthiness and ex post commitment, which deters adverse 
selection (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985) and moral hazard (Boot et al., 1991) and 
thereby reduces the likelihood of default (Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Therefore, posting extra 
collateral should help the borrower access a third-party guaranteed loan. In this framework, if 
collateral is required to receive a mutual guaranteed loan, both the borrower and lender likely 
privilege the use of personal assets, because personal collateral is more effective in limiting 
the borrower’s risk preferences, in that it increases the chances that the borrower will feel any 
losses due to default personally (Mann, 1997a, b; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; Menkhoff et 
al., 2012). Alternatively, the substitution effect might exist for business collateral if mutual 
guarantees promote lending activity even when the firm’s business assets are constrained. To 
test whether posting extra collateral increases access to a mutual guaranteed loan, we use a 
binary variable that equals 1 if the borrower receives a mutual guaranteed loan with extra 
collateral and 0 otherwise (i.e., Collateral). To explicitly test the differences between the 
value of business and personal assets to access banking loans, we use two alternative binary 
variables: Business collateral equals 1 if the borrower has pledged firm assets as collateral, and 
Personal collateral equals 1 if the borrower has pledged personal assets as collateral to receive 
the loan. Each variable equals 0 otherwise.  
To control for adjustments to the bank capital ratios, in line with the Basel II Capital 
Accord, we measured lender characteristics, in the form of Tier 1 and Solvability ratio 
variables. Tier 1 is the ratio of total equity, less revaluation reserves, to risk-based assets; 
Solvability is the ratio of equity to debt. We also control for the loan size and sector of activity. 
To examine the possibility of endogeneity in MG (and interaction effects of MGS and 
collateralization) and the IRP variables in Equation 2, we use Project Finance, a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the loan was granted to finance a project and 0 otherwise (Godlewski and Weill, 
2011) as an IV. 
                                                          
27 The database provided by the bank reports four credit score categories: (1) Credit Score AAA to BB; (2) 
Credit Score BB-; (3) Credit Score B+ to B-; and (4) Credit Score CCC to C. Our objective is to examine 
behavior in the two extreme categories, high and low, so we aggregated the two intermediate levels. 
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The interaction effects among credit score, industry risk, and financial tension in 
Equation 1 seek to control for the relation between mutual guarantees and the firm´s risk. 
Therefore, Inter1 is the interaction between High credit score and Industry Risk; Inter2 is the 
interaction between High credit score and Financial Tension; Inter3 is the interaction between 
Low credit score and Industry Risk; and Inter4 is the interaction between Low credit score and 
Financial Tension. To control the relation between mutual guarantees and IRP (Equation 2) and 
ex post default (Equation 3), we use the variable Inter 5, which reflects the interaction of MG 
and Collateral. With this interaction, we test explicitly for the impact of posting extra 
collateral, as a signal of borrowers’ credit quality, on both loan prices and ex post default.  
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics. The sample comprises 11,181 loans with a 
maximum volume of 65 million euros. Of these loans, 55% were supported by mutual guarantees 
and 79% were collateralized. According to this preliminary finding, collateral posted by 
borrowers is relevant for obtaining a loan in an MGS (Boschi et al., 2014). The sample includes 
5,839 (52.2%) loans classified as high credit scores. Almost 17% of the sample loans experienced 
default, and the mean IRP is 2.89%. The mean of the Tier 1 ratio ranges between 7% and 10%; 
and the solvency ratio ranges between 10% and 15%28, both above the minimum value required 
by the Basel II. The mean value of the loans granted is €251,984. The industry sectors most 
widely represented in the sample are wholesale and retail, repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles (Sector G, 34.5%), and manufacturing (Sector C, 25%). The least represented 
include electricity, gas, steam, hot and cold water, and cold air industries (Sector D, 0.1%), as 
well as artistic activities, entertainment, sports, and recreation (Sector R, 0.5%); service 
activities (Sector S, 0.6%); collection, purification, and distribution of water, sanitation waste 
management, and remediation activities (Sector E, 0.6%); education (Sector P, 0.7%); financial 
and insurance activities (Sector K, 0.8 %); and the extractive industry (Sector B, 1%). 
Table 2.2 contains the results of the nonparametric univariate tests, for MG (Panel A) 
and Default (Panel B). At the mean level, mutual guaranteed loans go to firms that pay lower 
IRP (2.55% vs. 3.3%) and with lower ex post default events (11% vs. 24%). Panel A also shows 
that borrowers with high credit scores tend to receive these loans (59% vs. 44%), according to 
the positive relation between the Industry Risk (Financial Tension) and MG. We find a positive 
relation between mutual guaranteed loans and the incidence of collateral (incidence = 61% in 
nonguaranteed loans, 93% in mutual guaranteed loans). In line with prior literature and Table 
2.1, this result indicates that poorly guaranteed firms do not obtain additional financing if their 
collateral guarantee intensity is too low (e.g., Boschi et al., 2014).  
                                                          
28 For reasons of confidentiality, we do not report the absolute values of these two ratios. This information 
is available upon request. 
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With regard to the type of collateral, the results indicate a negative (positive) link 
between MG and business (personal) collateral. If the borrower is business collateral 
constrained, the lender may require personal collateral to provide (costly) guarantees (93% vs. 
58%). Therefore, the coverage ratio between the guarantee and lending amount is an important 
tool to mitigate moral hazard, such that it serves as a performance bond against post-loan 
managerial shirking and risk-taking activities (Boot and Thakor 1990). In exchange, firms face 
lower loan IRP (2.55% vs. 3.3%) (Gama and Duarte, 2015). 
The results further indicate that, at the mean, the incidence of default is higher for 
non-guaranteed loans, for loans granted to firms operating in riskier industries and with low 
credit scores, and among firms that pay higher loan IRP.  
2.5.2. Determinants of mutual guaranteed loans 
Table 2.3 contains the results for the determinants of mutual guaranteed loans (i.e., 
Equation 1).29 Because we have several collateral and lender characteristics variables, we 
estimate different specifications to avoid multicollinearity. Specification [1] includes only 
borrower risk type variables; specifications [2] and [3] add collateral profile variables, 
Specifications [4] and [5] include lender characteristics but exclude collateral variables, 
Specification [6] features the borrower’s risk profile and all control variables, and 
Specifications [7]–[11] employ the interactions variables, with different combinations of the 
collateral and lender characteristics variables. According to the Probit estimations, firms 
operating in riskier industries (Industry risk p < .01, specification [1], [2], [3] and [5]; p < .05 
specification [4]) and in contexts with higher financial tension are more likely to obtain mutual 
guaranteed loans, regardless of the lender’s preference for firms with high credit score (the 
coefficients are statistically significant in specifications [1]–[5], p < .01). Interaction effects 
(specifications [7]–[11]) confirm that firms operating in riskier sectors and/or with greater 
financial difficulties have the most likely access to mutual guaranteed loans, if and only if the 
bank identifies them as having high credit scores (positive coefficients of Inter 1 are statistically 
significant in all specifications p < .01; positive coefficients of Inter 2 are statistically significant 
at the 1% level in specifications [10] and [11] and the 5% level in specifications [7]; the 
coefficients of Inter 3 and Inter 4 are statistically significant at the 1% level in specifications 
[10]–[11] and [7]–[10], respectively). 
The probability of benefiting from a mutual guaranteed loan thus ranges from 47% to 
55%. A mutual guaranteed loan is more likely for borrowers that provide collateral (p < .01, 
specification [2]). Yet a closer analysis reveals that MG and business collateral are substitutes 
                                                          
29 We isolate Industry risk and Sector variables when the first variable also varies depending on the activity 
sector. Collateralization profile and activity sector are isolated, because the ability to provide collateral 
relates closely to the characteristics of the individual loan and firm (Berger and Udell, 1998) which may 
vary across sectors. Loan size and collateralization profile are also isolated; these variables can be jointly 
determined, and it is very difficult to find a good instrumental variable for the loan size that is not related 
to the incidence of collateral (e.g., Brick and Palia, 2007). 
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(p < .01, specification [3]), whereas MG is a complement to personal collateral (p < .01, 
specification [3]). In line with the univariate tests results, we find that lenders value the 
provision of extra collateral, in the form of personal assets, in their credit decisions, either as 
a deterrent to moral hazard (e.g., Besanko and Thakor 1987) or simply to increase coverage of 
the secured loan.  
Moreover, an increase of bank capital ratios (Tier 1 and Solvability ratio) increases the 
number of loans granted under MGS (p < .01, specifications [4] and [5]). It appears that under 
the new set-up imposed by Basel II, the relevance of MGS increases for Portuguese banks, 
because these schemes, in certain conditions (e.g., Basel II categorizes most MGS as guarantors; 
Gai, 2005; Vallascas, 2005), can help mitigate banks’ SMEs portfolio risks and reduce regulatory 
capital requirements. Furthermore, smaller loans are more likely to attract a mutual guarantee 
(p < .01, specification [6]). Assuming that loan size is a good proxy for firm size (e.g., Columba 
et al., 2010), this result indicates that mutual guarantees actually are used to extend credit to 
smaller firms, which tend to be constrained in their business assets (Menkhoff et al., 2012), 
and to fund previously unfunded, profitable projects (Gale 1990, 1991). Human capital–
intensive activities, such as information and communication (Sector J) or human health (Sector 
Q) sectors, are most likely to benefit from mutual guarantees. Agriculture, animal production, 
or fishing (Sector A),30 financial and insurance activities (Sector K), and real estate (Sector L) 
are the sectors less likely to benefit from them. The results for Specifications [8]–[11] remain 
unchanged, compared with those reported in specifications [2]–[5]. 
                                                          
30 The early development stage of Portuguese MGS in Sector A during the study period might explain this 






Table 2.1. Variables definition and descriptive statistics      
This table presents variables definition and descriptive statistics. The Default variable is based on information available in the Central Credit Register. Industry risk is 
calculated as the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans granted, by industrial sector. Credit Scores are internal scores assigned by the risk department of the bank 
to the loan applicant. The Tier 1 and Solvability ratios are available in the annual report of the financial institution. a See footnote 28. 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables       
MG Equals 1 if borrower receives a mutual guaranteed loan (0,1) 11,181 0.546 0.498 0 1 
IRP Difference between the contractual interest rate for the loan and the prime rate 11,181 2.890 1.145 0.50 13.78 
Default Equals 1 if borrower did not default previously but defaulted after the loan was granted (0,1) 11,181 0.172 0.377 0 1 
Borrower risk type       
Industry risk Ratio of the default loans divided by total loan granted by industry 11,181 4.689 1.803 0.125 7.075 
Financial Tension Ratio between the loan amount approved by the bank to the firm and the total credit available 
in the entire financial system for the firm (%)  
11,181 39.370 27.001 0.024 100 
High credit score Equals 1 if the loan is classified with an internal credit score of AAA to BB (0, 1). 11,181 0.522 0.500 0 1 
Medium credit score Equals 1 if the loan is classified with an internal credit score of BB- to B- (0,1) 11,181 0.444 0.497 0 1 
Low credit score Equals 1 if the loan is classified with an internal credit score of CCC to C (0,1) 11,181 0.033 0.179 0 1 
Collateralization profile       
Collateral Equals 1 if borrower has pledged collateral (0,1) 11,181 0.785 0.411 0 1 
Business collateral Equals 1 if borrower has pledged firm assets as collateral (0,1) 11,181 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Personal collateral Equals 1 if borrower has pledged personal assets as collateral (0,1) 11,181 0.770 0.421 0 1 
Lender characteristics       
Tier 1 Ratio [(total equity – revaluation reserves)/risk-based assets]a 11,181 [7:10] 0.684 [7:10] [7:10] 
Solvability Ratio Ratio (equity/debt) a 11,181 [10:15] 0.686 [10:15
] 
[10:15] 
Interaction variables       
Inter1 [High credit score  Industry Risk] 11,181 2.466 2.689 0 7.075 
Inter2 [High credit score  Financial Tension] 11,181 19.710 26.814 0 100 
Inter3 [Low credit score  Industry Risk] 11,181 0.134 0.800 0 7.075 
Inter4 [Low credit score  Financial Tension] 11,181 1.626 10.103 0 100 
Inter5 [MG  Collateral] 11,181 0.506 0.500 0 1 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics (Continuation)      
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Control variables       
LoanSize Loan amount measured in euros 11,181 251,984.500 1,304,331.000 5,000 65,000,000 
Sector_A Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the agriculture, animal production, or 
fishing industry (0,1) 
11,181 0.017 0.130 0 1 
Sector_B Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the extractive industry (0,1) 11,181 0.010 0.101 0 1 
Sector_C Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the manufacturing industry (0,1) 11,181 0.250 0.433 0 1 
Sector_D Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the electricity, gas, steam, hot and cold 
water, and cold air industry (0,1) 
11,181 0.001 0.025 0 1 
Sector_E Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the collection, purification and distribution 
of water, sanitation waste management and remediation activities (0,1) 
11,181 0.006 0.078 0 1 
Sector_F Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the construction industry (0,1) 11,181 0.129 0.335 0 1 
Sector_G Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the wholesale and retail repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles industry (0,1) 
11,181 0.345 0.475 0 1 
Sector_H Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the transportation and storage industry (0,1) 11,181 0.037 0.189 0 1 
Sector_I Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the lodging, restaurant, and similar 
industries (0,1) 
11,181 0.039 0.194 0 1 
Sector_J Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the information and communication 
activities industry (0,1) 
11,181 0.019 0.135 0 1 
Sector_K Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the financial and insurance activities 
industry (0,1) 
11,181 0.008 0.087 0 1 
Sector_L Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the real estate industry (0,1) 11,181 0.021 0.143 0 1 
Sector_M Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the scientific and technical consultancy 
industry (0,1) 
11,181 0.051 0.220 0 1 
Sector_N Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the administrative and support services 
industry (0,1) 
11,181 0.023 0.151 0 1 
Sector_P Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the education industry (0,1) 11,181 0.007 0.083 0 1 
Sector_Q Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the human health activities and social 
support (0,1) 
11,181 0.026 0.158 0 1 
Sector_R Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the artistic activities, entertainment, sports, 
and recreation (0,1) 
11,181 0.005 0.074 0 1 
Sector_S Equals 1 if borrower belongs to the other service activities industry (0,1) 11,181 0.006 0.075 0 1 
Instrumental Variable       
Project Finance Equals 1 if the loan was granted to finance a project (0,1) 11,181 0.323 0.468 0 1 
95 
 
Table 2.2. Univariate Test (nonparametric) 
This table presents univariate tests for independent variables. MG = 1 if the borrower received a mutual guaranteed 
loan (0,1); IRP = difference between the contractual interest rate for the loan and the prime rate; Default = 1 if 
the borrower did not default previously but defaulted after the loan was granted (0,1).   Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 
is conducted for continuous variable on mean; a z-test applied to binary variables at the median. H0: mean (y = 0) = 
mean (y = 1). DIFF = mean (y = 1). The left-hand column reports the difference in means: Panel A Mean (MG = 0) – 
Mean (MG = 1), and Panel B Mean (Default = 0) – Mean (Default = 1).*** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1.  
Panel A: Mutual Guarantees (MG) 
 
Without Mutual Guarantees 
(N=5,075) 
With Mutual Guarantees (N=6,106) 
Mean Diff  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables          
IRP 3.30 1.31 0.50 13.78 2.55 0.84 0.88 8.00 2.89*** 
Default 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.13*** 
Industry risk 4.33 1.84 0 7.08 4.99 1.71 0 7.08 -0.66*** 
Financial Tension 36.89 27.92 0 100 41.43 26.04 0 100 -4.54*** 
High credit score 0.44 0.50 0 1 0.59 0.49 0 1 -0.15*** 
Low credit score 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.02 0.13 0 1 0.04*** 
Collateral 0.61 0.49 0 1 0.93 0.26 0 1 -0.31*** 
Business collateral 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.12*** 
Personal collateral 0.58 0.49 0 1 0.93 0.26 0 1 -0.34*** 
Tier 1 8.18 0.80 7.00 8.90 8.58 0.51 7.00 8.90 -0.40*** 









265,398.90 5,000 4,830,319 212,295.8*** 
Panel B: Ex post default (Default) 
 Not Defaulted (N=9,262) Defaulted (N=1,919) 
Mean Diff  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variables          
MG 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.23*** 
IRP 2.82 1.08 1 13 3.21 1.35 1 14 -0.40*** 
Industry risk 4.68 1.81 0 7 4.71 1.76 0 7 -0.028 
Financial Tension 39.77 26.55 0 100 37.45 28.99 0 100 2.31*** 
High credit score 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.39*** 





Table 2.3. Mutual Guaranteed Loans 
This panel reports the marginal effects in the Probit estimations for MG. dMG/dx is the discrete 
change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. All industry sectors are controlled but only 
statistically significant sectors are reported: Sector_A = agriculture, animal production, or 
fishing industry; Sector_J = information and communication activities; Sector_K = financial and 
insurance activities; Sector_L = real estate industry; Sector_Q = human health activities and 
social support. Including binary variables for sectors implies the non-inclusion of Industry Risk, 
due to the potential for collinearity. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** p < .01 ** p 
< .05 * p < .1. 
Panel A: Probit Marginal Effects 
Dependent variable: MG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Borrower risk type       
Industry risk 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.012** 0.021***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
Financial tension 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High credit score 0.143*** 0.139*** 0.132*** 0.165*** 0.159*** 0.139*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Low credit score -0.207*** -0.214*** -0.225*** -0.206*** -0.213*** -0.239*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
Collateralization 
profile 
      
Collat ral  0.451***     
  (0.010)     
Business collateral   -0.454***    
   (0.012)    
Personal collateral   0.491***    
   (0.009)    
Lender 
characteristics 
      
Tier 1    0.212***   
    (0.009)   
Solvability      0.190***  




      
Ln(LoanSize+1)      -0.249*** 
      (0.065) 
Sector       
Sector_A      -0.237*** 
      (0.058) 
Sector_J      0.141** 
      (0.066) 
Sector_K      -0.429*** 
      (0.054) 
Sector_L      -0.154*** 
      (0.071) 
Sector_Q      0.117** 
      (0.066) 
Pr(MG) 0.548 0.541 0.536 0.545 0.545 0.545 
Observations 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 
LR chi2 802.89 2,305.61 3,250.51 1,415.50 1,349.68 694.62 
Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




2.5.3. Mutual guaranteed loans and the cost of borrowing  
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report estimations of the effect of mutual guarantees on loan IRP (Equation 
2). Because mutual guarantees, the effect of posting extra collateral (Inter 5), and the cost of 
borrowing (IRP) could be jointly determined, in Table 2.4 we report benchmark estimations to 
evaluate the potential presence of endogeneity among these variables. We first regress the IRP 
on all variables, assuming that MG and Inter 5 (i.e., interaction effect between MG and 
Collateral) are exogenous (Ono and Uesugi, 2009). Then we report endogeneity tests: the 
residual t-statistics of the potential endogenous variables (MG and Inter5) in the first step, as 
well as the Durbin chi-square (Durbin, 1954) and Wu-Hausman F-test (Wu, 1974; Hausman, 
1978). 
 
Table 2.3. Mutual Guaranteed Loans (Cont.) 
This panel reports the marginal effects in the Probit estimations for MG. dMG/dx is the discrete change of the 
dummy variable from 0 to 1. Inter1= [High credit score x Industry Risk]; Inter2=[High credit score x Financial 
Tension]; Inter3=[Low credit score x Industry Risk]; Inter4=[Low credit score x Financial Tension]. Standard errors 
are reported in brackets. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1. 
Panel B: Probit Marginal Effects 
Dependent variable: MG 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Interaction variables      
Inter 1  0.039*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inter 2 0.001** -0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Inter 3 -0.005 0.001 0.006 -0.038*** -0.036*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Inter 4 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Collateralization profile      
Collateral  0.454***    
  (0.008)    
Business collateral   -0.415***   
   (0.010)   
Personal collateral   0.492***   
   (0.008)   
Lender characteristics      
Tier 1    0.276***  
    (0.006)  
Solvability Ratio     0.270*** 
     (0.006) 
Pr(MG) 0.490 0.475 0.465 0.466 0.469 
Observations 12,474 12,474 12,474 12,474 12,474 
LR chi2 663.49 2,642.71 3,715.89 2,969.20 2,800.61 
Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Table 2.4. Mutual Guaranteed Loans and Loan Interest Rate Premium -OLS 
This panel reports the single OLS estimator for IRP on all exogenous variables, including the possible MG (Inter5) 
endogenous variable, plus the residuals of IRP obtained in the first step. Inter 5 = [MG  Collateral]. All industry sectors 
are controlled (Specifications [4] and [8]), but only statistically significant coefficients sectors are reported. Sector_B = 
1 if borrower belongs to the extractive industry (0,1); Sector_E = 1 if borrower belongs to the collection, purification, 
and distribution of water, sanitation waste management and remediation activities (0,1); Sector_K = 1 if borrower 
belongs to the financial and insurance activities industry (0,1), Sector_M = 1 if borrower belongs to the scientific and 
technical consultancy industry (0,1). Including the sector binary variables implies the non-inclusion of Industry Risk, due 
to the potential for collinearity. Residual t-statistics and Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests are reported, to test the 
hypothesis of endogeneity of MG (Inter5) explaining IRP, such that H0: The variable MG (Inter5) is exogenous. Standard 
errors are reported in brackets. *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1. 
 First Stage, Ordinary Least Squares     
Dependent variable: IRP     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MG -0.785*** -0.922*** -0.849*** -0.735***     
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)     
Borrower risk type        
Industry risk 0.102*** 0.008 0.064***  0.096*** 0.007 0.062***  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
Financial tension 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High credit score -0.251*** -0.198*** -0.230*** -0.237*** -0.265*** -0.217*** -0.247*** -0.250*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Low credit score 0.274*** 0.282*** 0.271*** 0.196*** 0.306*** 0.318*** 0.305*** 0.230*** 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) 
Lender characteristics        
Tier 1  0.491***    0.465***   
  (0.017)    (0.017)   
Solvability    0.231***    0.210***  
   (0.017)    (0.017)  
Control variables 
vavaraicharacteristics 
       
Ln(Lo nSize+1)    -0.093***    -0.091*** 
    (0.008)    (0.008) 
Sector         
Sector_B    0.774*    0.736* 
    (0.414)    (0.418) 
Sector_E    0.935**    0.898** 
    (0.422)    (0.425) 
Sector_K    0.794*    0.790* 
    (0.418)    (0.421) 
Sector_M    0.759*    0.717* 
    (0.405)    (0.408) 
Interaction variables         
Inter5     -0.716*** -0.836*** -0.771*** -0.670*** 
     (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant 2.867*** -0.738*** 0.278 3.749*** 2.840*** -0.575*** 0.480** 3.710*** 
 (0.035) (0.131) (0.191) (0.415) (0.035) (0.132) (0.193) (0.419) 
Observations 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 
F 395.13 488.41 366.57 82.23 344.89 424.40 317.27 72.18 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.150 0.208 0.165 0.140 0.134 0.186 0.146 0.125 
Adj. R-squared 0.150 0.207 0.164 0.138 0.133 0.185 0.145 0.123 
Exogeneity tests for MG (Inter5)       
Resid_MG(Inter5) -0.001 0.077 0.037 0.012 0.171*** 0.286*** 0.228*** 0.173*** 
 (0.021) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054) (0.055) (0.052) 
Durbin chi-squared 0.0002 2.393 0.528 0.063 10.694*** 28.458*** 17.431*** 11.181*** 
Wu-Hausman F-stat 0.0003 2.394 0.528 0.063 10.690*** 28.406*** 17.416*** 11.194*** 
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Table 2.5. Mutual Guaranteed Loans and Loan Interest Rate Premium -2SLS    
This panel reports the two-stage least squares for IRP. Project Finance is the instrumental variable for endogenous MG 
(Inter5). Inter 5 = [MG  Collateral]. All industry sectors are controlled (Specifications [4] and [8]) but only statistically 
significant coefficients are reported. Sector_B = 1 if borrower belongs to the extractive industry (0,1); Sector_E = 1 if 
borrower belongs to the collection, purification, and distribution of water, sanitation waste management, and 
remediation activities (0,1); Sector_K = 1 if borrower belongs to the financial and insurance industry (0,1), Sector_M = 
1 if borrower belongs to the scientific and technical consultancy industry (0,1). Including the sector binary variables 
implies the non-inclusion of Industry Risk, due to potential problems of collinearity. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets. *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1. 
 Two-Stage Least Squares     
Dependent variable: IRP     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MG (fitted values) -0.784*** -0.982*** -0.878*** -0.744***     
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.042)     
Borrower risk type        
Industry risk 0.102*** 0.009 0.064***  0.103*** 0.010 0.065***  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)  
Financial tension 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High credit score -0.251*** -0.189*** -0.226*** -0.235*** -0.247*** -0.183*** -0.221*** -0.232*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Low credit score 0.275*** 0.271*** 0.266*** 0.194*** 0.284*** 0.283*** 0.276*** 0.202*** 
 (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) 
Lender characteristics        
Tier 1  0.503***    0.508***   
  (0.019)    (0.019)   
Solvability    0.236***    0.241***  
   (0.018)    (0.019)  
Control variables        
Ln(LoanSize+1)    -0.093***    -0.093*** 
         
Sector_B    0.777*    0.775* 
    (0.414)    (0.418) 
Sector_E    0.937**    0.921** 
    (0.422)    (0.426) 
Sector_K    0.793*    0.770* 
    (0.418)    (0.422) 
Sector_M    0.762*    0.757* 
    (0.405)    (0.409) 
Interaction variables        
Inter5 (fitted 
values) 
    -0.853*** -1.070*** -0.957*** -0.809*** 
     (0.047) (0.049) (0.050) (0.046) 
Constant 2.867*** -0.814*** 0.226 3.752*** 2.860*** -0.859*** 0.158 3.755*** 
 (0.035) (0.140) (0.204) (0.415) (0.035) (0.143) (0.208) (0.420) 
         
Observations 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 
F 177.70 238.79 
 
161.23 39.61 173.63 229.82 156.60 38.78 
Prob.>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 





For the OLS estimations (Equations 1–4), the residual t-statistics in the estimations that 
include the MG variable fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity at a 10% statistical 
significance level. When we interact MG with Collateral (Inter 5), the residual t-statistics reject 
the null hypothesis at a 1% statistical significance level. The Durbin chi-square and Wu-Hausman 
F-test confirm the previous results. With this mixed evidence about the presence of 
endogeneity, we refit the estiamtions using a 2SLS model (Ono and Uesugi, 2009). The IV for 
MG and Inter 5 variables is Project Finance. 
Table 2.5 contains these results; they are very similar to those obtained from OLS. 
Specification [1] includes only the fitted value of MG and the borrower’s risk type; 
Specifications [2] and [3] include the lender characteristics; Specification 4 replaces industry 
risk with sector variables and the loan size (i.e., control variables). Then Specifications [5]–[8] 
follow the same pattern but substitute the fitted value of MG by Inter 5 (fitted value). These 
results broadly confirm that borrowers benefit from a reduction in loan IRP due to a willingness 
to provide MG (negative coefficients in Specifications [1]–[4] are statistically significant, p < 
.01), in line with Zecchini and Ventura (2009) and Columba et al. (2010). This reduction is 
particularly noteworthy if the firm provides extra collateral (negative coefficients of fitted 
values of Inter 5 in Specification [5]–[8] are statistically significant, p < .01). These results are 
partially in line with Boschi et al. (2014): Below a certain level of the third-party guarantee, 
the borrower benefits in terms of its costs when it posts extra collateral. If borrowers offer 
collateral and the loan is mutual guaranteed, the lender interprets it as a good signal while 
also enjoying reduced risk exposure. In turn, these borrowers benefit from a discounted IRP. 
This evidence also confirms Honohan’s (2010) prediction that, in terms of credit decisions, 
lenders do not regard mutual guarantees as a perfect substitute for collateral, despite academic 
predictions that they offer identical signaling value (e.g., Busetta and Zazzaro, 2012). 
Furthermore, the results confirm that firms operating in a stressful context (i.e., riskier 
industries, high financial tension) and those with low credit scores pay higher IRP, while those 
with higher credit scores pay lower IRP (p < .01; Han et al., 2009). The results suggest that 
increasing bank capital ratios (Tier 1 and Solvability ratio) increases loan pricing—a result that 
was expected once the Portuguese banking sector committed to increasing its capital ratios 
and constrained credit provision by increasing IRP (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The negative 
coefficients of LoanSize in Specifications [4] and [8] (p < .01) confirm that large loans relate 
negatively to IRP (Gama and Duarte, 2015). In addition, the extractive industry (Sector B); 
collection, purification, and distribution of water, sanitation waste management and 
remediation activities (Sector E); financial and insurance activities (Sector K); and scientific 
and technical consultancies (Sector M) pay higher IRP for their bank loans.
 
2.5.4. Mutual guaranteed loans and ex post performance 
Table 2.6 reports Probit estimations of the effect of MG and Inter 5 on ex post 
performance loans (Equation 3). The first specification comprises only the MG variable and 
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borrower’s risk variables, the second substitutes industry risk with sector activity variables, 
and then the subsequent specifications follow the previously set pattern by including the 
interaction variable (Inter 5). The negative coefficients of MG and Inter 5 (statistically 
significant in all specifications, p < .01) suggest that mutual guaranteed loans are less likely to 
enter into default. These results confirm that borrowers who benefit from MGS show higher ex 
post performance, in partial contrast with the findings of Ono et al. (2013)31 and in line with 
Bartoli et al. (2013). 
In line with our predictions, firms operating in riskier industries have a higher likelihood 
of default (positive coefficients of industry risk in specifications [1] and [3] are statistically 
significant, p < .01). Yet firms operating in contexts marked by greater financial tension have 
a lower probability of ex post default (positive coefficients of financial tension are statistically 
significant, p < .01 in specifications [1] and [3] and p < .05 in specifications [2] and [5]). As 
expected, borrowers assigned a high (low) credit score entered default less (more) (negative 
[positive] coefficients of high [low] credit score are statistically significant at the 1% [5%] level 
in all specifications). This evidence reinforces the outcomes from Table 2.3, as well as the 
value of public mutual guarantees to provide funds to good firms that simply are operating in 
adverse contexts (i.e., greater financial tension) and thus facing difficulties receiving funds 
(Gale, 1990, 1991).  
However, the lack of a significant effect of loan size on ex post performance does not 
confirm the prediction that large loans tend to be riskier (Leeth and Scott, 1989). Extractive 
(Sector B), manufacturing (Sector C), construction (Sector F), wholesale and retail repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles (Sector G), transportation and storage (Sector H), real estate 
(Sector H), and scientific and technical consultancies (Sector M) are the sectors most likely to 
enter default. 
                                                          
31 Ono el al. (2013) show that the ex post performance of firms that received mutual guaranteed loans, in 
an emergency program, deteriorated more than that of firms that received non-emergency mutual 
guaranteed loans. They do not find such a performance “deterioration” effect when a non-main bank 
extended the emergency mutual guaranteed loans though. 
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Table 2.6. Mutual Guaranteed Loans and Ex Post Performance 
This table reports the marginal effects after Probit estimations for 
MG controlling for interaction effects. dMG/dx is the discrete change 
of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Inter 5 = [MG  Collateralization]. All 
industry sectors are controlled (specifications [2] and [4]) but only 
statistically significant coefficients are reported. Sector_B = 
extractive industry; Sector_C = manufacturing industry; Sector_F = 
construction industry; Sector_G = wholesale and retail repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles industry; Sector_H = transportation and 
storage industry; Sector L = real estate industry; Sector_M = scientific 
and technical consultancy. Including the sector binary variables 
implies the non-inclusion of Industry Risk, due to potential problems 
of collinearity. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** p < .01. 
** p < .05. * p < .1. 
Probit Marginal Effects 
Dependent variable: Default 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MG -0.102*** -0.100***   
 (0.007) (0.007)   
Borrower risk type     
Industry Risk 0.007***  0.007***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  








 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High credit score -0.213*** -0.212*** -0.203*** -0.212*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Low credit score 0.045** 0.036** 0.048** 0.039** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Control variables     
Ln(LoanSize+1)  -0.004  -0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Sector_B  0.360***  0.358*** 
  (0.109)  (0.108) 
Sector_C  0.194***  0.194*** 
  (0.073)  (0.073) 
Sector_F  0.339***  0.336*** 
  (0.090)  (0.089) 
Sector_G  0.158**  0.157** 
  (0.064)  (0.064) 
Sector_H  0.172**  0.172** 
  (0.087)  (0.087) 
Sector_L  0.368***  0.369*** 
  (0.101)  (0.101) 
Sector_M  0.141*  0.140* 
  (0.081)  (0.081) 
Interaction 
variables 
    
Inter 5   -0.101*** -0.099*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Pr(Default) 0.140 0.133 0.139 0.147 
Observations 11,181 11,174 11,181 11,174 
LR chi2 1,251.10 1,514.79 1,252.16 1,516.44 
Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




2.6. Post-estimation and robustness tests 
With post-estimation tests, we check the IRP and MG (and Inter 5) to confirm the results 
of the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests. The F-statistic for Project Finance as an IV (statistically 
significant at 1% in all specifications) is greater than 10, so the IV is not weak (Stock et al., 
2002). The Stock and Yogo (2005) tests also reject the null hypothesis of a weak IV (10% 
rejection rate), after we confirm that the Cragg and Donald (1993) minimum Eigenvalue 
statistics are higher than the critical value obtained in the 2SLS Wald test (see the appendix 
2.1). 
In Appendices 2.2–2.4, we provide the results of a subsample analysis.32 The results 
generally confirm the previously identified relations. Appendix 2.2 contains the results related 
to determinants of mutual guaranteed loans and confirm that third-party guaranteed loans are 
granted mainly to good firms operating in adverse contexts (i.e., risker industries or financial 
tension). These results also confirm the predicted probability of obtaining a mutual guaranteed 
loan (with independent variables at their mean values), such that Prob (MG) is higher for 
collateralized loans (65%) than for non-collateralized loans (17%). Furthermore, borrowers 
classified with a high credit score are more likely to obtain a mutual guaranteed loan (62%) 
than those with low credit scores (45%) when both provide extra collateral.  
The results of the robustness test related to the effect of MG on IRP show that mutual 
guaranteed loans pay lower loan prices, especially for collateralized loans (Appendix 2.3). The 
positive effect of banking capital ratios on loan price is even higher for non-collateralized loans. 
Appendix 2.4. reports on the robustness test for the influence of MG on ex post performance, 
such that this performance improves with mutual credit guarantees, independent of collateral 
requirements. However, the predicted probability of default when the independent variables 
are at their mean (Prob (Default)) is higher for noncollateralized loans (i.e., 22% vs. 12%). 
These results support the thesis that the efficiency of mutual guarantees does not 
exempt loan collateralization. However, they reveal that banks use third-party guarantees to 
extend (cheaper) credit to good firms that are suffering increased exposure to credit rationing. 
Doing so reduces the banks’ risk exposure and losses in the case of default, while increasing 
the ex post performance of the borrowers. These effects are especially noticeable when third-
party guarantees combine with collateral. 
 
2.7. Concluding remarks 
Credit guarantee schemes might emerge for three main reasons. First, the 
informational advantages they provide can help overcome information asymmetries, improve 
borrowers’ access to bank loans, and reduce the costs of borrowing for certain borrowers. 
                                                          
32 The robustness tests do not include the control variables (i.e., loan size and sector activity). These 
results are available on request.  
104 
 
Second, MGS help diversify risk across lenders that exhibit sectorial or geographic 
specialization. Third, MGS can exploit regulatory arbitrage, if they are not subject to the same 
regulatory requirements as the lender (e.g., Beck et al., 2010; Columba et al., 2010). The 
importance of mutual guarantees in Portugal thus has increased, serving as privileged 
instruments to absorb the negative impacts of the international financial crisis of 2008–2009 on 
the banking sector, even as this sector reacts to the Basel II (and III) Accords. 
The many competing pressures for public funds suggests the strong need to evaluate 
the effectiveness of MGS that include the participation of government agencies. To the best of 
our knowledge, this study is the first comprehensive evaluation of the types of loan covered by 
mutual guarantees, the relation between guarantees and extra collateral, and the effectiveness 
of mutual guarantees in terms of reducing borrowing costs and affecting the ex post 
performance of both the firm and the loan.  
With this study, we find that MGS privileges high type borrowers, such that mutual 
guarantees and collateral (broadly measured) are complementary loan tools. However, MG and 
business collateral function more as substitutes, while MG complements personal collateral. 
These results suggest that lenders value the provision of extra collateral in the form of personal 
assets, either as a deterrent to moral hazard or as a means to increase their coverage of a 
secured loan. In light of the Basel II (and III) Accords, MGS allow banks to mitigate their credit 
risk associated to business lending, save regulatory capital, and redub both the probability of 
default and the losses if default occurs. Accordingly, an increase of bank capital ratios increases 
the number of loans granted. The results further confirm that mutual guaranteed loans pay 
lower IRP, especially in the presence of collateralized loans. In contrast with de Meza (2002), 
we find that MGS reduce the probability of ex post default, independent of the collateral 
requirements, though the evidences suggests that this negative relation increases in the 
presence of mutual guaranteed and collateralized loans.  
The comprehensive insights confirm the value of MGS as a tool to improve Portuguese 
banking loan activity, especially for good SMEs operating in stressful contexts, and to reduce 
borrowers’ ex post default, while still enabling banks to adhere to new banking regulations. 
However, efficiency of these mutual guarantees does not exempt borrowers from loan 
collateralization. The intervention of the government in credit guarantee systems thus is 
important for providing additional funds to constrained SMEs but has less relevance for risk 
assessment, screening, and monitoring. In line with Boschi et al. (2014), we assert that it is 
unacceptable to ignore the heterogeneity in guarantees or consider all firms equally. In addition 
to the signaling role of MGS, the pure provision of guarantees is still required, so collateral 
remains virtually compulsory. The obstacles to access bank loans remain for SMEs that cannot 
provide collateral. 
Future investigations should address the impact of MGS using the value of the 
guarantees provided. From a financial stability perspective, the coverage ratio—namely, the 
ratio between the guaranteed and borrowed amount—constitutes an important instrument for 
minimizing risk, by limiting moral hazard problems for both borrowers and lenders (Boschi et 
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al., 2014). Empirical studies of the value of mutual guarantees largely neglect this approach, 
mainly due to data limitations that prevent clear analyses of the financial impact of partial 
versus total coverage ratios on banks’ and firms’ performance. Further research should 
investigate the relation between mutual guarantees and the coverage ratios of business and 
personal collateral. We show that mutual guarantees and collateral are complementary, mainly 
by increasing signals of the borrower’s creditworthiness. Nonetheless we wonder if, once the 
signal exists, borrowers might receive a “discount” on the ratio of collateral required, in the 
presence of a mutual guaranteed loan. 
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Appendix 2.1. Postestimations – Validity of Instrumental Variable    
This table reports the exogeneity tests and the inferences for the validity of instrumental variable(s). *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A         
Dependent Variable IRP 
Endogenous Variable  GM GM GM GM Inter 5 Inter 5 Inter 5 Inter 5 
Instrumental Variable Euribor 
Robust Exogeneity Tests    
Wooldridge’s (1995) test          
Robust score chi-squared stat <0.001 3.377* 0.707 0.083 13.948*** 38.346*** 22.630*** 14.525*** 
Robust regression F stat <0.001 3.376* 0.706 0.083 14.011*** 39.007*** 22.812*** 14.549*** 
Weak Instruments Inference         
F-statistic 3,488.22*** 3,154.88*** 3,184.73*** 3,568.66*** 2,749.48*** 2,464.37*** 2,488.49*** 2,825.77*** 
Minimum Eigenvalue statistic 3,488.22 3,154.88 3,184.73 3,568.66 2,749.48 2,464.37 2,488.49 2,825.77 





Appendix 2.2. Robustness Tests: Mutual Guaranteed Loans  
 
       
This table reports the marginal effects after Probit estimations for MG. dMG/dx is the discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets. *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1 
Probit Marginal Effects        
Dependent variable: MG        
 Collateral=1 Collateral=0 High credit score=1 High credit score=0 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Risk type            
Industry risk 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.023*** 0.027*** -0.003 0.007 0.048*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.131*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
Financial tension 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High credit score 0.136*** 0.156*** 0.152*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.072***       
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)       
Low credit score -0.199*** -0.200*** -0.205*** -0.135*** -0.121*** -0.130***       
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)       
Collateralization profile            
Collateral       0.481***   0.405***   
       (0.015)   (0.013)   
Lender characteristics            
Tier 1  0.172***   0.123***   0.184***   0.244***  
  (0.009)   (0.124)   (0.011)   (0.014)  
Solvability    0.170***   0.090***   0.156***   0.232*** 
   (0.009)   (0.012)   (0.010)   (0.013) 
Pr(MG) 0.651 0.652 0.651 0.172 0.159 0.163 0.621 0.621 0.620 0.454 0.458 0.457 
Observations 8,779 8,779 8,779 2,402 2,402 2,402 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,342 5,342 5,342 
LR chi2 550.59 894.46 916.54 132.92 223.36 187.94 1,108.83 537.29 485.22 901.43 593.10 584.04 
Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.078 0.080 0.058 0.097 0.081 0.143 0.069 0.062 0.122 0.080 0.079 
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Appendix 2.3. Robustness Tests: Mutual Guaranteed Loans and Loan Interest Percentage 
This table reports the OLS and 2SLS for IRP by subsamples. The MG in the 2SLS estimation is the fitted value of MG obtained using Project Finance as the IV. Standard 
errors are reported in brackets. *** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1. 
 Dependent variable: IRP         
 OLS estimations 2SLS estimations 
 Collateral=1 Collateral=0 Collateral=1 Collateral=0 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
MG -1.113*** -1.158*** -1.132*** -0.585*** -0.744*** -0.669*** -1.049*** -1.114*** -1.075*** -0.606*** -0.850*** -0.734*** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.096) (0.100) (0.098) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) 
Risk type             
Industry risk 0.095*** 0.051*** 0.074*** 0.103*** -0.007 0.060*** 0.093*** 0.051*** 0.073*** 0.104*** -0.005 0.061*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Financial 
tension 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High credit 
score 
-0.205*** -0.190*** -0.199*** -0.266*** -0.193*** -0.236*** -0.210*** -0.194*** -0.203*** -0.263*** -0.178*** -0.227*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Low credit 
score 
-0.057 -0.043 -0.054 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.393*** -0.049 -0.038 -0.047 0.395*** 0.380*** 0.380*** 
 (0.100) (0.099) (0.100) (0.067) (0.063) (0.066) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.068) (0.064) (0.067) 
Lender characteristics            
Tier 1  0.159***   0.657***   0.154***   0.675***  
  (0.031)   (0.020)   (0.033)   (0.022)  
Solvability    0.081***   0.319***   0.077***   0.331*** 
   (0.029)   (0.020)   (0.029)   (0.022) 
Constant 3.154*** 2.066*** 2.293*** 2.635*** -2.298*** -1.004*** 3.157*** 2.102*** 2.341*** 2.642*** -2.402*** -1.111*** 
 (0.061) (0.222) (0.310) (0.041) (0.156) (0.233) (0.061) (0.232) (0.318) (0.044) (0.163) (0.247) 
Observations 2,402 2,402 2,402 8,779 8,779 8,779 2,402 2,402 2,402 8,779 8,779 8,779 
F 122.06 107.12 103.35 212.75 376.53 224.36 43.93 38.07 36.87 126.17 255.36 132.84 
Prob.>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.203 0.212 0.206 0.108 0.205 0.133 0.202 0.211 0.205 0.108 0.203 0.132 























Appendix 2.4. Robustness Tests: Mutual Guaranteed 
Loans and Ex Post Performance 
This table reports the marginal effects after Probit 
estimations for MG. dMG/dx is the discrete change of 
dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors are reported 
in brackets.*** p < .01. ** p < .05. * p < .1. 
Probit Marginal Effects 
Dependent variable: Default 
 Collateral =1  Collateral=0 
MG -0.090** -0.077*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Risk type   
Industry risk 0.007*** 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
Financial tension -0.001 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
High credit score -0.179*** -0.294*** 
 (0.008) (0.017) 
Low credit score 0.031** 0.106** 
 (0.020) (0.049) 
Pr(Default) 0.122 0.220 
Observations 8,779 2,402 
LR chi2 812.25 344.24 
Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 







Business Collateral and Personal Collateral in SME Lending: 




Using a database of banking credit approvals for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) operating in less-developed countries throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia, this 
article extends empirical evidences on the determinants of collateral by examining the 
simultaneous determinants of business collateral and personal collateral/commitments. 
Controlling for the level of collateral provided, we report first-hand results regarding the 
impact of the recently reformed credit environment on collateral requirements. We find that 
younger firms use personal collateral as a signal their creditworthiness and commitment to 
access a loan. This signal is interpreted through a gesture of posting personal assets rather than 
through its level. The findings endorse the importance of producing and sharing private 
information to reduce the need to provide collateral. The results also suggest that market 
concentration increases “lazy” behavior of banks, in the form of asking for (personal) collateral 
not to mitigate observable risk but rather to reduce screening efforts. This article rejects the 
hypothesis that lenders privilege business assets as a debt seniority signal for larger loans. The 
results also indicate that reforms pertaining to the depth of information-sharing instruments by 
public credit registries have practical effects on mitigating credit constraints and reducing 
collateral requirements when coupled with public reforms on its coverage. In addition, using a 
continuation ratio model, we uncover several differences in the determinants of the 
collateralization decision and the type and value of the collateral provided. 
 
Keywords: SMEs lending; Personal collateral; Business collateral; Level of personal and business 
collateral; Less-developed countries 
JEL classification: G21; G30; G32; C35; O16 
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Recorrendo a uma base de dados de crédito bancário aprovado para pequenas e médias 
empresas (PMEs) que operam em países menos desenvolvidos em toda a Europa Oriental e da 
Ásia Central, este artigo estende as evidências empíricas sobre os determinantes das garantias 
bancárias examinando simultaneamente os determinantes das garantias bancárias reais e 
pessoais. Controlando a cobertura das garantias bancárias prestadas, este capítulo fornece 
resultados únicos sobre o impacto do ambiente de crédito recentemente sujeito a um conjunto 
de reformas (por exemplo, ao nível dos centros públicos e privados de recolha e partilha de 
informação - DBR, 2010). Concluímos que as empresas jovens usam as garantias pessoais como 
sinal da sua capacidade creditícia e de compromisso para aceder ao crédito bancário. Este 
efeito de sinalização é alcançado através da prestação de ativos pessoais como garantia do 
empréstimo bancário. Os resultados reforçam ainda a importância em recolher e partilhar 
informações privadas sobre os mutuários entre credores, reduzindo deste modo a necessidade 
de prestar garantias bancárias. Sugerem também que o aumento da concentração bancária 
promove um comportamento ocioso dos bancos, que se traduz num aumento das exigências de 
garantias pessoais, não para mitigar o risco, mas sim para reduzir os custos de “screening” e 
monotorização do risco. Os resultados indicam ainda que reformas relativamente à 
“profundidade” dos instrumentos de partilha de informação por parte de registos públicos de 
crédito apenas têm efeitos práticos sobre a atenuação de restrições de crédito e redução das 
exigências de garantias bancárias quando acompanhadas de reformas públicas sobre a sua 
cobertura. Este estudo revela ainda várias diferenças entre os determinantes: da incidência de 
garantias bancárias; do tipo de ativos usados para garantir a obtenção de crédito; e do valor 
da(s) própria(s) garantia(s) prestada(s). 
 
Palavras-Chave: Financiamento às PMEs, Garantias bancárias pessoais; Garantias bancárias 
reais; Nível de garantias bancárias externas e internas; Países menos desenvolvidos 
 




Recent literature shows that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) report not only 
greater financing obstacles than large firms but also that the effects of these constraints are 
stronger for SMEs than they are for large firms (for an overview, see Beck et al., 2005, 2006). 
Both the high transaction costs related to relationship lending and the high risk intrinsic to SME 
lending explain the reluctance of financial institutions to reach out to SMEs (Beck and de la 
Torre, 2007). Therefore, collateralization appears to be a crucial component of a firm’s access 
to external financing, particularly in less-developed countries where the financial environment 
typically involves more opaque information and weak enforcement (Hainz, 2003; Menkhoff et 
al., 2006). For example, Beck et al. (2006), using the World Business Environment Survey, 
examine 12 financing obstacles and report that collateral requirements are the third most 
important. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)–World Bank Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) results for firms in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia show that high collateral requirements are the fourth most important reason firms 
do not apply for external loans. 
Collateral serves as a signaling device for borrower quality, mitigating the lender’s 
adverse selection problem (e.g., Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 
1987a, b; Boot et al., 1991); it lowers the agency costs of debt by preventing the problem of 
asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); it minimizes the underinvestment problem 
(Myers, 1977; see also Stulz and Johnson, 1985); and it reduce ex post risk-shifting behavior, 
thus solving the moral hazard problem (Boot et al., 1991). Therefore, in scenarios with both 
adverse selection and moral hazard, stronger credit protection from collateral leads to better 
credit terms or even credit approval that otherwise would not have been granted. 
In addressing how borrowers’ (un)observed risk is related to collateral requirements, empirical 
research has primarily focused on SMEs operating in developed countries and largely examines 
only a single country (e.g., Leeth and Scott, 1989; Berger and Udell, 1990, 1995; Cowling, 1999; 
Brau, 2002; Jiménez and Saurina, 2004; Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2006; 
Jiménez et al., 2006; Han et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2011a, b). In less-developed 
institutions/countries, however, information asymmetries are more pronounced, and it is often 
difficult for banks to conduct risk assessments; data might be sparse and of limited reliability 
because SMEs’ financial statements are generally not audited (Menkhoff et al., 2012). In 
addition, weak credit information systems, which often exclude the smallest firms, make it 
even more difficult to collect historical credit information on firms. Furthermore, net losses 
following default are high, because in many emerging markets, weaknesses in collateral 
registration, contract enforcement, bankruptcy codes, and the judicial process and collection 
mechanisms limit banks’ ability to recover assets from the enterprise (Doing Business Report 
[DBR] 2010; Hanedar et al., 2014b). Thus, collateral requirements for obtaining a loan increase. 
Entrepreneurial (vs. corporate finance) models (Bolton Committee, 1971) show that small 
businesses are often owned and managed by the same individual; thus, the personal 
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characteristics and wealth of SME owner-managers have a greater influence on firm 
performance than is the case for large companies (e.g., Tirole, 2010). Because the owner’s 
personal wealth cannot be separated entirely from the assets of the business, it frequently 
serves as a means to access bank loans (Ang et al., 1995); thus, the availability of collateral is 
mainly determined by the business owner’s personal wealth. Because small borrowers typically 
lack assets to pledge as collateral (Menkhoff et al., 2012) or tend to be business collateral 
constrained, because the financial system imposes stringent limitations on the range of assets 
the lender can accept to secure the loan (DBR, 2010), borrowers may complement or substitute 
their ability to provide business assets by providing outside (i.e., owner) assets to collateralize 
the loan. 
It is well documented in developed loan markets that SMEs rely on personal and business 
wealth to negotiate the contractual details of lending arrangements (e.g., Voordeckers and 
Steijvers, 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007; Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008; Ono and Uesugi, 2009; 
Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009; Steijvers et al., 2010; Ono et al., 2012; Peltoniemi and Vieru, 
2013; Gama and Duarte, 2015). Empirical research that analyzes the trade-off effect of both 
types of collateral in less-developed loan markets is scant though. To the best of our knowledge, 
to date, only one empirical study (La Porta et al., 2003) has examined the lending process to 
SMEs operating in less-developed countries (Mexico). In this study, the researchers used a 
single-country approach to analyze the determinants of personal guarantees (vs. business 
collateral) rather than the determinants of personal collateral.33 Moreover, due to data 
limitations, no empirical research has employed the level of business and personal collateral 
as a dependent variable to test the robustness of existing findings regarding determinants of 
the incidence of both types of collateral. Instead, prior literature has assumed that the level 
of business and personal collateral should not matter as much as the decision to pledge personal 
and/or business assets as a signaling gesture to collateralize the loan. However, deciding on a 
level of (personal or business) collateral as opposed to deciding whether to take (personal or 
business) collateral is not the same thing (for an extensive overview of the level-of-collateral 
debate, see Hanley, 2002). 
This paper contributes to extant literature in three ways. First, by examining loans 
granted to SMEs operating in less-developed countries (i.e., Eastern Europe and Central Asia), 
we provide unique empirical evidence pertaining to the determinants of both business and 
personal collateral. Simultaneously, we extend the work of Hanedar et al. (2014b), who study 
the same set of countries but remain silent on the issue of joint business and personal collateral. 
Second, we stressed the empirical research regarding the level of business and personal 
collateral extending the methodology of Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006). With an integrated 
                                                          
33 Personal collateral means that collateral is pledged in the form of the owner’s assets. Personal 
guarantees are defined as an owner’s obligation for repayment by a letter of compromise. Thus, in the 
second case, the loan is not collateralized because the lender only relies on the willingness of the 
borrowers to repay. We thank to anonymous referee for this comment. 
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approach, we test whether the binary business and personal collateral outcome variables proxy 
for business and personal collateral levels (Hanley, 2002). Third, we report first-hand results 
on the impact of the recently reformed credit environment on collateral requirements in less-
developed countries (e.g., number of private and public credit bureaus created). The findings 
hold potential value for policy makers in these developing countries for drafting and 
implementing policies that increase access to lending. 
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows: In Section 3.2, we review related 
literature on the determinants of business collateral and personal collateral. In Section 3.3, we 
describe the data, method, and variables. In Section 3.4, we report the results, and in Section 
3.5, we provide robustness tests. We offer some concluding remarks in Section 3.6. 
 
3.2. Determinants of Business Collateral and Personal Collateral 
The provision of collateral can ease conditions of credit rationing that firms face, 
especially SMEs (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1998), through several channels: First, it decreases 
lenders’ risk in the event of default (Coco, 2000); second, it rectifies credit market 
imperfections related to adverse problems (Deelen and Molenaar, 2004); and third, it reduces 
the costs of monitoring in the relationship between borrowers and lenders (Cowling and 
Mitchell, 2003). Because the financial environment in less-developed countries typically 
involves more opaque information and weak enforcement (Hainz, 2003; Menkhoff et al., 2006), 
firms in these countries are more likely to experience difficulties obtaining access to external 
financing due the lack of collateralizable assets (Menkhoff et al., 2006, 2012).  
The majority of theoretical contributions consider “secured” debt, but with a few 
exceptions (e.g., Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Mann, 1997), they do not take into account any 
explicit distinction between personal and business collateral. The economic impact of requiring 
a pledge of personal collateral is different from that requiring a pledge of business collateral 
though. Whereas Chan and Kanatas (1985) postulate that business and personal collateral are 
similar, Mann (1997) argues that the implicit value of personal collateral as a disciplining device 
that limits borrower’s ex post risk behavior is higher than that for business collateral, because 
the principal feels the consequences of any ex post managerial shirking and risk-taking activities 
personally. Moreover, personal collateral can serve as a better signaling instrument: The owner 
of a lower-quality firm cannot afford to imitate the owner of a high-quality firm due to the 
threat of losing personal assets (Brick and Palia, 2007). In addition, personal collateral can be 
viewed as a substitute for equity investment by the owner. In the case of default, the personal 
assets could be sold to repay the loan. Therefore, in a low transparent environment, the use of 
personal assets to access a loan is a more credible signal of quality (and mitigates adverse 
selection problems). A pledge of business collateral also reduces the firm owner’s freedom due 
to the restricted possibility of selling business assets to invest back into new projects (Smith 
and Warner, 1979) or using it to spark consumption (John et al., 2003). In summary, whereas 
moral hazard and adverse selection apply primarily to personal collateral, business collateral 
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is used mainly to reduce conflicts of interest among multiple lenders by providing a priority of 
debt claims (Menkhoff et al., 2012). 
The following subsections outline literature related to the determinants of collateral 
(business and personal) that is in some way also linked to the depth of moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. Considering the broad literature on the topic, we concentrate the analysis 
only on studies that are most related to our data set characteristics, namely, less-developed 
countries (see Appendix 3.1 for an overview of studies on collateral issues covering developed 
and less-developed countries). Transition countries are a relevant sample to study, because 
since 2005, less-developed countries, especially those in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, have 
experienced both strong credit market development and considerable institutional change, 
including the introduction of information-sharing systems and reforms to the collateral concept. 
Historically, many reforms have resulted from recessions or financial crises.  
Empirically, the economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have been among the 
most active reformers in the world, in part to make access to finance easier, which became 
more difficult after the financial crisis of 2008. Since 2005, nearly two-thirds of new credit 
bureaus have been created by these economies, and the coverage of credit information and 
the number of companies using movable assets as collateral have increased dramatically. For 
example, since 2008–2009, any business owner can offer movable assets, such as inventory and 
accounts receivables, as security to generate capital for expansion and influence the value of 
collateral in the credit acquisition process (DBR, 2010). Private-sector credit in less-developed 
countries has increased from 24.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 to 46.5% at the end 
of 2009. The quality of lending, however, has become worse, with the ratio of nonperforming 
loans to total gross loans in banks’ portfolios increasing from 3.3% in 2005 to 7.2% at the end of 
2009 (according to World Bank Data Indicators). Thus, we examine how collateral requirements 
(business and personal) are related to firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and credit 
market environment. 
 
3.2.1. Firm Characteristics 
Researchers have used firm age and firm size extensively as proxies to measure 
information costs in the lending process. The experience of the chief executive officer 
(CEO)/manager explains firm viability and firm credibility (Hanley, 2002; Voordeckers and 
Steijvers, 2006). Older and larger firms and more experienced CEOs/managers are likely to 
have a longer track record and more and better established relationships with lenders (Berger 
and Udell, 1995). Thus, they tend to go through screening processes more easily, which reduces 
the incidence of collateralized loans (e.g., Smith and Warner, 1979; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; 
Leeth and Scott, 1989). If a lender requires collateral, we would expect that older and larger 
firms could use business assets rather than personal assets to secure the loan (e.g., Steijvers 
and Voordeckers, 2009; Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2010) because they have 
developed more credibility and are less asset-constrained than younger/smaller firms. 
121 
 
Another firm characteristic that could influence the use of collateral is ownership 
structure (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). Traditional 
agency models predict that concentrated ownership and owner-managed firms lead to a 
minimum level of (or even zero) agency costs between owners and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This model assumes that firms characterized by 
concentrated ownership are more motivated by and concerned about long-term survival and 
firm reputation (Ang, 1992), which in turn promotes an alignment between the interests of a 
lender and those of a firm as the relationship matures, thus reducing risk (Diamond, 1989). 
Some studies, however, contest the traditional agency view, arguing that agency costs in 
concentrated ownership can be even higher than in firms with fractional ownership due to the 
possible negative effects of self-control and parental altruism with regard to management 
efficiency (e.g., Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). From a collateral point of view, due to the stronger 
social bonds inherent in concentrated ownership, borrowers should be less opposed to offering 
personal collateral than firms characterized by greater shareholder diversification (Voordeckers 
and Steijvers, 2006), because when some or all partners pledge personal collateral, the actions 
of one shareholder can place the wealth and personal assets of all others at risk (Ang et al., 
1995). Thus, when the decision to secure a loan is made to mitigate agency costs, firms 
characterized by concentrated ownership may be more willing to provide personal collateral. 
Observable credit risk is used extensively to explain the stringency of collateral 
requirements, and the literature provides several variables as proxies, such as prior default (or 
overdue on payments) (e.g., Jiménez et al., 2006; Hanedar et al., 2014b) and a track record of 
losses experienced as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism, or arson by firms operating in less-
developed countries (Hanedar et al., 2014b). Firm quality is also measured by the presence of 
international recognition of quality certification (Hanedar et al., 2014a, b). We expect lenders 
to require more stringent collateral requirements from firms with a history of overdue payments 
or a track record of losses due to crime and less stringent requirements for borrowers with 
quality certifications. If there is indeed a positive relationship between observable credit risk 
and incidence (and level) of collateral (e.g., Han et al., 2009), we also expect an increase in 
the incidence (and level) of personal collateral versus business collateral, because the value of 
an owner’s assets is more appropriate to sufficiently discipline a borrower’s behavior. 
Trade credit and the track record of a borrower as a “customer” of financial 
products/services can be used as signaling instruments, mitigating the adverse selection 
problem and decreasing the value of collateral as a screening device. For example, trade credit 
can play an important role in the credit decision process of banks when suppliers have private 
and more accurate information about their customers (Biais and Gollier, 1997), which they can 
in turn convey to the bank when extending credit (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; Gama and 
van Auken, 2014). Similarly, checking/savings accounts and contracted overdrafts, for example, 
might be credible ways for banks to collect private information about firms, which can then be 
shared among themselves. Thus, when the signaling effect of the information shared is strong 
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enough, the risk of lending decreases and the need to provide collateral as a signal device may 
decrease, especially for personal collateral. 
 
3.2.2. Loan characteristics 
The maturity and size of a loan are broadly viewed as determinants of the incidence 
and the degree of collateralization. Much theoretical and empirical literature asserts that loan 
maturity is positively related to collateral requirements (e.g., Leeth and Scott 1989; Boot et 
al. 1991; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000), in that long-term debt 
affords the borrower sufficient opportunity to alter the project in subtle ways or even from 
low-risk to high-risk projects (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Furthermore, the likelihood of an 
adverse event becomes greater when the duration of the loan is longer. In such cases, collateral 
has the power to decrease the ex ante risk assessment of a loan (Voordeckers and Steijvers 
2006). A pledge of collateral (especially personal collateral) is an effective mechanism for the 
creditor to get a guarantee of a certain value in the future: A company may not retain its value 
in the long run, but collateral most likely does (Mann 1997). In contrast, Stulz and Johnson 
(1985) predict that long-term loans rely less on collateral. 
Regarding loan size, a firm taking on more debt theoretically attains a higher level of 
leverage and thus increases its risk of not repaying the loan (Leeth and Scott, 1989; Avery et 
al., 1998). Consequently, banks are likely to ask for more protection in the form of collateral 
(e.g., Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000). Furthermore, because pledging collateral involves 
numerous costs that can only be fully recovered with large loans through economies of scale, 
the likelihood of pledging collateral is greater for larger loans than for smaller loans (e.g., 
Jackson and Kronman, 1979). Empirically, however, there is no consensus regarding the 
relationship between loan size and collateralization. For example, some authors show that 
larger loans are more likely secured (e.g., Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 
2000; Han et al., 2009; Menkhoff et al., 2012; Gama and Duarte, 2015), whereas Boot et al. 
(1991) show the opposite. Because an asset can be pledged only once and its evaluation is 
costly, by asking for collateral, the main bank ensures its loan seniority to other creditors’ 
claims and creates a barrier to entry for other banks (Menkhoff et al., 2012). Thus, the 
hypothetical positive relationship between loan size and collateralization privileges business 
collateral over personal collateral. 
 
3.2.3. Lender market characteristics 
A stream of literature argues that as bank competition increases, a bank’s incentive to 
invest in information collection may decrease, because borrowers may attempt to switch to 
other banks. Thus, in increasingly competitive conditions, a bank’s power to extract rents will 
be reduced, which increases the likelihood of relying on collateral (Besanko and Thakor, 1987 
a,b; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Another theoretical perspective argues that competition may 
induce banks to invest even more in relationship lending (Boot and Thakor, 2000), because 
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client-driven lending helps a bank distinguish itself from competitors. As such, the lender would 
be more likely to relax contractual terms (Berlin and Butler, 2002). Some authors suggest that 
high concentration induces banks to demand (more) collateral because it is used not only to 
solve the adverse selection or moral hazard problems but also to extract rents (Hainz, 2003; 
Hainz et al., 2013). Thus, these views suggest that collateral and loan market concentration 
are complementary (e.g., Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). 
The proximity between bank branches and customers’ locations (i.e., physical distance; 
Jiménez et al., 2009) is relevant in determining the terms of banking services. Customers’ 
transportation costs produce spatial differentiation of banks, thus reducing competition. Banks’ 
costs of gathering and processing site-specific information about potential borrowers increase 
with distance (Petersen and Rajan, 2002), so more distant banks will be less informed about 
local credit market conditions than banks that are closer to the borrowers. Accordingly, Hainz 
et al. (2013) show that firms located near a bank are best financed through screening contracts, 
whereas more distant borrowers are required to pledge collateral. Nonetheless, in the case of 
Spain, Jiménez et al. (2009) show that the likelihood of collateral is lower for loans granted by 
distant than by local lenders, which supports the lender-based theory that collateral is used by 
local lenders to profit from their superior information advantage about the credit risk of the 
borrower, which increases the informational rents that “inside banks” can extract (see the sixth 
proposition in Inderst and Mueller, 2007). 
 
3.2.4. Credit environment characteristics 
When a bank evaluates a request for credit, it can either collect information about the 
applicant first-hand or source this information from other lenders that have already dealt with 
the applicant. Information exchange between lenders can occur voluntarily through private 
credit bureaus or be enforced by regulation through public credit registries. Thus, we argue 
that institutional and legal development environments are central issues to explaining the 
determinants of collateral. 
Sharing information among lenders allows banks to obtain information about loan 
applicants’ repayment histories and current debt exposure. In countries with weaker 
information-sharing instruments, lenders may experience difficulties measuring credit risk, 
particularly if they are unfamiliar with the loan applicant before the loan application. 
Accordingly, information sharing is an important tool for reducing informational asymmetries 
and eventually decreasing adverse selection problems (Hanedar et al., 2014b), which in turn 
can make access to finance easier, particularly for SMEs (Djankov et al., 2007). 
In line with these arguments, empirical research has tested the role of information-sharing 
instruments to increase information and quality traceability (e.g., Pagano and Jappeli, 1993) 
and increase the availability of credit (e.g., Brown et al., 2009) and the need for collateral in 
loan arrangements (e.g., Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2011; Godlewski and Weill, 2011; 
Hanedar et al., 2014b). If information-sharing instruments reduce information asymmetries, we 
would expect to find that they substitute for collateral requirements (broadly measured). 
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However, in an investigation of lending arrangements of firms operating in less-developed 
countries, Hanedar et al. (2014b) report empirical evidence contrary to this prediction. The 
authors argue that deeper shared information also helps extend credit to new and previously 
unfunded firms, which in turn increases the mean collateral requirements for new funded firms. 
The legal framework of creditor rights also potentially affects the value of collateral. 
Economies that rank high on ease of obtaining credit typically have a legal system that 
encourages lending by financial institutions to the private sector (DBR, 2010). Laws in such 
environments ensure secured creditors’ rights through a registration mechanism for secured 
interests, they allow out-of-court enforcement of security rights, and they protect secured 
creditors during insolvency processes. Accordingly, some empirical studies show that strong 
conditions of creditor protection expand the availability of favorable-term loans (e.g., Qian 
and Strahan, 2007; Djankov et al., 2007) promoting the development of financial markets 
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013), particularly in situations involving severe adverse selection 
problems in these markets (e.g., Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). However, how the strength of 
legal rights affects collateral requirements remains an open empirical question. 
Empirical research has also used GDP per capita to control for the effect of economic 
development on collateral requirements, predicting that a country’s development is negatively 
related to collateral stringency (e.g., Godlewski and Weill, 2011). 
 
3.3. Data, Method, and Variables 
3.3.1. Data 
We use the fourth-round database of the BEEPS, conducted from 2007 to 2009, which 
covers approximately 11,728 enterprises in 29 countries. The BEEPS is a joint initiative of the 
EBRD and the World Bank Group. The survey was first undertaken on behalf of the EBRD and 
the World Bank in 1999–2000; it was administered to approximately 4,000 enterprises in 26 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia to assess the environment for private enterprise 
and business development. In the second round of the BEEPS (2002), the survey was 
administered to approximately 6,500 enterprises in 27 countries. In the third round of the BEEPS 
(2005), the survey included approximately 9,500 enterprises in 28 countries. The fourth-round 
BEEPS (2008–2009) underwent several changes from the 2005 round, offering numerous 
advantages compared with those used in previous studies (e.g., Hanedar et al., 2014b). 
First, the “new” BEEPS allows for greater comparability of European and Central Asian 
countries with countries in other regions, whereas previous rounds only allow for cross-regional 
comparisons at a more limited level. Second, this survey was restructured to make it compatible 
with Enterprise Surveys’ Enterprise Analysis Unit of the World Bank to collect feedback from 
enterprises in EBRD countries of operation on the state of the private sector as well as to help 
build a panel of enterprise data. Thus, unlike in previous rounds, this data set makes it possible 
to track changes in the business environment over time. Third, this data set covers the most 
recent contextual changes faced by several countries, such as the deterioration of access to 
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finance as well as crime and corruption. It also reports numerous strides many countries have 
made in governance and regulations between these periods.  
To complement the BEEPS information, we also use the Bankscope database and 
indicators provided by the World Bank (i.e., World Bank Data Indicators and the Doing Business 
Report [DBR]) and the Global Financial Development Database. The data set includes 10,620 
SMEs (i.e., 3,265 medium firms, 4,841 small firms, and 2,514 micro firms) operating in less-
developed countries. To reconcile the definition of SME with both the BEEPS definition and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conventions, we define SMEs 
as firms with a maximum of 250 full-time employees.34 Our final sample comprises 3,403 SMEs 
that requested loans that were ultimately approved by a bank and reported information 
regarding collateral requirements. For the distribution of the sample by firm size and data for 
different years and countries, see Appendices 3.2 and 3.3.35 
 
3.3.2. Method 
In literature examining the determinants of business and/or personal collateral (and 
guarantees), previous studies have relied extensively on logit and probit models (e.g., Avery et 
al., 1998; La Porta, 2003; Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2006, 2010; Ono et al., 
2012; Peltoniemi and Vieru, 2013) or used instrumental (single) models (e.g., Brick and Palia, 
2007; Ono and Uesugi, 2009; Gama and Duarte, 2015). Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006), in 
their preliminary approach, tested both determinants using an ordered probit model. The 
problems with these approaches is that it is not possible to investigate whether the 
determinants of a choice of asking for collateral or not differs from the determinants of the 
choice of type of collateral, once the decision is made to ask for collateral (Voordeckers and 
Steijvers, 2006). This limitation is particularly relevant if we assume that the borrower and the 
lender first negotiate the inclusion of collateral in the loan contract and then negotiate the 
type of collateral (business or personal collateral) to ensure the fulfillment of the agreement.  
To overcome this limitation, we employ a continuation ratio model.36 The continuation 
ratio model comprises two probit models: the first model estimates the choice between 
collateralization and no collateralization (Eq. 1), and the second model estimates the choice 
between business collateral (only) and personal collateral (with or without business collateral) 
after borrowers and lenders have already agreed to provide collateral in loan arrangements 
(Eq. 2). Our first estimator of the continuation ratio probit (CRP) model is written as follows: 
                                                          
34 The BEEPS definition of enterprise size is as follows: small firms = 2–49 employees, medium firms =50–
249 employees, and large firms = 250–9,999 employees. 
35 We built the final sample on the basis of answers to the following survey questions: “At this time, does 
this establishment have a line of credit or loan from a financial institution?” [yes, no, don’t know], and 
“Referring only to this most recent loan or line of credit, did financing required collateral?” [yes, no, 
don’t know.] 




Collaterali= α+β1firm charac.i+β2loan charac.i+ β3lender‐market charac.i 
+β4Credit´s environ.i +ε𝑖  for i=1, …, N ,  
(Eq.1) 
where Collaterali is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has pledged collateral 
to obtain an external loan and 0 otherwise; and ε𝑖 is the error term. 
Our second estimator of the CRP model is written as follows: 
PCi= α + β1firm charac.i+β2loan charac.i+ β3lender‐market charac.i 
+β4Credit´s environ.i +ε𝑓  , if Collateral=1 for i=1, …, N ,  
(Eq.2) 
where PCi is the binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has pledged personal 
collateral to obtain an external loan and 0 if the firm has pledged only business collateral to 
obtain the loan; and ε𝑖 is the error term. 
We extend the continuation ratio model to analyze the determinants of business and 
personal collateral level (i.e., BCr and PCr, respectively). With this approach, we test whether 
the binary business collateral and personal collateral outcome variables proxy for business and 
personal collateral levels. In line with the continuation ratio model, we argue that the first 
decision is to require (or not require) collateral on a loan contract; then, it is necessary to 
negotiate the amount of collateral and the type of collateral. To capture this sequence of 
negotiation events, we use the truncated regression model (i.e., the second estimator of the 
two-step model), which is theoretically more appropriate than using single ordinary least 
squares. Nonetheless, our two-step model differs from that typically estimated in previous 
studies investigating the collateral-to-loan ratio for an undistinguished type of collateral (e.g., 
Hanedar et al., 2014b). We are not interested in dropping all regressands’ null observations, 
because our model outputs two different regressand clusters of zeros in BCr and PCr: one 
cluster produced by noncollateralized loans (Eq. 1), which we dropped, and another cluster of 
zeros produced by loans collateralized by the alternative type of assets (i.e., business collateral 
vs. personal collateral [Eq. 2]), which we included.37 Thus, our truncated regression is written 
as follows: 
                                                          
37 Alternatively, several authors apply the censored regression model (i.e., Tobit) (e.g., Lehman and 
Neuberger, 2001; Hanley, 2002; La Porta et al. 2003; Menkhoff et al., 2006). This model enables the 
researcher to divide the firms in two groups: one about which there is information on the regressor and 
the regressand (i.e., collateral-to-loan ratio) and another consisting of firms about which there is have 
information only on the regressor but not on the regressand because it includes firms that do not pledged 
collateral. Thus, if we employ a Tobit model, we are also able to censor the sample for both clusters of 




BCri=β1firm charac.i+β2loan charac.i+ β3lender‐market charac.i 
+β4Credit´s environ. i +ε𝑖  , if Collateral=1 for i=1, …, N , 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
(Eq.3) 
 
PCri=β1firm charac.i+β2loan charac.i+ β3lender‐market charac.i 
+β4Credit´s environ. i +ε𝑖  , if Collateral=1 for i=1, …, N 
 (Eq.4) 
 
where BCri and PCri are the levels of business and personal collateral (i.e., percentage of 




3.3.3.1. Dependent variables 
To test the determinants of the incidence of collateral, we use a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the firm has pledged collateral to obtain an external loan and 0 otherwise 
(Collateral). To test the determinants of personal collateral (vs. business collateral) after 
lenders decide to ask for collateral, we use a dummy variable (PC) that takes a value of 1 if the 
borrower provides personal collateral (with or without business collateral) to secure the loan 
and 0 if the borrower provides only business assets to secure the loan (e.g., Voordeckers and 
Steijvers, 2006).38 To explain the level of business collateral and personal collateral provided, 
once the decision to collateralize the loan is made, we uses the ratio of business or personal 
collateral value to loan size (%)—that is, BCr and PCr, respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
38 We extracted the classification of the type of collateral from the following survey question: “Referring 
only to this most recent loan or line of credit, what type of collateral was required?” We coded the 
response “personal assets of owners (house, etc.)” as personal commitment and the remaining answers 
(“land, building under ownership of the establishment”; “machinery and equipment including movables”; 
“accounts receivable and inventories”) as business commitments. We coded the response “other forms of 
collateral not including in the categories above” as business collateral in line with Avery et al. (1998). For 




3.3.3.2. Independent variables 
 
Firm characteristics include Age (measured as the number of years the firm has been 
operating), Size (measured as the number of the firm’s full-time employees) (e.g., Leeth and 
Scott, 1989), and Experience (years of experience as a top manager) (e.g., Steijvers and 
Voordeckers, 2009). To examine the impact of agency costs, we employ the variable Ownership, 
measured as the percentage ownership of the firm held by the largest shareholder. To proxy 
for borrower risk, we include three binary variables: Overdue (1 if firm has payments overdue 
more than 90 days and 0 otherwise), Crime (1 if firm experienced any episode of crime and 0 
otherwise), and Quality (1 if firm has an internationally recognized quality certification and 0 
otherwise) (e.g., Hanedar et al., 2014b). To control for the value of private information shared 






This table presents variable definition and the sources of the data. BEEPS = 2009 Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey; GFDD = Global Financial Development Database; DBR = Doing 
Business Report. WBDI = World Bank Data Indicators. 
Variable Definition Source 
Collateralization 
Collateral 




Equals 1 if the firm has pledged personal collateral to obtain an 
external loan and 0 if firm provide only business collateral (0,1 )  
BEEPS 
BCr Percentage of business collateral value to loan size BEEPS 
PCr Percentage of personal collateral value to loan size BEEPS 
Firm Characteristics 
Age 
Age of firm, measured as the number of years that the firm has 
been operating 
BEEPS 
Size Size of the firm, measured as the number of full-time employees BEEPS 
Experience Experience of top manager measure in years BEEPS 
Ownership Percentage ownership of the firm held by the largest shareholder BEEPS 
Overdue 
Equals 1 if the SME has utility payments or tax payment that are 
overdue by more than 90 days (0, 1) 
BEEPS 
Crime 
Equals 1 if the SME has experienced any losses as a result of theft, 
robbery, vandalism, or arson (0,1) 
BEEPS 
Quality 
Equals one if the firm has an internationally recognized quality 
certification, such as ISO 9000 or ISO 9002 (0, 1) 
BEEPS 
Trade Credit 
Percentage of a firm’s purchases of material inputs and services 




Number of active products/services contracted by the firm with 
entire banking sector (checking or savings account; overdrafts) 
BEEPS 
Loan Characteristics  
LoanSize Loan amount measured in U.S. dollars BEEPS 
Lender Market Characteristics  
City 
Equals 1 if the firm is located in the capital or in a city with a 
population over 1 million (0, 1) 
BEEPS 
Cr 




Brpc Number of branches per 100,000 adults GFDD 
Credit Environment Characteristics 
CreditInfo  Depth of credit information index (0 = weak to 6 = strong) DBR 
LegalRights Strength of legal rights index (0 = weak to 12 = strong) WBDI 
GDPpcppp 
Gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power 




with banks, we define the variables TradeCredit (percentage of a firm’s purchases of material 
inputs and services paid on credit; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006) and FinancialOpenness (the 
number of active products/services contracted by the firm with the entire banking sector in 
terms of overdrafts and savings/checking). Loan characteristics include only LoanSize (loan 
amount measured in U.S. dollars) (e.g., Leeth and Scott, 1989; Jiménez et al., 2006; Godlewski 
and Weill, 2011); due to data limitations, we cannot measure loan maturity. Lender market 
characteristics include City (1 if the firm is located in the capital or in a city with population 
of more than 1 million) (Hanedar et al., 2014b) and Brpc (the number of branches per 100,000 
adults) (Hanedar, et al., 2014a) as measures for the proximity between bank branches and 
customers’ locations, and Cr (share of the assets of the three largest banks in total banking 
system assets) as a proxy for banking market competition (Hainz et al., 2013). Credit 
environment characteristics include CreditInfo (the depth of the credit information index [DBR, 
2010]), LegalRights (the strength of the legal rights index), and GDP per capita (GDPpcppp) 
(Godlewski and Weill, 2011). Table 3.1 presents definitions and sources of variables. 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2. reports descriptive statistics. The final sample includes 3,403 SMEs, of which 
1,279 (37.5%) are medium-sized firms, 1,529 (45%) are small firms, and 595 (17.5%) are micro 
firms. Approximately 83% of the SMEs provided collateral to receive bank loans. The collateral-
to-loan ratios (BCr and PCr) range from 0% to 600%. Credit granted to SMEs uses mainly business 
collateral to secure loans. At the mean, approximately 71% of the loan amount is secured only 
by business assets (BCr), and personal collateral covers 29% of the loan (PCr) mean. Among 
firms that provided collateral, the mean of the business collateral-to-loan ratio (measured by 
truncated BCr) is 87%, and the mean of personal collateral-to-loan ratio (measured by truncated 
PCr) is approximately 36%. These statistics show that loan collateralization privileges business 
assets over personal assets. Appendix 3.5 reports the correlation matrix. 
The sample includes a majority of firms with high concentrated ownership (mean of 
Ownership is 77%). Only 8.7% of the firms report being overdue on utility or tax payments, 
which may indicate that loans are primarily granted to good firms. The size of the loan ranges 
between US$1,170.19 and US$54,000,000, suggesting that the sample is heterogeneous and 
covers banking loans for different goals and type of firms. Variables measuring informational 
opacity/traceability(i.e., TradeCredit and FinancialOpenness) reveal that approximately 64% 
of the firms’ inputs are paid on credit and the majority of firms have overdrafts and 
checking/savings accounts in addition to the given line of credit in study. Less-developed 
countries covered in the final sample report a satisfactory quality of data distributed by public 
and private registries. The mean value of CreditInfo, weighted by the number of observations 
by country/year, is 4.187. The nonweighted mean value of this variable is 4.17 among countries 
included in 2009, 4.10 among countries included in 2008, and 3.34 among countries included in 
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200739 The sample also reports a satisfactory level of protection of the lender’s rights through 
collateral and bankruptcy laws. The mean value of LegalRights weighted by the number of 
observations by country/year is 5.806. The nonweighted mean value of this variable is 6.54 
among countries included in 2009, 6.39 among countries included in 2008, and 6.43 among 
countries included in 2007.40 Compared with Hanedar et al. (2014b), who used a similar 
database between 2002–2005, we conclude that from 2004 (when the World Bank started 
providing statistics about the strength of legal rights), substantial changes were undertaken 
regarding the depth of private information shared among creditors, as well as the strength of 
credit protection. 
                                                          
39Statistics are not reported but are available on request. 
40 Statistics are not reported but are available on request. 
Table 3.2. – Descriptive statistics     
This table reports descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables. 
a Variables truncated for collateral’s null observations (i.e., Collateral = 0) 
Variable Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Collateralization     
Collateral 3,403 0.831 1 0.374 0 1 
PC 3,399 0.242 0 0.428 0 1 
PC (truncated) a 2,826 0.291 0 0.454 0 1 
BCr 3,063 70.795 40 85.478 0 600 
BCr (truncated) 
a 
2,490 87.087 90 87.001 0 600 
PCr 3,063 29.233 0 66.657 0 600 
PCr (truncated) 
a 
2,490 35.960 0 72.277 0 600 
Firm Characteristics     
Age 3,362 14.78 13 11.76 1 182 
Size 3,397 57.037 30 60.421 1 250 
Experience 3,362 17.327 15 10.327 1 75 
Ownership 3,311 77.009 96 27.177 1 100 
Overdue 3,385 0.087 0 0.283 0 1 
Crime 3,393 0.262 0 0.440 0 1 
Quality 3,285 0.282 0 0.450 0 1 
TradeCredit 2,570 63.794 70 30.995 0 100 
FinancialOpenne
ss 
3,210 1.499 2 0.572 0 2 
Loan Characteristics      
LoanSize 3,390 610,501.2 95,465.39 2,556,781 1,170.193 54,000,000 
Lender Market 
Characteristics 
     
ity 3,403 0.391 0 0.488 0 1 
Cr 3,403 57.770 57.67 18.756 31.810 100.000 
Brpc 3,357 26.468 24.43 16.436 3.490 92.680 
Credit Environment Characteristics     
CreditInfo  3,403 4.187 5 1.541 0 6 
LegalRights 3,403 5.806 6 2.286 2 10 




3.4.2. Discussion of results 
3.4.2.1. Incidence of Collateral 
Table 3.3 reports the estimations for the CRP model. Because our data set includes 
several specific country variables (i.e., credit market environments), we estimate different 
regressions to avoid collinearity problems. Thus, the left-hand side of each column provides 
the results for the determinants of the incidence of collateral (Eq. 1), whereas the right-hand 
side shows the determinants of collateralization through personal assets, given that the bank 
has already decided to ask for some kind of collateral (Eq. 2). 
 
Table 3.3. – Continuation ratio probit (CRP) Model  
This table reports the first and second estimators of the CRP. Left-hand side columns report the results of 
the first estimator (dependent variable: Collateral) and the right-hand side the results of the second 
estimator (dependent variable: PC) for collateralized loans. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01, 
**p <.05, *p < .1. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Collateral  PC Collateral  PC Collateral  PC 
Firm Characteristics     
Age -0.007** -0.012*** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.007** -0.01227*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Size 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) 
Experience -0.007** 0.002 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.008** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ownership 0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Overdue 0.090 0.153 0.095 0.153 0.086 0.154 
 (0.119) (0.112) (0.120) (0.113) (0.118) (0.112) 
Crime 0.148* 0.049 0.184** 0.027 0.165** 0.058 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.076) (0.071) (0.076) (0.070) 
Quality -0.189** -0.126* -0.199*** -0.137* -0.195** -0.131* 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
TradeCredit -0.005*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.002* -0.004*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FinancialOpenness -0.133** -0.034 -0.151** -0.066 -0.155** -0.051 
 (0.062) (0.058) (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.057) 
Loan Characteristics      
Ln(LoanSize) 0.180*** -0.017 0.184*** -0.015 0.182*** -0.017 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Lender Market Characteristics      
City -0.197*** 0.262*** -0.249*** 0.254*** -0.229*** 0.247*** 
 (0.069) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066) 
Cr 0.004** 0.003*     
 (0.002) (0.002)     
Brpc   -0.004* 0.004**   
   (0.002) (0.002)   
Credit Environment Characteristics     
CreditInfo      -0.001 0.004 
     (0.022) (0.021) 
Constant -0.667** -0.334 -0.358 -0.257 -0.430 -0.157 
 (0.297) (0.294) (0.279) (0.276) (0.294) (0.283) 
       
Observations 2,224 1,830 2,189 1,798 2,224 1,830 
Log-likelihood -954.50 -1,036.10 -945.00 -1,017.82 -956.80 -1,037.54 
LR chi2 156.13 97.26 152.32 97.68 151.53 94.37 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




































Estimation results regarding the determinants of the incidence of collateral yield 
negative coefficients for Age (p < .05) and Experience (p < .05) in all specifications, in line with 
our predictions: Older firms and firms with a top manager who has a high degree of experience 
are less likely to have to provide collateral. However, the Size and Ownership variables do not 
reveal any statistically significant relationship with the incidence of collateral. The positive 
coefficients for Crime (p < .1 in specification [1]; p < .05 in specifications [2]–[4]; p < .01 in 
specification [5]) and negative coefficients for Quality (p < .01 in specification [2]; p < .05 in 
the remaining specifications) confirm that observable credit risk is positively associated with a 
high incidence of collateral, in line with the observed risk hypothesis (e.g., Berger and Udell, 
1990). However, the positive coefficients for the variable Overdue are not statistically 
significant in any specification, which may be justified by the reduced number of firms that 
Table 3.3. – Continuation ratio probit (CRP) Model (Continuation) 
 (4) (5) 
 Collateral PC Collateral  PC 
Firm Characteristics   
Age -0.007** -0.013*** -0.006** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Size 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Experience -0.008** 0.001 -0.006** 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ownership 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Overdue 0.100 0.152 0.072 0.143 
 (0.118) (0.113) (0.122) (0.113) 
Crime 0.161** 0.058 0.243*** 0.080 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.078) (0.071) 
Quality -0.195** -0.131* -0.155** -0.119 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) 
TradeCredit -0.005*** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FinancialOpenne
ss 
-0.148** -0.051 -0.083 -0.034 
 (0.061) (0.057) (0.063) (0.058) 
Loan Characteristics   
Ln(LoanSize) 0.184*** -0.01649 0.216*** -0.009 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
Lender Market Characteristics    
City -0.216*** 0.247*** -0.332*** 0.228*** 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.070) (0.066) 
Cr     
     
Brpc     
     
Credit Environment Characteristics   
CreditInfo      
     
LegalRights 0.031** -0.002   
 (0.015) (0.014)   
Ln(GDPpcppp)   -0.625*** -0.136** 
   (0.074) (0.058) 
     
Constant -0.64395** -0.132 4.727*** 0.945* 
 (0.29308) (0.281) (0.677) (0.537) 
     
Observations 2,224 1,830 2,224 1,830 
Log-likelihood -954.57 -1,037.55 -916.14 -1,034.82 
LR chi2 155.99 94.35 232.85 99.81 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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were overdue on payments receiving loans. The negative coefficients for TradeCredit (p < .01 
in specification [1]–[4]) and FinancialOpeness (p < .05 specifications [1]–[4]) confirm the 
importance of producing and sharing private information between firms and lenders to reduce 
informational asymmetries and, consequently, the need to provide collateral to receive the 
loan. 
In line with Leeth and Scott’s (1989) arguments, we find that an increase of LoanSize 
positively affects the incidence of collateral (p < .01 in all specifications). The negative 
coefficients of the City variable (p < .01 in specifications [1]–[5]) and Brpc (p < .1 in 
specification [2]) suggest that borrowers located in big cities (in which financial centers are 
primarily located and the distance between lender and borrower is lower) and those operating 
in countries with a more extensively branched banking system (in which local competitiveness 
tends to be higher) are less likely to be required to provide collateral. These results, in contrast 
with those of Jiménez et al. (2009), suggest that borrowers benefit from being located in a 
more developed and representative banking market, in which banks have greater access to 
reliable hard data to better screen the borrowers, compared with those operating in less-
developed and theoretically more opaque countries. Thus, in line with Hainz et al. (2013), our 
results suggest that firms that are located close to a bank are financed by a screening contract 
and those that are located further away are financed by a collateralized contract in the absence 
of trustworthy hard data. In support of this paradigm, Table 3.3 shows that firms operating in 
a more highly concentrated banking market (Cr) have a greater probability of providing 
collateral (p < .05 in specification [1]). 
The first estimator does not report any significant relationship between the depth of 
information-sharing instruments (CreditInfo) and the likelihood of collateralization. The 
positive coefficient of the variable LegalRights (p < .05 in specification [4]) is not surprising if 
we assume that an increase of creditor/lender protection facilitates the granting of credit to 
firms on a collateral basis (we test this assumption in depth in Section 3.5. [“Robustness 
Tests”]). Finally, our estimations suggest that lenders exercise a less restrictive policy of 
collateralization in countries with higher GDP per capita (p < .01 in specification [5]). 
We report the second estimator of the CRP in the right-hand side of each specification, 
which provides the outcomes regarding the determinants of collateralization through personal 
assets. The results show that to meet a collateral request, older and larger borrowers can use 
business assets (p < .01 in all specification). Alternatively, these results confirm that younger 
and smaller firms, which are business-asset constrained, meet collateral requirements by 
offering owners’ patrimony. Although weakly statistically significant (p < .10), the positive 
coefficients of Ownership confirm that firms with concentrated ownership are more likely to 
provide personal collateral than those with fragmented ownership, which privileges business 
assets for securing a loan. These findings corroborate the assumption that firms with 
concentrated ownership have a strong commitment to long-term survival and the reputation of 
the firm. In line with previous estimations, the coefficients of the variable Overdue are not 
statistically significant. The negative coefficients of the variables Quality (p < .10 in 
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specifications [1]–[4]) and TradeCredit (p < .05 in specifications [1], [3], and [4]; p < .10 in 
specification [2]) show that if a borrower needs to provide collateral, lenders allow borrowers 
to exchange personal with business assets to secure these unlikely collateralizable loans (as 
suggested by the first estimator). The ability to trade personal collateral for business collateral 
may be justified in part because these firms tend to be larger and less opaque, with a range of 
sufficient business assets to secure the loan. 
The experience of top managers (Experience), firm losses due to crime events (Crime), 
and the number of financial services with the banking sector (FinancialOpeness) do not 
influence the type of collateral used to secure the loan but rather influence only 
collateralization likelihood, as broadly measured. We fail to accept the hypothesis that lenders 
requesting collateral privilege business assets as a debt seniority signal for larger loans (the 
coefficients of LoanSize are negative and not statistically significant in any specification). 
Lenders do not ask for a specific type of asset as a function of the loan size, suggesting that 
they recognize that posting collateral is a satisfactory gesture to mitigate moral hazard 
problems. Among collateralized contracts, firms located in big cities (City) (p < .01 in all 
specifications) and those operating in countries with a branched banking market (Brpc) (p < .05 
in specification [2]) are more likely to provide personal collateral, whereas other firms tend to 
provide business collateral. The variable Cr yields similar results, showing that a concentrated 
banking market increases the likelihood of providing personal collateral (p < .10 in specification 
[1]). A possible explanation is that once the ability to switch lenders in a concentrated banking 
market is limited, lenders privilege personal assets to secure a loan, because the assets provide 
a more credible signal to the lender and reduce the lender’s efforts in screening and monitoring 
the firm’s quality and ex post behavior (i.e., the “lazy” argument; see Mann, 1997). In line with 
the first estimator, CreditInfo does not show a statistically significant relationship with the 
trade-off of business collateral versus personal collateral. The coefficient of LegalRights, which 
is not statistically significant, suggests that the strength of legal rights only influences 
collateralization likelihood as broadly measured; it does not influence the substitution policy 
between types of assets to secure the loan. Economic development (GDPppcpp) reduces the 
likelihood of choosing personal collateral to meet a collateralization request. 
 
3.4.2.2. Level of Collateral 
Table 3.4 reports the truncated regression estimations for business and personal 
collateral level (BCr and PCr, respectively) as an extension of the continuation ratio model (Eq. 




Table 3.4. – Truncated regression model (left-truncated if Collateral=0) 
This table reports the results of truncated regression model conditioned to collateralized loans. Left-hand side 
columns report the results regarding the determinants of the level of business collateral (i.e., dependent 
variable: BCr) and the right-hand side the results regarding the determinants of the level of personal collateral 
(i.e., dependent variable: PCr) for collateralized loans. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < 
.05, *p < .1. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 BCr PCr BCr PCr BCr PCr 
Firm Characteristics     
Age 0.459** -0.258 0.481** -0.240 0.451** -0.253 
 (0.200) (0.173) (0.200) (0.172) (0.201) (0.173) 
Size 0.087** -0.104*** 0.0878** -0.105*** 0.092** -0.104*** 
 (0.039) (0.034) (0.039) (0.034) (0.039) (0.034) 
Experience 0.137 -0.022 0.181 0.057 0.190 -0.014 
 (0.218) (0.189) (0.215) (0.186) (0.217) (0.188) 
Ownership -0.079 0.174** -0.112 0.174*** -0.101 0.169** 
 (0.079) (0.068) (0.078) (0.067) (0.078) (0.068) 
Overdue -10.794 -0.160 -10.931 0.744 -11.084 -0.104 
 (7.590) (6.565) (7.578) (6.541) (7.597) (6.568) 
Crime -2.087 2.588 -0.512 2.651 -2.486 2.340 
 (4.655) (4.027) (4.641) (4.006) (4.649) (4.019) 
Quality 0.528 -2.749 0.539 -3.076 1.064 -2.775 
 (4.938) (4.271) (4.938) (4.262) (4.946) (4.276) 
TradeCredit 0.209*** -0.142** 0.205*** -0.131** 0.208*** -0.145** 
 (0.070) (0.061) (0.070) (0.061) (0.070) (0.061) 
FinancialOpenne
ss 
2.861 -3.637 4.462 -5.045 3.870 -3.299 
 (3.839) (3.321) (3.803) (3.282) (3.790) (3.277) 
Loan Characteristics      
Ln(LoanSize) 0.272 -0.597 -0.05026 -0.003 0.24384 -0.606 
 (1.423) (1.231) (1.42518) (1.230) (1.42357) (1.231) 
Lender Market Characteristics      
City -18.859*** 7.359* -17.149*** 7.165* -17.762*** 7.619** 
 (4.415) (3.819) (4.362) (3.765) (4.379) (3.785) 
Cr -0.205* -0.057     
 (0.118) (0.102)     
Brpc   -0.178 -0.190   
   (0.140) (0.120)   
Credit Environment Characteristics     
CreditInfo      -1.430 0.515 
     (1.369) (1.183) 
LegalRights       
       
Ln(GDPpcppp)       
       
       
Constant 79.903*** 55.984*** 73.581*** 50.395*** 72.938*** 50.426*** 
 (19.276) (16.673) (17.930) (15.476) (18.681) (16.149) 
       
Observations 1,652 1,652 1,625 1,625 1,652 1,652 
F stat 4.73 3.81 4.74 3.85 4.66 3.80 
Prob > F Stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.034 0.027 0.034 0.028 0.033 0.027 






The truncated regression model shows that the ratio of personal collateral is not 
influenced by the age of firm, even though it reduces the likelihood of providing personal 
collateral (i.e., second estimator of CRP model). However, older firms tend to provide a higher 
level of business assets in collateralized contracts (p < .05 in all specifications). Together, these 
results confirm that younger firms use personal collateral as a signal of creditworthiness and 
commitment when obtaining access to a loan. This signal is interpreted through the gesture of 
posting personal assets rather than through its level. Older firms, which are theoretically less 
risky and better known, provide a higher ratio of business collateral to access the loan. These 
Table 3.4. – Truncated regression model (left-truncated if Collateral=0) 
(Continuation) 
 (4) (5) 
 BCr PCr BCr PCr 
Firm Characteristics   
Age 0.469** -0.255 0.476** -0.236 
 (0.200) (0.173) (0.201) (0.173) 
Size 0.097** -0.101*** 0.089** -0.106*** 
 (0.039) (0.0340) (0.039) (0.034) 
Experience 0.192 -0.006 0.195 0.015 
 (0.216) (0.187) (0.217) (0.187) 
Ownership -0.096 0.169** -0.106 0.159** 
 (0.078) (0.068) (0.078) (0.068) 
Overdue -9.067 0.361 -11.188 -0.688 
 (7.583) (6.577) (7.599) (6.561) 
Crime -2.565 2.457 -2.065 3.429 
 (4.628) (4.014) (4.677) (4.038) 
Quality 0.355 -2.807 1.220 -1.987 
 (4.922) (4.269) (4.953) (4.276) 
TradeCredit 0.186*** -0.149** 0.234*** -0.096 
 (0.070) (0.061) (0.075) (0.065) 
FinancialOpenne
ss 
4.582 -3.143 4.448 -2.548 
 (3.779) (3.278) (3.813) (3.292) 
Loan Characteristics   
Ln(LoanSize) 0.042 -0.666 0.507 -0.184 
 (1.419) (1.231) (1.442) (1.245) 
Lender Market Characteristics    
City -17.192*** 7.838** -18.502*** 6.578* 
 (4.366) (3.786) (4.416) (3.813) 
Cr     
     
Brpc     
     
Credit Environment 
Characteristics 
   
reditInfo      
     
LegalRights 3.355*** 1.009   
 (0.918) (0.796)   
Ln(GDPpcppp)   -4.306 -7.159** 
   (3.873) 
4) 
(3.344) 
     
Constant 49.091*** 46.991*** 103.109*** 109.651*** 
 (18.498) (16.044) (35.738) (30.856) 
     
Observations 1,652 1,652 1,652 1,652 
F stat 5.80 3.03 4.76 4.17 
Prob > F Stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.041 0.028 0.034 0.030 
Adj. R2 0.034 0.021 0.027 0.023 
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results suggest that dichotomous variables proxy the level of collateral provided, but only to a 
limited extent. 
The positive coefficients of Size in BCr (p < .05 in all specifications) and the negative 
sign in PCr (p < .01 in all specifications) confirm that when required to provide collateral, larger 
firms trade higher ratios of personal collateral for business collateral, in part because they tend 
to be less business-asset constrained. These results are in line with the second estimator of the 
CRP model. Table 3.4 also confirms that ownership concentration increases not only the 
likelihood of providing personal collateral but also the level of personal collateral provided (p 
< .01 in specification [2]; p < .05 in the remaining specifications). Nonetheless, no statistically 
significant effect is reported for BCr. These results are consistent with the notion of a “dark 
side of altruism” with respect to small firms, given the high agency costs with lenders. In line 
with binary outcomes (Eq. 2), the results do not indicate a significant relationship between BCr 
or PCr and Experience, Overdue, Crime, and FinancialOpeness. When we investigate the 
Quality effect, the p-value of the variable falls from 10% in binary outcomes to more than 10% 
in the study of collateral-to-loan ratios. This table shows that trade credit allows borrowers to 
exchange personal collateral for business collateral, also regarding its level, if the lender 
requires them to provide collateral (p < .05 in specifications [1]–[4]). 
Consistent with previous estimations, the size of loan does not influence the level of 
business or personal collateral provided. In addition, the positive coefficient of City in BCr (p 
< .01) and the negative coefficient in PCr (p < .10 in specifications [1], [2], and [5]; p < .05 in 
the remaining specifications) confirm that the local (distant) lender will exchange business 
(personal) assets for personal (business) assets to secure the loan. These results suggest that 
an increase of banking concentration decreases the level of business collateral, which may 
suggest that market concentration increases banks’ “lazy” behavior by asking for collateral not 
to mitigate observable risk but rather to reduce their screening efforts (see Table 3.4). 
The coefficient of CreditInfo does not appear statistically related to the 
collateralization policy. Although it does not influence the choice between personal and 
business collateral when the borrower is requested to provide collateral (the second estimator 
of the continuation ratio model), this table shows that the strength of legal rights is positively 
related to the level of business collateral. Finally, the model shows that the negative impact 
of an increase in GDP per capita on collateralization falls when we analyze the value of personal 
collateral and is null with respect to the level of business collateral provided. 
 
3.5. Robustness Tests 
Partially in line with Hanedar et al. (2014b), our results seem to suggest that more 
intensive information-sharing instruments mitigate neither the presence of (business and 
personal) collateral nor its level. Likewise, the increase of legal protection by credit rights does 
not prove to be instrumental in either reducing the likelihood of loan collateralization or 
reducing the level of (business and personal) collateral. Instead, in countries with stronger 
credit rights, the borrower is more likely to be requested to pledge collateral and to provide 
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higher levels of business collateral. When interpreting these results, it is important to 
emphasize that we observe only firms with approved loan applications, that is, those that 
passed the lender’s credit evaluation. Thus, it could be argued that the depth of information-
sharing instruments and the strength of legal rights positively affect the approval of loan 
requests more than they mitigate collateral requirements. To test this assumption, similar to 
Hanedar et al. (2014b), we investigate the impact of both factors in extending credit. Based on 
the 2009 BEEPS, we used ProbRejected (which takes a value of 1 if the firm reported access to 
finance as a severe problem and 0 otherwise41) as the dependent variable.42 Then, we ran a 
probit model on ProbRejected over CreditInfo, LegalRights, and the set of independent 
variables, except for LoanSize and country variables.43 
The probit model yields a negative coefficient for LegalRights (p < .05), confirming that 
credit access is less stringent for firms operating in countries with better credit protection laws. 
This result sheds more light on the relationship of legal rights, credit rationing, and 
collateralization terms, leading us to conclude that reliable credit protection laws decrease 
banks’ reluctance in extending credit using a collateralized contract. Nonetheless, contrary to 
Hanedar et al. (2014b), we do not find a statistically significant effect of the depth of 
information-sharing instruments (CreditInfo) on providing credit access. 
To extend the study of the value of information-sharing instruments, we adopt 
alternative variables to CreditInfo. Similar to Godlewski and Weill (2011), we select two 
variables measuring the presence and dissemination of private and public information-sharing 
instruments in the market: Priv_cbr (measured as the number of firms listed by a private credit 
bureau with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or outstanding credit, as 
percentage of the adult population) and Pub_creg (measured as the number of firms listed by 
the public credit registry with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or 
outstanding credit as percentage of the adult population).44 These variables enable us to control 
for the coverage of information-sharing instruments rather than the type of instruments 
adopted (DBR, 2010). Accordingly, we expect to find a negative relationship between those 
variables and collateral requirements. To test this assumption, we re-run the CRP model (Eq. 
2; see Table 3.5) and the truncated regression model (Eq. 3 and 4; see Table 3.6) using Priv_cbr 
and Pub_creg as independent variables. First, we replaced the variable CreditInfo with these 
alternative variables and tested them separately. Second, we tested the interaction effect 
                                                          
41 The question in the survey is as follows: “Is access to finance, which includes availability and cost, 
interest rates, fees and collateral requirements, No Obstacle, A Minor Obstacle, A Moderate Obstacle, a 
Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishments?” 
42 We assume that the severity of access to finance in some way predicts the likelihood of firms being 
discouraged to apply for a loans or being rejected. 
43 Estimations are not reported here, but they are available upon request. 
44 Variables provided by the World Bank (World Bank Data Indicators.) 
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between the depth of information-sharing instruments and its coverage (i.e., Inter1: CreditInfo 
 Priv_cbr; Inter2: CreditInfo  Pub_creg). 
Table 3.5 reports the results of the CRP model. The first estimator (left-hand side of 
each column) shows that firms operating in countries with higher coverage of information-
sharing instruments by private credit bureaus (Priv_cbr: p < .01) tend to receive screening 
contracts (Pub_creg is not statistically significant). Furthermore, the results suggest that the 
depth of information-sharing instruments helps reduce collateralized loans if these instruments 
provide information about a higher percentage of firms (Inter1: p < .01; Inter2: p < .05).  
The results provided by the second estimator (right-hand side of each column) suggest 
that an increasing percentage of firms listed by public credit registries increases preference for 
personal collateral to secure loans (Pubcreg: p < .01; Inter2: p < .05; Privcbr and Inter1 variables 
have positive coefficients but are not statistically significant). This unexpected evidence is not 
in accordance with predictions that the value of personal collateral decreases (mitigating moral 
hazard and adverse selection) in an environment with higher informational traceability 
(Menkhoff et al., 2012). However, it is possible that an increase in the coverage of information-
sharing instruments acts as device to mitigate credit rationing, especially for younger and more 
opaque firms, which, when required to meet collateral request, tend to use personal collateral. 
Table 3.5 also confirms the robustness of the previous results (reported in Table 3.4) 
because a firm’s level variables report similar effects on the incidence of collateral (except for 
Ownership) as well as explaining the type of assets used to meet collateral requests. The 
positive coefficients of Ownership are statistically significant in this table (p < .05 when we 
insert Priv_cbr and Inter1 into the equation), in line with Schulze et al. (2001, 2003).  
Table 3.6 suggest that increasing the coverage of information-sharing instruments 
lowers ratios for both business and personal collateral in the presence of collateralized 
contracts (BCr and PCr estimations: Pub_creg and Inter 2: p < .01; Priv_cbr and Inter1 are not 
statistically significant in either the BCr or the PCr estimations). These results confirm that 
increasing the likelihood of providing personal collateral does not necessarily relate with the 
level of personal collateral. Table 3.6 also confirms the robustness of the previous results 
(reported in Table 3.4).
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Table 3.5. –Coverage of information-sharing instruments (CRP model) 
This table reports the results of robustness of CRP model by including proxies for 
share-information. Left-hand side columns report the results of the first estimator 
(dependent variable: Collateral) and the right-hand side the results of the second 
estimator (dependent variable: PC) for collateralized loans. Priv_cbr is the number 
of individuals of firms listed by a private credit bureau with current information on 
repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding, as a percentage of the adult 
population. Pub_creg in number of individuals of firms listed by public credit 
registry with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit 
outstanding as percentage of the adult population). Inter1 =  CreditInfo  Priv_cbr; 
Inter2 = CreditInfo  Pub_creg. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < 
.05, *p < .1. 
 Collateral  PC Collateral  PC 
Firm Characteristics 
Age -0.007** -0.011*** -0.007** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Size < -0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Experience -0.005 < -0.001 -0.008** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ownership 0.003** 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Overdue 0.124 0.166 0.092 0.135 
 (0.125) (0.114) (0.119) (0.113) 
Crime 0.179** 0.041 0.163** 0.068 
 (0.083) (0.072) (0.076) (0.070) 
Quality -0.143* -0.142* -0.193** -0.136* 
 (0.083) (0.079) (0.077) (0.077) 
TradeCredit -0.003** -0.002* -0.004*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FinancialOpenness -0.078 -0.056 -0.159*** -0.023 
 (0.066) (0.059) (0.061) (0.058) 
Loan Characteristics     
Ln(LoanSize) 0.242*** -0.024 0.181*** -0.013 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Lender Market Characteristics    
City -0.361*** 0.252*** -0.218*** 0.209*** 
 (0.072) (0.0670) (0.069) (0.067) 
Credit Environment Characteristics 
Priv_cbr -0.008*** 0.002   
 (0.002) (0.002)   
Pub_creg   -0.004 0.014*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
Inter1     
     
Inter2     
     
     
Constant -1.143*** -0.066 -0.402 -0.280 





    
Observations. 2,076 1,740 2,224 1,830 
Log-likelihood -956.59 -995.90 -956.59 -1,033.54 
LR chi2 151.96 84.16 151.96 102.37 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.074 0.041 0.074 0.047 
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Table 3.5. –Coverage of information-sharing instruments (CRP model) 
(Continuation) 
 Collateral  PC Collateral  PC 
Firm Characteristics 
Age -0.007** -0.01122*** -0.007*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.00374) (0.003) (0.004) 
Size < -0.001 -0.00255*** 0.001 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.00065) (0.007) (0.001) 
Experience -0.005 0.00008 -0.007** <0.001 
 (0.003) (0.00346) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ownership 0.003** 0.00214* 0.001 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.00124) (0.001) (0.001) 
Overdue 0.135 0.16989 0.105 0.133 
 (0.125) (0.11396) (0.119) (0.113) 
Crime 0.179** 0.04131 0.155** 0.069 
 (0.083) (0.07207) (0.076) (0.070) 
Quality -0.135 -0.13700* -0.186** -0.139* 
 (0.083) (0.07940) (0.077) (0.077) 
TradeCredit -0.003** -0.00203* -0.004*** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.00108) (0.001) (0.001) 
FinancialOpenne
ss 
-0.078 -0.05140 -0.164*** -0.033 
 (0.066) (0.05886) (0.061) (0.058) 
Loan Characteristics 
Ln(LoanSize) 0.244*** -0.02250 0.178*** -0.0124 
 (0.025) (0.02229) (0.023) (0.022) 
Lender Market Characteristics 
City -0.355*** 0.25001*** -0.189*** 0.209*** 
 (0.072) (0.067) (0.070) (0.068) 
Credit Environment Characteristics 
Priv_cbr     
     
Pub_creg     
     
Inter1 -0.002*** <0.001   
 ( < 0.001) (<0.001)   
Inter2   -0.003** 0.003** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Constant -1.155*** -0.089 -0.322 -0.266 
 (0.302) (0.284) (0.282) (0.277) 
     
Observations. 2,076 1,740 2,224 1,830 
Log-likelihood -814.44 -995.51 -954.81 -1,034.78 
LR chi2 199.41 83.31 155.50 99.90 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.110 0.040 0.075 0.046 
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Table 3.6. –Coverage of information-sharing instruments (Truncated regression model) 
This table reports the results of robustness tests using of truncated models by including 
proxies for share-information. Left-hand side columns report the results regarding the 
determinants of the level of business collateral (i.e., dependent variable = BCr), and the 
right-hand side  reports the results regarding the determinants of the level of personal 
collateral (i.e., dependent variable =  PCr) for collateralized loans Priv_cbr is the number 
of individuals of firms listed by a private credit bureau with current information on 
repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding, as percentage of the adult 
population. Pub_creg in number of individuals of firms listed by public credit registry 
with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding as 
percentage of the adult population). Inter1 = CreditInfo  Priv_cbr; Inter2 = CreditInfo  
Pub_creg. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1. 
 BCr PCr BCr PCr 
Firm Characteristics   
Age 0.512** -0.214 0.425** -0.272 
 (0.219) (0.191) (0.199) (0.173) 
Size 0.073* -0.104*** 0.085** -0.106*** 
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034) 
Experience 0.238 -0.045 0.262 0.024 
 (0.225) (0.196) (0.216) (0.188) 
Ownership -0.076 0.173** -0.093 0.171** 
 (0.081) (0.070) (0.078) (0.067) 
Overdue -10.720 0.701 -8.741 0.692 
 (7.812) (6.803) (7.560) (6.568) 
Crime -0.915 1.974 -3.717 2.000 
 (4.813) (4.192) (4.620) (4.014) 
Quality 3.180 -2.685 1.268 -2.480 
 (5.188) (4.518) (4.909) (4.264) 
TradeCredit 0.239*** -0.124** 0.195*** -0.147** 
 (0.073) (0.063) (0.070) (0.061) 
FinancialOpenne
ss 
4.725 -2.386 0.726 -4.654 
 (3.939) (3.431) (3.827) (3.325) 
Loan Characteristics    
Ln(LoanSize) 0.723 -0.623 -0.169 -0.774 
 (1.487) (1.295) (1.417) (1.231) 
Lender Market Characteristics    
City -19.860*** 7.370* -13.605*** 9.377** 
 (4.505) (3.924) (4.442) (3.859) 
Credit Environment Characteristics   
Priv_cbr -0.172 -0.015   
 (0.107) (0.093)   
Pub_creg   -1.529*** -0.626** 
   (0.325) (0.282) 
Inter1     
     
Inter2     
     
     
Constant 59.572*** 50.566*** 82.303*** 58.612*** 
 (18.893) (16.453) (18.052) (15.683) 
     
Observations 1,573 1,573 1,652 1,652 
F stat 4.85 3.26 6.56 4.22 
Prob > F Stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.036 0.025 0.046 0.030 





Finally, we re-run the probit model on ProbRejected and replaced CreditInfo with 
Priv_cbr, Pub_creg, and the interaction variables,45 with the aim of testing the robustness of 
previous evidence about the value of information-sharing mechanisms in mitigating credit 
rationing. The results show that coverage by public credit registries adds value to the depth of 
information-sharing instruments, reducing credit rationing (negative coefficients of Pub_creg 
and Inter2 are statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas the negative coefficients of 
Priv_cbr and Inter1 are not statistically significant at the 10% level). Thus, we conclude that 
reforms pertaining to the depth of information-sharing instruments by public credit registries 
                                                          
45 Estimations are not reported here, but they are available upon request. 
Table 3.6. –Coverage of information-sharing instruments (Truncated regression model) 
(Continuation) 
 BCr PCr BCr PCr 
Firm Characteristics    
Age 0.504** -0.210 0.401** -0.278 
 (0.219) (0.191) (0.199) (0.173) 
Size 0.074* -0.105*** 0.083** -0.106*** 
 (0.041) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034) 
Experience 0.229 -0.042 0.308 0.033 
 (0.225) (0.196) (0.216) (0.188) 
Ownership -0.076 0.174** -0.117 0.163** 
 (0.081) (0.070) (0.077) (0.068) 
Overdue -10.738 0.818 -7.891 0.817 
 (7.819) (6.808) (7.547) (6.574) 
Crime -0.898 2.001 -4.161 1.927 
 (4.815) (4.192) (4.611) (4.017) 
Quality 3.104 -2.548 1.871 -2.313 
 (5.196) (4.524) (4.899) (4.268) 
TradeCredit 0.237*** -0.123* 0.211*** -0.141** 
 (0.073) (0.063) (0.070) (0.061) 
FinancialOpenness 4.579 -2.305 0.940 -4.341 
 (3.935) (3.426) (3.795) (3.306) 
Loan Characteristics    
Ln(LoanSize) 0.701 -0.587 -0.371 -0.811 
 (1.489) (1.297) (1.415) (1.233) 
Lender Market Characteristics    
City -19.759*** 7.366* -12.049*** 9.583** 
 (4.505) (3.922) (4.464) (3.888) 
Credit Environment Characteristics    
Priv_cbr     
     
Pub_creg     
     
Inter1 -0.034 -0.007   
 (0.024) (0.020)   
Inter2   -0.472*** -0.158** 
   (0.085) (0.074) 
     
Constant 60.128*** 50.100*** 86.131*** 58.773*** 
 (18.892) (16.449) (18.048) (15.721) 
     
Observations 1,573 1,573 1,652 1,652 
F stat 4.80 3.27 7.28 4.18 
Prob > F Stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.036 0.025 0.051 0.030 
Adj. R2 0.028 0.017 0.044 0.023 
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have practical effects in mitigating credit constraints and reducing the collateral requirements 
only when coupled with public reforms on its coverage. 
 
3.6. Concluding Remarks  
Using a database of credit approvals for SMEs from a cross-country sample of less-
developed economies, including transition economies from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
the current research extends empirical evidence on the determinants of collateral by examining 
the simultaneous determinants of business collateral and personal collateral/commitments. 
This is a worthwhile sample to study, not only due to the scarcity of literature in this domain 
but also because these economies have recently experienced both strong credit market 
development and considerable institutional changes. Employing a CRP model, we examine the 
determinants of both the choice to ask for collateral and the choice of the type of collateral 
(business or personal) once the decision to ask for collateral has been made. Furthermore, our 
method enables us to control for the level of collateral provided. 
Regarding the determinants of collateralization, the results confirm that observable 
credit risk is positively associated with the incidence of collateral. We found that younger firms 
use personal collateral as a signal of creditworthiness and commitment to access a loan. This 
signal is interpreted through the gesture of posting personal assets rather than through its level. 
If required to provide collateral, larger firms trade higher ratios of personal collateral for 
business collateral. 
Our results endorse the importance of producing and sharing private information among 
lenders to reduce information asymmetries and, consequently, the need to provide collateral 
to receive the loan. Furthermore, contrary to Jiménez et al. (2009), we find that borrowers 
benefit from being located in a more developed, representative, and competitive banking 
market. These results suggest that firms located close to a bank are financed by a screening 
contract. Contrary to the theoretical models of Manove et al. (2001) and Hainz et al. (2013), 
this study reveals that banks operating in a concentrated banking system use their market 
power to increase lending under collateralized contracts, especially with respect to personal 
assets. Moreover, truncated regression estimations show that an increase of banking 
concentration increases the level of collateral. These results suggest that the market 
concentration increases “lazy” behavior by banks insofar as they ask for collateral not to 
mitigate observable risk but rather to reduce screening efforts. Furthermore, our results show 
that lenders operating in less-developed countries do not ask for a specific type of asset (or 
value) as a function of the loan size, suggesting that they recognize that posting collateral is a 
satisfactory gesture to mitigate moral hazard problems. These surprising results reject the 
hypothesis that lenders requesting collateral privilege business assets as a debt seniority signal 
for larger loans (Menkhoff et al., 2012). 
Finally, these findings consistently suggest that reliable credit protection laws decrease 
banks’ reluctance to extend credit through collateralized contracts. We also find that reforms 
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pertaining to the depth of information-sharing instruments by public credit registries have 
practical effects in mitigating credit constraints and reducing the collateral requirements only 
when coupled with public reforms on its coverage. The results show that the explanatory power 
of models predicting (business and personal) collateral requirements and credit rationing yields 
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Appendix 3.1. – Empirical studies on “determinants” of collateral 
This table report an overview about literature that broadly tested the determinants of collateral. Other studies on collateralization issues are not included. 
aAEL – Applied Economic Letters; FBR – Family Business Review; FR – The Financial Review; JBF – Journal of Banking and Finance; JBFA – Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting; JEBO –Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; JEF – Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance; JFE – Journal of Financial Economics; 
JFI – Journal of Financial Intermediation; JFQA – Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; JFSR – Journal Finance Services Research; JJIE – Journal of 
the Japanese and International Economies ; JMCB – Journal of Money, Credit and Banking; JSBM – Journal of Small Business Management ; QJE – The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics; SBE – Small Business Economics; SMEF –Survey on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Finance; TJF – The Journal of Finance; VC – 
Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance; WSEAS – WSEAS Transactions on Business and Economics. 
bAO – Angola; ARG – Argentina; AUS – Australia; AT – Austria; BEL – Belgium; BD – Bangladesh; BG – Bulgaria; BOL – Bolivia; BRA - Brazil; CAM –Cameroon; CH - 
Switzerland; CI – Ivory Coast; CL –Chile; CN – China; CO – Colombia; CRT – Croatia; CZ – Czech Republic; DK – Denmark; EC – Ecuador; EECA – Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia developing countries ; EGY – Egypt; FIN – Finland ; FRA - France; GER – Germany; GH – Ghana GR – Greece; GT – Guatemala; HKG – Hong-
Kong; HU – Hungary; IDN – Indonesia; IND – India; IT – Italy; IR – Iran; IRE – Ireland; IL – Israel; ISR – Israel ; JAM – Jamaica; JP – Japan; KAZ – Kazakhstan; KR – 
South Korea; LT – Lithuania; LKA – Sri Lanka; MA – Morocco; MEX – Mexico; MY – Malaysia; NL – Netherland; NO – Norway; NZ – New Zealand; OM – Oman; PAN 
– Panama; PE – Peru; PG – Papua New Guinea; PH – Philippines; PL – Poland; PK – Pakistan; PT – Portugal; ROU – Romania; RU – Russia; SA – South Arabia; SE – 
Sweden; SG – Singapore; SP – Spain; SI – Slovenia; SK – Slovakia; TLD – Thailand; TUN- Tunisia; TR – Turkey; TW –Taiwan; UK – United Kingdom; US – United 
States; VE – Venezuela; VN – Vietnam; ZA – South Africa  
cABCCS – Association of British Chambers of Commerce Survey; BEEPS – Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey; CIR – Credit Register of the 
Bank of Spain; CIRC – Central de Información de Riesgos Credicticios; CSMAR – China Securities Markets and Accounting Research Database; EBRD – European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development; EOSMEs – Economic Observatory of SMEs; FID – Financial Information Database; LPC – Loan Pricing Corporation 
DealScan database ; SNFIB – Survey of the National Federation of Independent Business; NSSBF – National Survey of Small Business Finance; FRBoCCB – Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Commercial Bank; HCD - Holding Company Database; SABE – Sistema de Análisis de Balances Españoles; SABI – Iberian Balance sheet 
Analysis System; SFE –Survey of the Financial Environment ; SMBC - Seventeen Mexican Banks Circa; SSBCS – Survey of Small Business Credit Scoring ; SSMGF 
– Survey of Small and Medium-Sized German Firms; STBL – Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Bank Lending; WBDI – World Bank Data Indicators 
dAccording to International Monetary Fund Classification. e MBS – Market-based System; BBS – Bank-based system. 
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Appendix 3.1. – Empirical studies on “determinants” of collateral (Continuation) 
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Appendix 3.2. - Sample distribution by firm size 
This table report the full data by firm size. The stratification criteria for the size dummies are the number of full-time employees. 
Stratification by Size Description Observations % Full Sample % SMEs 
LARGE 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has more than 250 full 
employees and 0 if otherwise 
1,108 9.45  
SMEs 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has more than 250 full 
employees and 0 if otherwise 
10,620 90.55  
MEDIUM 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has more than 49 full 
employees and less than 251 and 0 if otherwise 
3,265  30.74 
SMALL 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has more than 9 full 
employees and less than 50 and 0 if otherwise 
4,841  45.58 
MICRO 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has less than 10 full 
employees and 0 if otherwise 







Appendix 3.4. - Type of collateral – BEEPS 
This table provides an overview of the type of assets provided to collateralize the loan. The 
table shows the answers to the survey question: “What type pf collateral was required?” 
 Do Not Know Yes No 
 # % # % # % 
Land, buildings under ownership of 
establishment 
51 1.8 1,776 62.76 1,003 35.44 
Machinery a d equipment including 
movables 
72 2.54 1,073 37.92 1,685 59.54 
Accounts receivable and inventories 98 3.46 485 17.14 2,247 79.40 
Personal assets of owner (e.g., house) 84 2.97 738 26.08 2,008 70.95 
Other forms of collateral not included in the 
categories above 
119 4.20 383 13.53 2,328 82.26 
 
Appendix 3.3. - Number of loans included by year and country 
This table reports an overview of the number of loans included in the final set of 
observations. The survey includes firms surveyed over three different years (i.e., 2007, 
2008, and 2009). Data from Kosovo are not included given the missing values for the 
country-level information. 
 
 SMEs (Global) SMEs (Final Sample) 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 120 53 0 45 16 0 
Belarus 0 236 0 0 84 0 
Georgia 0 354 0 0 108 0 
Tajikistan 0 344 0 0 73 0 
Turkey 0 1,010 0 0 467 0 
Ukraine 0 758 0 0 137 0 
Uzbakistan 0 336 0 0 0 0 
Russia 0 522 540 0 147 88 
Poland 0 176 323 0 68 42 
Romania 0 495 0 0 167 0 
Serbia 0 344 0 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan 0 432 64 0 124 10 
Moldova 0 279 52 0 107 7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 325 13 0 177 11 
Azerbaijan 0 334 23 0 50 1 
FYR Macedonia 0 331 5 0 157 2 
Armenia 0 243 116 0 70 43 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 169 55 0 26 4 
Mongolia 0 206 128 0 115 57 
Estonia 0 250 0 0 126 0 
Czech Republic 0 70 160 0 21 52 
Hungary 0 253 2 0 96 1 
Latvia 0 240 0 0 129 0 
Lithuania 0 147 106 0 69 47 
Slovak Republic 0 239 9 0 75 0 
Slovenia 0 130 106 0 87 77 
Bulgaria 0 268 0 0 86 0 
Croatia 44 51 45 26 33 24 
Montenegro 0 88 26 0 46 5 




        
Appendix 3.5 -Correlation matrix 
This table provides the pairwise correlation matrix for the independent variables. a,b,c Denotes rho statistically significant 
at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Age 1 1        
Size 2 0.2318a 1       
Experience 3 0.2262a 0.0549b 1      
Ownership 4 -0.124a -0.1383a -0.1293a 1     
Overdue 5 0.0398b -0.0306c 0.0052 -0.01 1    
Crime 6 0.037b 0.1038a -0.0278 -0.0132 0.0101 1   
Quality 7 0.1316a 0.2844a 0.0841a -0.1016a -0.008 -0.0111 1  
TradeCredit 8 0.0746a 0.0428b 0.0795a -0.0184 -0.0148 0.0347c 0.0887a 1 
FinancialOpenness 9 0.0917a 0.1148a 0.1145a -0.0591a -0.0646a -0.0105 0.1053a 0.0338 c 
Ln(LoanSize + 1) 10 0.1513a 0.4555 0.0412 -0.0511a -0.0532a 0.1227a 0.2512a 0.1131a 
City 11 0.0204 0.0298c 0.0822 -0.1002a 0.015 -0.0147 0.092a -0.0547a 
Cr 12 -0.1076a -0.0739a -0.1971a 0.2011a 0.0053 0.0828a -0.0911a 0.0545a 
Brpc 13 0.0424 -0.0169 -0.0161 0.071a -0.0058 0.0881a 0.0272 0.0552a 
CreditInfo 14 0.0086 0.0623a 0.0664a -0.0439b -0.032c 0.0258 0.09a 0.0193 
LegalRights 15 -0.0415b -0.0284c -0.0497a 0.023 -0.0295 0.0337b 0.0044 0.084a 
Ln(GDPpcppp+1) 16 0.1562a 0.1082a 0.1291a -0.0837a -0.0253 0.1313a 0.1484a 0.3713a 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
FinancialOpenness 9 1        
Ln(LoanSize + 1) 10 0.132a 1       
City 11 0.0887a 0.0262 1      
Cr 12 -0.2372a -0.0089 -0.1917a 1     
Brpc 13 -0.0877a 0.0643a -0.078a 0.0592a 1    
CreditInfo 14 0.0137 0.0421b 0.0196 -0.2055a 0.1094a 1   
LegalRights 15 -0.0252 0.0356 -0.0836a 0.2231a -0.0735a -0.2931a 1  












Using the fourth-round database of the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (2008/09 BEEPS), we examine the determinants of the credit 
discouragement in less developed countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The results 
show that whereas firms’ opaqueness, demographic factors, and distance between lender and 
borrower better explain the discouragement due to tough loan price and/or loan application 
procedures, firm risk and banking concentration explain the incidence of discouraged borrowers 
due to the fear of rationing. Innovator status, the legal protection of creditors and lenders in 
the event of default, and the coverage of information sharing instruments help explain 
discouragement in a transversal way. 
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Usando a base de dados do quarto Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (2008/09 BEEPS), este estudo examina os determinantes do desencorajamento de 
crédito em países menos desenvolvidos da Europa Oriental e da Ásia Central. Os resultados 
mostram que, enquanto a rastreabilidade acerca da qualidade das empresas, os fatores 
demográficos, e a distância entre credor e mutuário explicam melhor o desencorajamento 
motivado pelo preço do empréstimo e/ou pela complexidade dos procedimentos de acesso ao 
crédito, o risco da empresa e concentração bancária explicam a incidência do 
desencorajamento de mutuários devido ao medo de racionamento do crédito. O estatuto 
inovador, a proteção jurídica dos credores e mutuários em caso de incumprimento, e a 
cobertura dos instrumentos de partilha de informação ajudam a explicar o desencorajamento 
de uma forma transversal. 
 
Palavras-Chave: Mutuários desencorajados; Países menos desenvolvidos; PMEs 




During the past decades, there has been increased interest from policy makers, 
regulators, and practitioners in the functioning of the financial markets that fund small 
businesses. In particular, there is concern that small businesses may face difficulties in 
accessing formal financing due to asymmetric information and risky nature. Much of this 
concern stems from the recognition that small businesses serve as an engine of economic growth 
and innovation. In most countries small businesses employ a large percentage of the private 
sector workforce, which increases the importance of their needs to policy makers and explains 
why governments worldwide have prompted supply-side initiatives such as loan guarantee 
schemes and seed capital funds (e.g. Levenson and Willard, 2000; Cressy, 2002). Considering 
the economic and social importance of the small business sector, questions about the particular 
nature of the private debt of small business finance are at the core of the research agenda 
(Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008). 
Bank loans are the most widely used form of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
financing (Berger and Udell, 1995), though these exchange relationships often suffer from 
market imperfections, such as information asymmetries. Information asymmetries occur 
because lenders lack reliable information regarding the default risk of the loan applicants. The 
mostly unlisted small businesses also tend to lack audited financial statements, so they have 
difficulties signalling their quality to financial institutions. Such information asymmetries can 
be so severe that they eventually lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Lenders 
may reject part of firms’ loan amount requests (i.e. type I rationing), simply turn down the 
credit (i.e. type II rationing; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009), or offer a menu of contracts 
that acts as a self-selection mechanism to distinguish good from bad borrowers (Bester, 1985). 
Alternatively, some firms do not apply for loans, even when they seek capital. These firms are 
the so-called ‘discouraged borrowers’. The literature defines a discouraged borrower as ‘a good 
firm requiring finance that chooses not to apply to the bank because it feels its application will 
be rejected’ (Kon and Storey, 2003:47). 
According to Kon and Storey (2003), one of the most important determinants of 
‘discouragement’ is the unobservable quality of the borrower, which is, in principle, applicable 
to developed and less developed economies. Nevertheless, the majority of empirical studies 
are concentrated in developed economies (e.g. Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2009, and Han et 
al., 2009, for the United States; Popov and Udell, 2010; Brown et al., 2011; and Popov and 
Ongena, 2011, for European markets) rather than in less developed countries, where the 
discouragement seems to be greater (e.g. Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Cole and Dietrich, 
2012). These less developed countries, especially those in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, are 
a relevant sample to study because, since 2005, they experienced both strong credit market 
developments and considerable institutional changes, including the development of 
information sharing systems. 
Historically, many reforms have been prompted by recessions or financial crises. The 
economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the regions most affected by recent crises, have 
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been the most active reformers in the world, partly due to easier access to finance, which 
became more difficult after 2008. Since 2005, close to two-thirds of new credit bureaus were 
created by these economies and the coverage of credit information instruments increased 
dramatically, including an improvement in the lending environment by establishing centralized 
pledged registries and/or by improving the position of creditors in bankruptcy procedures 
(Doing Business Report [DBR], 2010). Private sector credit in less developed countries in this 
region climbed from 24.2% of the gross domestic product in 2005 to 46.5% at the end of 2009. 
The quality of lending, however, worsened considerably, with the ratio of non-performing loans 
to total gross loans in banks’ portfolios rising from 3.3% in 2005 to 7.2% at the end of 200946. 
Hence, we specifically examine the determinants of discouragement in less developed countries 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we define as discouraged 
borrowers those borrowers who need banking credit but do not apply due to fear of being 
rejected/rationed and by tough explicit/implicit loan price or tough loan application 
procedures. Based on this definition, we capture several differences predicting the probability 
of being discouraged between discouragement types, extending knowledge on discouraged 
borrowers in loan dynamics. Second, we examine the conditions under which both high- and 
low-type discouraged borrowers exist in less developed countries. In these countries, 
application costs and screening errors, which lie at the heart of the discouragement concept, 
are, in principle, higher than in other banking marketplaces. Hence, based on a country-level 
analysis, this study explicitly measures the impact on the probability of being discouraged 
resulting from changes in the depth and coverage of public and private information sharing 
instruments. Additionally, we control the impact of the strength of the legal rights index in this 
probability, including improvements in the legal environment for secure lending, for example, 
by establishing centralized pledge registers or improving the position of creditors in bankruptcy 
procedures. 
We use the fourth-round database of the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (2008/09 BEEPS), conducted from 2007 to 2009, which covers 
approximately 11,800 enterprises in 29 countries, including firms in both rural areas and large 
cities. Our data set comprises 10,571 SMEs with coherent information regarding discouragement 
status, including 2,207 firms that did not apply for loans during the last fiscal year although 
they needed them (i.e. discouraged borrowers), 4,084 firms that did not apply for loans because 
they did not need them (i.e. non-applicants), and 4,280 firms that applied for loans in the last 
fiscal year (i.e. loan applicants).47 This data set covers the most recent contextual changes 
faced by several developed countries, such as the deterioration in access to finance, crime, or 
corruption, that may influence the number of discouraged borrowers. 
                                                          
46 Public data available at the “World Bank Data Indicators”  
47 Among those firms, 16.17% (692) had their loan application rejected by lenders and 83.83% (3,588) of 
the loans requested were approved.  
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The results show that, whereas firms’ opaqueness, demographic factors, and distance 
between lender and borrower better explain the discouragement due to tough loan prices 
and/or loan application procedures, firm risk and banking concentration explain the incidence 
of discouraged borrowers due to the fear of rationing. Innovator status, the legal protection of 
creditors and lenders in the event of default, and the coverage of information sharing 
instruments help to explain the discouragement in a transversal way. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on discouraged borrowers. Section 4.3 describes the data, variables, and 
method. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical results. Section 4.5 presents the robustness test 
and Section 4.6 concludes the paper. 
 
4.2. Empirical and theoretical background literature 
Traditionally, academic studies on small business finance have concentrated much of 
their attention on firms that apply for funding and, specifically, on the problem of credit 
rationing (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987; Bigsten et al., 2003). However, they often indicate low rates of loan rejection 
(e.g. Cosh and Hughes, 2003; Fraser, 2004) and it appears entirely plausible that the great 
majority of these firms were not creditworthy (Freel et al., 2012). For example, Levenson and 
Willard (2000) for the United States48 and Freel et al. (2012) for the United Kingdom49 find that 
the percentage of small businesses discouraged from applying for a bank loan is (almost) twice 
as high as the rate of rejected loans. Given their significant numbers in the population, 
discouraged borrowers cannot be thought of as mere random samples; therefore, they cannot 
be excluded from any formal analysis of the determinants of availability and/or the cost of 
capital (Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2009). Hence, the discouragement may be a relevant 
phenomenon, even for firms that do not apply for credit, if the prospects for acceptance 
discourage firms that do not reach the stage where their loan applications might be accepted 
(Levenson and Willard, 2000). This is the problem of credit-constrained borrowers, which goes 
beyond the type I or II rationing problem. These borrowers are so-called discouraged borrowers. 
Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) define a discouraged borrower as a business owner who avoids 
applying for credit for fear of being rejected, thus labelling the process as a ‘prescreening and 
self-selection issue’.50 Jappeli (1990) argues that omitting this group of borrowers could lead 
to biased estimates of the probability of borrowers being credit constrained, since the self-
                                                          
48 The authors used data provided by the 1988–1989 United States National Survey of Small Business 
Finance (US NSSBF). 
49 Their study was conducted based on data provided by the biannual survey of small business attitudes 
and opinions undertaken on behalf of the Federation of Small Business in the United Kingdom. 
50 In the labour market, a discouraged worker is defined as an individual who wants a job and is available 




selection of applicants could induce intermediaries to adopt screening rules that differ from 
those that would prevail if discouraged borrowers were also to apply. Hence, if the extent of 
discouragement is indeed great or significantly larger than the extent of rejection, then 
addressing the fears of discouraged borrowers may be a more appropriate means of intervention 
than traditional supply-side mechanisms (Freel et al., 2012). 
Studying the relevance of this topic, in the context of small business finance, Kon and 
Storey (2003) provided a heuristic framework modelling the application behavior of firms and 
loan granting decisions by banks in a pooling equilibrium involving both the discouragement and 
rejection of loan applications. According to the authors, one of the most important 
determinants of discouragement is the unobservable quality of the borrower. Ideally, lenders 
would like to encourage good borrowers and discourage bad borrowers, but they do not know 
or do not know exactly the borrower’s quality due of information asymmetries (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). Hence, if the loan application is costly and banks possess imperfect screening 
instruments of loan applicants, good borrowers are discouraged from applying for a bank loan. 
Therefore, the authors hypothesize that the discouragement depends on three factors: 
screening errors, the scale of application costs, and the difference in interest rates between 
banks and other moneylenders. 
For example, Diagne (1999)51 shows that borrowers’ decisions to apply for a loan are 
primarily determined by their expectations of the likely value of the credit limit. Chakravarty 
and Yilmazer (2009)52 examine the impact of banking relationships on a small borrower’s 
decision to apply for credit based on the likelihood of loan application acceptance and on the 
interest rate that the borrower can obtain if the application is approved. Consequently, 
borrowers with adverse expectations about the credit limit or loan price are self-selected, 
staying out of the credit markets even though they need a bank loan. This self-selection could 
also put aside good borrowers who are wrong in their expectations, since they might be able to 
obtain worthwhile loans at reasonable costs. Such borrowers are defined as ‘falsely 
discouraged’ (Diagne, 1999). Han et al. (2009)53 suggest, however, that discouragement is an 
efficient self-rationing mechanism, because riskier borrowers are more likely to be 
discouraged. The authors find that riskier borrowers have a higher probability of 
discouragement that increases with longer financial relationships. Therefore, imperfect 
information lies at the heart of the concept of discouraged borrowers, which may depend on 
the business quality. 
Empirically, the quality of small business is measured in several ways, such as by Dun 
and Bradstreet scores (e.g. Elsas and Krahnen, 2000; Han et al., 2009), by internal banking 
ratings, and from firms’ financial ratios (e.g. Booth and Booth, 2006; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; 
                                                          
51 This study specifically addresses the discouragement problem in the household sector in the formal and 
informal markets in Malawi. 
52 Their study was conducted based on 1993, 1995, 1998, and 2003 data provided by the US NSSBF. 
53 This study was conducted using 1998 data from the US NSSBF. 
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Menkhoff et al., 2006). Other authors use bankruptcy events (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; 
Jiménez et al., 2006) or overdue tax/utility payments (Hanedar et al., 2014) to measure firm 
risk. In addition, the attribution of public quality certifications to small enterprises means that 
banks view such enterprises as less likely to default on loans, influencing the incidence of 
discouraged borrowers (Kon and Storey, 2003). Firm age and firm size are also frequently used 
as proxies for firm viability (e.g. Avery et al., 1998). A positive relation between firm age/size 
and creditworthiness is derived by Jovanovic (1982) and, despite several other authors testing 
their non-monotonic relation as a proxy for firm risk (e.g. Jensen and McGuckin, 1997), 
Levenson and Willard (2000) suggest that external financing is directed toward the pool of 
older/larger firms that have a higher probability of repayment as a whole and relatively low 
screening costs. Furthermore, as a function of lifecycle, older/larger firms are likely to have a 
greater need for finance than their younger/smaller counterparts (e.g. Vos et al., 2007). Ceteris 
paribus, small firms are also likely to be seeking to raise small amounts of funding, which banks 
may be less willing to provide because they incur proportionately greater costs and hence yield 
lower profit margins (Treichel and Scott, 2006). Empirically, Cosh and Hughes (2003) show 
older/larger small businesses submitting more frequent credit applications and obtaining higher 
success rates. Other authors (e.g. Han et al., 2009; Freel et al., 2012; Chakravarty and Xiang, 
2013) find that larger firms are less likely to be discouraged, as well as older firms (Chakravarty 
and Xiang, 2013). 
Because small businesses are mainly non-listed firms, not followed by analysts and 
lacking audited financial statements, they often have difficulties signalling their qualities to 
financial institutions (Craig et al., 2007; Freel, 2007; Zambaldi et al., 2011). Moreover, these 
firms are not always willing to release any information, since it is time-consuming (costly) to 
do so (Berger and Frame, 2007). Hence, the acquisition of reliable information from small, 
opaque borrowers is a concern to lenders (Ang, 1991). Therefore, some authors (e.g. Godlewski 
and Weill, 2011; Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013) use businesses’ annual financial statements by 
an external auditor to address the quality and transparency of information. Since the greater 
quality and availability of a firm’s financial information reduce informational asymmetries, 
such public statements are expected to decrease the likelihood of being discouraged. 
Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) use business trade credit ratios and Peterson and Rajan (1994) 
business cards and credit lines to measure the information transparency of a business. Trade 
credit can play an important role in the credit decision process of banks, because suppliers 
have private information about their customers (Biais and Gollier, 1997), which they can convey 
to the banks (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006; Gama and Van Auken, 2014). Peterson and Rajan 
(1994) and Han et al. (2009) argue that business credit card holders and users of lines of credit 
tend to be less informationally opaque because their creditworthiness is assessed in the 
external credit market. 
Kon and Storey (2003) suggest that screening errors and application costs arising from 
information asymmetries are the main determinants of discouragement. Hence, one could 
argue that the discouraged are a function of pre-existing relationships with banks. According 
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to Han et al. (2009), banks can better collect information on borrowers by monitoring 
transactions on their current accounts, whereas this ability is limited among other types of 
lenders. Hence, seeking funding from banks, firms are likely to face lower application costs and 
lenders to commit lower screening errors. Since reliable information on small businesses is rare 
and costly, relationship lending is often considered the most appropriate lending technique for 
banks to collect soft information on small businesses (e.g. Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000; Baas 
and Schrooten, 2006; Zambaldi et al., 2011). Relationship lending should improve a bank’s 
knowledge of the characteristics of both the firm and its projects (Boot and Thakor, 1994). The 
lender also learns more about the hidden attributes and actions of the borrower, thus reducing 
information asymmetries (Jiménez et al., 2006). This knowledge should lead to improving the 
availability (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and reducing costs (Berger and Udell, 1995) of small 
business financing. Similarly, closer relationships should translate into ameliorated perceptions 
regarding the availability of debt and its price, contributing to mitigating the incidence of the 
discouragement (e.g. Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2009; Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013). However, 
when the relationship is exclusive, a lender can take advantage of its monopolist position and 
require high borrowing costs, exerting its information monopoly and its ex post superior 
bargaining power, as in the so-called hold-up problem (Sharpe, 1991; Detragiache et al., 2000). 
Hence, multiple borrowing relationships provide the opportunity for competition between 
finance providers and avoid the possibility of rent extraction. This strand of literature suggests 
that lower borrowing concentration reduces borrowing costs because a sole lender can charge 
a premium by ‘locking in’ a small business (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). Empirically, Han 
et al. (2009) and Chakravarty and Xiang (2013) find that the number of sources of financial 
services is negatively related with the incidence of discouragement. However, Cavalluzzo et 
al. (2002) report an opposite result. 
Another important determinant of discouragement is the physical distance between the 
bank and the small business. Despite contradictory results provided by the empirical literature 
in regard to the influence of physical distance on lending terms (e.g. Hainz et al., 2003; Inderst 
and Mueller, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009; Hanedar et al., 2014), it seems consensual that a non-
local lender has an unfair disadvantage compared to local lenders regarding the collection of 
soft information on borrowers (Jiménez et al., 2009). Hence, the costs of gathering and 
processing site-specific soft information about potential borrowers increase with distance 
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Likewise, we anticipate that the application costs should increase 
with distance, which could suggest that businesses located closer to the bank have a lower 
tendency of becoming a discouraged borrower.54 Additionally, some authors (e.g. Cavalluzzo et 
al., 2002;55 Han et al., 2009; Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013) assume that the discouragement is 
                                                          
54 However, foreign banks may be more reluctant than domestic banks to lend to opaque firms (i.e. small 
and young firms) but poach depositors and safe borrowers from domestic financial intermediaries while 
remaining unwilling to lend to local entrepreneurial firms (Detragiache et al., 2008). 
55 This study was conducted using 1993 data from the US NSSBF. 
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affected by the degree of concentration in local banking markets. According to Brown et al. 
(2011), the degree of difficulty in accessing a loan could increase with the level of bank market 
concentration. Hence, we could expect banking concentration to be positively related to 
discouragement. 
While it is consensual that increasing the informational flows between small businesses 
and lenders decreases screening errors and application costs, there is no empirical evidence of 
these effects on the likelihood of being discouraged. The theory suggests that sharing 
information between banks and borrowers increases the volume of lending (e.g. Pagano and 
Jappeli, 1993; Brown et al., 2011). Empirically, some authors show that the depth of 
information sharing instruments extends the credit to new, previously unfunded firms (e.g. 
Hanedar et al., 2014) and its coverage impacts the explicit and/or implicit loan price (e.g. 
Djankov et al., 2007; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Godlewski and Weill, 2011). Accordingly, if 
information sharing instruments are important in facilitating access to finance, particularly for 
small businesses (Djankov et al., 2007), we could expect that they increase the confidence of 
borrowers in applying for bank loans (Brown et al., 2011), reducing the incidence of discouraged 
borrowers. 
Finally, recent literature shows that credit constraints may depend on entrepreneurial 
and demographic characteristics. For example, there is a large literature on the extent to which 
female-owned business are discriminated against in credit markets, especially in the small 
business context (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Vos et al., 2007). Likewise, some authors (e.g. 
Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Han et al., 2009, Storey, 2004) find that the incidence of 
discouragement varies with owner/manager gender. Similarly, some studies explore the link 
between entrepreneurial experience and credit constraints (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Han 
et al., 2009). Westhead et al. (2005) suggest that portfolio entrepreneurs are characterized by 
their more diverse experiences in comparison to serial or novice peers. Hence, we anticipate 
that entrepreneurial experience likely decreases the incidence of discouragement. 
In models of entrepreneurial finance prevailing in the small business context (Hart and 
Oulton, 1999), ownership structure is very important in predicting credit conditions. For 
example, traditional agency models predict that concentrated ownership and owner–
management firms will lead to a minimum (or even zero) level of agency costs between owners 
and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This model assumes that 
concentrated ownership is motivated and mainly concerned with the firm’s long-term survival 
(Ang, 1992), which promotes the alignment of interests between lenders and firms, inducing a 
reduction of risk (Diamond, 1989). Some studies, however, contest the traditional agency view, 
arguing that agency costs in concentrated ownership could be even higher than in firms with 
fractional ownership due to possible negative effects of self-control and parental altruism on 
management efficiency (e.g. Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2003). In line with this strand 
of literature, Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) and Han et al. (2009) find that family-owned firms have 
a higher probability of being discouraged. Finally, some authors extend the study of the 
relationship between entrepreneurial activity and credit constraints to dimensions such as 
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innovation (e.g. Freel, 2007; Freel et al., 2012) and the export profile of a business (e.g. Brown 
et al., 2011), concerned with demonstrating that differences in funding outcomes are 
attributable to the specific characteristic in question, rather than some other source of firm-
level heterogeneity. 
In summary, screening errors, application costs, and consequently the prevalence of 
discouragement are likely to be associated with the profile of the entrepreneur/business, the 
quality of the borrower, as well as the nature of relationship lending and the location of the 
business. Because our focus is to examine discouragement across a pool of small businesses 
operating in less developed countries, we expect that the scale of discouragement also depends 
on country-specific characteristics, such as the banking sector, credit environment, and 
macroeconomic characteristics. 
 
4.3. Data, variables, and method 
4.3.1. Data 
The majority of studies around the topic of discouraged borrowers are undertaken 
within a single country with a relatively sophisticated small business financing marketplace 
(e.g. Levenson and Willard, 2000; Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2009; Han et al., 2009; Freel et 
al., 2012, for the United States; Brown et al., 2011, for European markets), providing results 
that should not be extrapolated to less developed financial markets, where credit application 
costs and screening errors are greatly amplified (Kon and Storey 2003). 
Contrary to previous studies, this paper investigates the problem of discouragement in 
less developed countries using a cross-country approach. Less developed countries, especially 
those in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, are a relevant sample to study because, since 2005, 
they experienced both strong credit market development and considerable institutional 
changes, including the development of information sharing systems. Hence, we use the fourth-
round database of the 2008/09 BEEPS, conducted from 2007 to 2009, which covers 
approximately 11,800 enterprises in 29 countries, including firms in both rural areas and large 
cities. This survey examines the quality of the business environment as determined by a wide 
range of interactions between firms and the state that serve as input to the policy dialogue of 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The BEEPS is a joint initiative of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank Group. The survey was first 
undertaken on behalf of the EBRD and the World Bank in 1999–2000, when it was administered 
to approximately 4,000 enterprises in 26 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia to assess 
the environment for private enterprise and business development. In the second round, the 
BEEPS was administered to approximately 6,500 enterprises in 27 countries in 2002. In the third 
round, in 2005, this survey included approximately 9,500 enterprises in 28 countries.  
The 2008/09 BEEPS survey underwent several improvements from the previous round 
in 2005, offering numerous advantages compared with previous rounds. First, the new BEEPS 
allows for greater comparability of Europe and Central Asia countries with countries in other 
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regions. Second, this survey was restructured to make it compatible with the Enterprise Surveys 
of the World Bank’s Enterprise Analysis Unit in order to collect feedback from enterprises in 
EBRD countries of operation on the state of the private sector, as well as to help in building a 
panel of enterprise data. Hence, contrary to previous rounds, this data set makes it possible to 
track changes in the business environment over time. Finally, this database covers the most 
recent contextual changes faced by several developed countries, such as the deterioration of 
access to finance, crime, or corruption, that can influence the number of discouraged 
borrowers.  
To the best of our knowledge, only Brown et al. (2011) use similar data set (i.e. the 
third round of the BEEPS, 2005) to compare access to bank credit for firms in Eastern Europe 
and Western European countries, providing fresh evidence regarding the determinants of credit 
applying and borrowing discouragement. However, unlike our study, the authors adopt the firms 
which ‘do not need bank loans’ as the base outcome to test the determinants of 
discouragement, testing the binomial between non-applicants that simply do not need loans 
and non-applicants seeking loans. This approach hurts Jappeli’s (1990) concept of discouraged 
borrowers and fails to provide guidelines for practitioners and policy makers about the 
incentives that should be tested and implemented to lead firms that actually need loans to 
effectively apply for them.56 
To complement the BEEPS information, we also use the Bankscope database and 
indicators provided by the World Bank (i.e. World Bank Data Indicators [WBDI] and Doing 
Business Report [DBR]) as well as by the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). 
To reconcile the definition of SME with both the BEEPS definition and Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD] conventions, we define SMEs to be firms with a 
maximum of 250 full-time employees.57 Thus, the data set comprises 10,571 SMEs58 with 
coherent information regarding discouragement status, including 2,207 (20.88%) firms that did 
not apply for loans during the last fiscal years although they needed them (i.e. discouraged 
borrowers), 4,084 (38.63%) firms that did not apply for loans because they did not need them 
(i.e. non-applicants), and 4,280 (40.49%) firms that applied for loans in the last fiscal year (i.e. 
                                                          
56 Furthermore, in their study, Brown et al. (2011) aggregate small and larger firms, which may bias the 
results, considering that larger firms have easier access to other sources of finance, such as the stock 
market. 
57 The BEEPS definitions of enterprise sizes are as follows: small firms have two to 49 employees, medium 
firms have 50 to 249 employees, and large firms have 250 to 9,999 employees. 
58 The distribution of SMEs by country is as follows: Albania (1.52%), Armenia (3.35%), Azerbaijan (3.33%), 
Belarus (2.14%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (3.10%), Bulgaria (2.44%), Croatia (1.27%), Czech Republic 
(2.10%), Estonia (2.33%), Macedonia (3.15%), Georgia (3.22%), Hungary (2.41%), Kazakhstan (4.64%), 
Kosovo (2.35%), Kyrgyz Republic (2.10%), Latvia (2.26%), Lithuania (2.33%), Moldova (3.07%), Mongolia 
(3.15%), Montenegro (1.01%), Poland (4.33%), Romania (4.29%), Russia (9.75%), Serbia (3.10%), Slovak 




loan applicants).59 See Appendix 4.1 for the definition of discouraged borrowers.60 We find that 
the prevalence of discouraged borrowers is almost three times higher than that of rejected 
loans, representing an increase of 50% compared to the results of Levenson and Willard (2000) 
and Freel et al. (2012). Furthermore, the ratio of discouraged borrowers to loan seekers in our 
data set is 34%, which is higher (14.6%) than that reported by Freel et al. (2012). This result 
shows that the discouragement is a problematic issue in SME financing in less developed 
countries.  
Since our goal is to analyse the problem of discouragement, we exclude from the 
analysis those firms that did not state a desire for credit (i.e. firms that indicated they did not 
apply for a loan because they had no need for credit). Thus, our final data set comprises 6,487 




To examine the determinants of discouragement, we use the variable DBorrower as a 
dependent variable that equals one if the firm was discouraged from applying external funding 
and zero otherwise (i.e. if the firm applied for credit).61 The independent variables are divided 
into six groups: characteristics of the business and entrepreneur/manager, the quality of the 
borrower, the nature of the relationship lending, application costs, characteristics of the 
banking sector, and characteristics of the credit environment and macroeconomic variables. 
These variables closely follow the literature on the credit constraints and financing obstacles 
of SMEs (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Beck et al., 2005; Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2009). See 
Table 4.1. for the definitions of the variables. 
                                                          
59 Among these firms, 692 (16.17%) had their loan application rejected and 3,588 (83.83%) had their loans 
approved.  
60 This study focuses on the responses to three questions of the BEEPS survey: 
i) Referring to the last fiscal year, did this establishment apply for any loan or line of credit? 
[yes; no] 
ii) What was the main reason this establishment did not apply for any loan or line of credit? [no 
need for a loan; list of discouraging factors] 
iii) In the last fiscal year, did this establishment apply for any new loan or line of credit that 
was rejected? [yes, no] 
61 Discouraging factors are that the application procedures for loans are complex, interest rates are not 
favourable, collateral requirements are too high, the size of the loan and maturity are insufficient, 
informational payments are necessary to obtain bank loans, did not think it would be approved, and others 
(based on Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013). 
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Table 4.1. Variable definitions and sources 
This table presents the variable definitions and sources of the study data. BEEPS stands for the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (2009); WBDI stands for the World Bank 
Data Indicators; and EBRD stands for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The 
industry classification follows ISIC classification, revision 3.1. 
Variable Definition Source 
Identifying discouraged borrowers 
LSeeker Demands for bank loans (0,1) BEEPS 
DBorrower Discouraged borrower (0,1) BEEPS 
Characteristics of the business and entrepreneur/manager 
FAge Age of the firm, measured in years  
FSize Size of the firm, measured by the number of full-time employees BEEPS 




ExtAud Firm has its annual financial statements checked and certified by an 
external auditor (0,1) 
BEEPS 
Ownership Share of the firm that is owned by the principal owner (%) BEEPS 
M_Woman Top manager is a woman (0,1) BEEPS 
M_Exp Top manager’s experience, measured by the number of years of 
experience working in this sector 
BEEPS 
Innovation Firm introduced new products r services in the last three years (0,1) BEEPS 
Export The sales that goes directly to exportation (%) BEEPS 
   
Quality of borrower 
Overdue Firm has utility and/or tax payments that are overdue by more than 90 
days (0,1) 
BEEPS 
Qualcert Firm has an internationally recognized quality certification, such as ISO 
9000 or ISO 9002 (0,1) 
BEEPS 
Nature of the relationship lending  
Overdraft Firm has an overdraft facility (0,1)  
Application Costs 
City Firm is located in the capital or in a city with a population over 1 million 
(0,1) 
BEEPS 
Characteristics of the banking sector 
Cr Share of the assets of the three largest banks in the whole banking 
system’s assets (%) 
BANKSCO
PE 
Foreign Share of the assets of foreign banks in the entire banking system’s 
assets (%) 
WBDI 
Characteristics of the credit environment  
LegalRights  Strength of legal rights index (0 = weak to 12 = strong)  WBDI 
 CreditInfo Depth of credit information index (0 = weak to 6 = strong)  DBR 
Privcbr 
Number of firms listed by a private credit bureau with current 
information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding 
(% of the adult population) 
WBDI 
Pubcreg 
Number of firms listed by a public credit registry with current 
information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding  
(% of the adult population) 
WBDI 
Macroeconomic conditions  
GDPpcppp Gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power parity 





r ved Loan application (during the last fiscal year) was approved  BEEPS 
Rejected Loan application (during the last fiscal year) was rejected BEEPS 
Control Variables  
IND_GroupD Firm operating in the sector of group D (i.e., manufacturing sector) (0,1) BEEPS 
IND_GroupF Firm operating in the sector of group F (i.e., construction sector) (0,1) BEEPS 
IND_GroupGH Firm operating in the sector of group G or H (i.e., service sector) (0,1) BEEPS 
IND_GroupI Firm operating in the sector of group  I (i.e., transport and storage 
sector) (0,1) 
BEEPS 





Characteristics of the business and entrepreneur/manager include Fage, which is the 
firm’s age measured in years (e.g. Freel et al., 2012); FSize, which is the firm size  measured 
by the number of full-time employees (e.g. Han et al., 2009; Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013); 
TradeCredit (%), which is the share of a firm’s purchases of material inputs and services paid 
on credit (e.g. Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006); ExtAud, a binary variable that equals one if 
the firm has its annual financial statements checked and certified by an external auditor and 
zero otherwise (e.g. Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013); Ownership (%), the share of the firm that is 
owned by the principal owner (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al., 2012); M_Woman, a binary variable that 
equals one if the firm’s top manager is female and zero otherwise (e.g. Han et al., 2009); 
M_Exp, the experience of the firm’s top manager, measured by the number of years working in 
the sector62 (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al., 2002); Innovation, a binary variable that equals one if the 
firm introduced new products or services in the last three years and zero otherwise (e.g. Freel, 
2007); and Export, the percentage of sales (%) that goes directly to exportation (e.g. Brown et 
al., 2011). 
The quality of the borrower is measured by the variables Overdue and Qualcert, where 
Overdue is a binary variable that equals one if the firm has utility payments that are overdue 
by more than 90 days and zero otherwise (e.g. Hanedar et al., 2014) and Qualcert is a binary 
variable that equals one if the firm has an internationally recognized quality certification, such 
as ISO 9000 or ISO 9002, and zero otherwise (e.g. Hanedar et al., 2014). 
To measure the nature of the relationship lending, due to data limitations we employ 
only one variable, Overdrafts, which is a binary variable that equals one if the business has an 
overdraft facility and zero otherwise. We expect that banks better screen firms with contracted 
services/products such as overdraft facilities. Unfortunately, our data cannot help us to extend 
this analysis to the effect of the exclusive relation or the length of the relationship lending on 
the incidence of discouraged borrowers. The application costs are measured by the variable 
City, which is a binary variable that equals one if the firm is located in the capital or in a city 
with a population over 1 million and zero otherwise (e.g. Hanedar et al., 2014).63 
To measure the characteristics of the banking sector, we employ variables related to 
market concentration. Hence, we define the variable Cr, which measures the share (%) of the 
assets of the three largest banks in the entire banking system’s assets (e.g. Brown et al., 2011) 
                                                          
62 Han et al. (2009) use the owner’s information (e.g. owner’s age, owner’s college degree, and the 
owner’s experience in the business). However, our survey does not report such information for the firm 
owner. Hence, we use the information for the firm’s top manager. We should note that, usually, for small 
firms, the top manager is also the owner of the firm.  
63 Our data set does not report information about the distance between the firm and the primary 
institution. Alternatively, we use the variable City based on the assumption that big cities have a higher 
density of banks’ branches, reducing the distance between borrowers and lenders, which increases the 
share of soft information. New informational technologies (Han, 2008) mainly directed at the treatment 
of hard information should also reduce application costs, even though we note that the dissemination of 
these technologies is more moderate in less developed countries. 
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and the variable Foreign, which corresponds to the share (%) of the assets of foreign banks in 
the whole banking system’s assets.64 
The characteristics of the credit environment include the variable LegalRights, a 
categorical variable that measure the strength of legal rights protecting creditors and 
borrowers, ranging from 0 (weak) to 12 (strong). We also include the depth of information 
sharing instruments, measured by CreditInfo, which is a categorical variable ranging from 0 
(weak) to 6 (strong) (e.g. Hanedar et al., 2014), as well as their coverage, measured by Privcbr, 
which is the number of firms listed by a private credit bureau with current information on 
repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding as a percentage of the adult population, 
and by Pubcreg, the number of firms listed by a public credit registry with current information 
on repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding as a percentage of the adult 
population (e.g. Qian and Strahan, 2007). 
Macroeconomic conditions are measured by GDPpcppp, that is, the gross domestic 
product per capita based on purchasing power parity (constant 2005 international dollars), 
which proxies for economic development (e.g. Godlewski and Weill., 2011). We include four 
industry dummies as control variables: IND_GroupD is a dummy variable that takes the value 
one if the firm sector is part of group D (i.e. the manufacturing sector);65 IND_GroupF is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm sector is part of group F (i.e. the 
construction sector); IND_GroupGH is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm 
sector is part of group G or H (i.e. the service sector); IND_GroupI is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if the firm sector is part of group I (i.e. the transport and storage sector); 
IND_GroupK is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm belongs to sub-sector 72 




To examine the conditions under which borrowers are discouraged from applying for a 
loan, this paper uses a binary probit model66 (e.g. Freel et al., 2012) expressed as follows: 
 
DBorroweri = α + β1 Characteristics of the business and entrepreneur/manageri + β2 
Quality of borroweri + β3 Nature of the relationship lendingi + β4 Application costsi + β5 
                                                          
64 During a period of financial crisis, credit constraints are expected to vary between national banks and 
foreign banks more exposed to the risk of contagion. Furthermore, a foreign-owned bank can be a distant 
lender. We thank the panel of the Fifth International Conference of the Financial Engineering and Banking 
Society for these comments. 
65 According to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3.1. 
66 According to the authors, the loss of nuance from using the binary probit model is relatively minor 




Characteristics of the banking sectori + β5 Characteristics of the credit environmenti + β5 
Macroeconomic variablesi + εi, 
(Eq. 1) 
where εi ~ N (0, σ
2) for i = 1,…, N. 
 
The variable DBorroweri, is a binary variable that equals one if firm i was discouraged from 
applying for external funding and zero otherwise; βi is the vector of parameters of the 
independent variables X to be estimated, and ε is the error term. 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2. reports the descriptive statistics. This table shows that more than half of 
the SMEs included in our data set are loans seekers (i.e. 6,487). Among these firms, 4,280 (66%) 
applied for a loan and 2,207 (34%) are classified as discouraged borrowers. On average, loan 
applicants are relatively young (i.e. 13 years old) and have 50 employees. The typical loan 
applicant pays more than 58% of its material inputs and services on credit and 46% are audited 
by an external entity. The large majority of firm shares belongs to a single person (i.e. the 
mean value of ownership concentration is 78%) and is managed by a man (80%) with 16 years of 
experience in the business. Loan applicants launched at least one innovation in the market in 
the last three years (56%), particularly oriented to domestic consumption (only 7.8% of outputs 
were exports), and 72% of these firms did not have a quality certification or were overdue on 
payments in the last three years (only 9% of loan applicants reported having been overdue on 
payments). Furthermore, loan seekers usually have overdraft facilities (57%) with a bank. The 
traditional loan applicant (i.e. 61%) operates in a small city or a rural area and operates in 
countries with satisfactory indices of legal rights (i.e. 6 out of 12) and depth of information 
sharing instruments (i.e. 4 out of 6) but with a low coverage level. Public (private) credit 
bureaus cover only 4% (20%) of the population. 
A discouraged borrower is not much younger (i.e. 12 years old) but is smaller (i.e. 34 
employees vs. 58 employees for applicants borrowers) and buys less on credit (i.e. 54% of its 
material inputs and services). Typically, discouraged borrowers are not externally audited (i.e. 
only 34% were audited). The ownership structure is more highly concentrated (i.e. 81%). 
Furthermore, the manager is less experienced (i.e. with 15 years). The firms are less innovative 
(i.e. only a minority of discouraged borrowers launched at least one innovation in the market 
in the last three years) and have a lower ratio of exportations (i.e. 4.61% vs. 9.44% of applicant 
borrowers). However, they have a similar incidence of overdue events (i.e. 8%) but a lower 
incidence of quality certifications (i.e. 16% vs. 28% for applicant borrowers). Additionally, the 
percentage of these firms with overdraft facilities is lower (i.e. 26% vs. 57% for applicant 
borrowers). The number of firms working in small cities is higher among discouraged borrowers 
(i.e. 66%) and the banking concentration is higher (57.40%). Finally, discouraged borrowers 
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operate in countries with lower indices of legal rights and less depth and lower coverage of 











                                                          
67 Recall that the percentage of discouraged borrowers in the sample is 34%. 
Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of key variables.a In the 
empirical modelling, these variables are transformed into the natural 




Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LSeeker 10571 0.61 0.49 0 1 
DBorrower 6487 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Fagea 10343 13.09 11.32 0 181 
FSizea 10480 47.21 55.25 1 250 
TradeCredita 6440 60.44 32.34 0 100 
ExtAud 10386 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Ownershipa 10040 79.21 26.60 1 100 
M_Woman 10495 0.20 0.40 0 1 
      
M_Expa 10274 16.48 10.30 1 75 
Innovation 10533 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Exporta 10536 7.46 21.45 0 100 
Overdue 10497 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Qualcert 10210 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Overdrafts 9834 0.43 0.50 0 1 
City 10571 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Cra,b 10323 56.27 18.15 31.81 100 
Foreigna,b 9767 54.81 30.82 6.60 99.20 
LegalRightsb  10323 5.77 2.44 2 10 
CreditInfob 10323 4.17 1.55 0 6 
Privcbra,b 10088 20.41 24.52 0 91.90 
Pubcrega,b 10323 3.63 5.85 0 28.10 
GDPpcpppa,b 10323 10885.00 5788.54 1660.86 27225.50 
Rejected   4280  0.162  0.368  0  1  
IND_GroupD 10571 0.44 0.50 0 1 
IND_GroupF 10571 0.09 0.28 0 1 
IND_GroupG
H 
10571 0.42 0.49 0 1 
IND_GroupI 10571 0.05 0.21 0 1 




Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics (Continuation) 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of key variables in different groups.a In the empirical modelling, these variables are 
transformed into the natural logarithm of the real value plus the unit value.b These variables vary across countries. 
  SMEs (NON-LOAN SEEKERS) SMEs (LOAN SEEKERS) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LSeeker 4084 - - - - 6487 1.00 0.00 1 1 
DBorrower - - - - - 6487 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Fagea 4012 13.01 11.20 0 163 6331 13.13 11.40 0 181 
FSizea 4046 43.21 52.56 1 250 6434 49.72 56.75 1 250 
TradeCredita 2222 64.55 31.88 0 100 4218 58.28 32.37 0 100 
ExtAud 4004 0.40 0.49 0 1 6382 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Ownershipa 3904 80.28 26.51 1 100 6136 78.52 26.63 1 100 
M_Woman 4070 0.21 0.41 0 1 6425 0.19 0.40 0 1 
M_Expa 3962 16.79 10.57 1 66 6312 16.28 10.12 1 75 
Innovation 4075 0.49 0.50 0 1 6458 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Exporta 4068 6.92 21.10 0 100 6468 7.80 21.66 0 100 
Overdue 4056 0.05 0.21 0 1 6441 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Qualcert 3982 0.24 0.43 0 1 6228 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Overdrafts 3706 0.37 0.48 0 1 6128 0.47 0.50 0 1 
City 4084 0.41 0.49 0 1 6487 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Cra,b 3914 56.43 17.36 31.81 100 6409 56.17 18.62 31.81 100 
Foreigna,b 3681 56.51 31.57 6.60 99.20 6086 53.79 30.31 6.60 99.20 
LegalRightsb  3914 5.89 2.45 2 10 6409 5.70 2.43 2 10 
CreditInfob 3914 4.22 1.54 0 6 6409 4.14 1.56 0 6 
Privcbra,b 3821 20.42 23.58 0 91.90 6267 20.40 25.09 0 91.90 
Pubcrega,b 3914 3.25 5.05 0 28.10 6409 3.86 6.28 0 28.10 
GDPpcpppa,b 3914 11370.02 5923.90 1660.86 27225.50 6409 10588.8
0 
5684.43 1660.86 27225.50 
Rejected   - - - - - - - - - - 
IND_GroupD 4084 0.41 0.49 0 1 6487 0.46 0.50 0 1 
IND_GroupF 4084 0.08 0.28 0 1 6487 0.09 0.28 0 1 
IND_GroupGH 4084 0.44 0.50 0 1 6487 0.40 0.49 0 1 
IND_GroupI 4084 0.05 0.21 0 1 6487 0.05 0.21 0 1 




Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics (continuation) 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of key variables in different groups.a In the empirical modelling, these variables are 
transformed into the natural logarithm of the real value plus the unit value.b These variables vary across countries. 
  APPLICANT BORROWERS DISCOURAGED BORROWERS 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LSeeker 4280 1.00 0.00 1 1 2207 1.00 0.00 1 1 
DBorrow
er 
4280 0.00 0.00 0 0 2207 1.00 0.00 1 1 
Fagea 4192 13.58 11.70 0 181 2139 12.25 10.74 0 181 
FSizea 4253 57.96 60.34 1 250 2181 33.64 44.81 1 250 
TradeCr
edita 
3097 59.90 31.78 0 100 1121 53.82 33.55 0 100 
ExtAud 4214 0.53 0.50 0 1 2168 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Ownersh
ipa 
4060 77.04 26.99 2 100 2076 81.42 25.69 1 100 
M_Woma
n 
4255 0.18 0.38 0 1 2170 0.23 0.42 0 1 
M_Expa 4181 16.72 10.17 1 75 2131 15.41 9.97 1 58 
Innovati
on 
4262 0.60 0.49 0 1 2196 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Exporta 4268 9.44 23.49 0 100 2200 4.61 17.14 0 100 
Overdue 4255 0.09 0.28 0 1 2186 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Qualcert 4108 0.28 0.45 0 1 2120 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Overdraf
ts 
4091 0.57 0.50 0 1 2037 0.26 0.26 0 1 
City 4280 0.41 0.49 0 1 2207 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Cra,b 4251 55.54 18.96 31.81 100 2158 57.40 17.87 31.81 100 
Foreigna,
b 
4078 54.59 30.56 6.60 99.20 2008 52.17 29.75 6.60 99.20 
LegalRig
htsb  
4251 5.69 2.35 2 10 2158 5.71 2.59 2 10 
CreditInf
ob 
4251 4.17 1.56 0 6 2158 4.08 1.55 0 6 
Privcbra,
b 
4120 22.70 25.82 0 91.90 2147 16.00 22.98 0 91.90 
Pubcrega
,b 
4251 4.24 6.44 0 28.10 2158 3.11 5.87 0 27.60 
GDPpcpp
pa,b 
4251 11137.20 5820.02 1660.86 27225.50 2158 9508.51 5243.47 1660.86 27225.50 
Rejected   4280 0.162 0.368 0 1 - - - - - 
IND_Gro
upD 
4280 0.46 0.50 0 1 2207 0.46 0.50 0 1 
IN _Gro
upF 
4280 0.09 0.29 0 1 2207 0.08 0.27 0 1 
IND_Gro
upGH 
4280 0.39 0.49 0 1 2207 0.41 0.49 0 1 
IND_Gro
upI 
4280 0.05 0.22 0 1 2207 0.04 0.20 0 1 
IND_Gro
upK 





4.4.2. Univariate Tests 
This section reports univariate tests comparing the characteristics of loan applicants 
and discouraged borrowers (Table 4.3.). The results confirm that discouraged borrowers are 
younger (FAge) and smaller (FSize) than loan applicants. Furthermore, discouraged borrowers 
have a lower ratio of operational inputs bought on credit (TradeCredit). These borrowers tend 
to be externally audited less often (ExtAud) and have a higher ownership concentration 
(Ownership). Additionally, they have a higher ratio of women as business managers 
(M_Woman), with less experience in the business (M_Exp). Moreover, loan applicants are more 
innovative (Innovation) and have an exportation volume twice as high as that of discouraged 
borrowers (Export). The incidence of quality certification is also higher among loan applicants 
(Qualcert). These borrowers are more likely to have overdraft facilities (Overdrafts) than 
discouraged borrowers are.  
Table 4.3. Univariate tests 
This table reports the results of the univariate tests of the key 
variables. The Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test is conducted for continuous 
variables at the mean and a z-test is applied to binary variables at the 
median. H0: mean (y = 0) = mean (y = 1); difference = mean (y = 1) – 











Characteristics of the business and entrepreneur/manager 
FAge 13.580 12.254 -1.326 0.000 
FSize 57.965 33.638 -24.327 0.000 
TradeCredi
t 
59.896 53.822 -6.074 0.000 
ExtAud 0.526 0.340 -0.186 0.000 
Ownership 77.039 81.424 43.385 0.000 
M_Woman 0.175 0.230 0.055 0.000 
M_Exp 16.717 14.413 1.303 0.000 
Innovation 0.604 0.468 -0.136 0.000 
Export 9.442 4.609 -4.834 0.000 
Quality of Borrower 0.000 
Overdue 0.089 0.085 -0.004 0.550 
Qualcert 0.278 0.158 -0.120 0.000 
Nature of the relationship lending  




    
City 0.413 0.345 -0.068 0.000 
Characteristics of the banking sector  
Cr 55.542 57.395 1.853 0.000 
Foreign 54.585 52.168 -2.417 0.002 
Characteristics of the credit environment   
LegalRights  5.688 5.712 0.024 0.729 
CreditInfo 4.174 4.082 -0.092 0.001 
Privcbr 22.698 15.997 -6.701 0.000 
Pubcreg 4.238 3.114 -1.124 0.000 
Macroeconomic conditions  




The results also suggest that the loan application costs are higher for discouraged 
borrowers (City). We find that, on average, discouraged borrowers operate in a more 
concentrated banking system environment (Cr). Univariate tests also indicate that loan 
applicants operate in a more favorable context in regards to the development of information 
sharing instruments (CreditInfo, Privcbr, and Pubcreg). Finally, the results suggest that loan 
applicants operate in countries with higher economic development. These results seem to 
confirm that informational traceability is the main determinant of discouraged borrowers, 
whereas the quality of borrowers (Overdue) and the legal context in which they operate 
(LegalRights) seem to be statistically insignificant in explaining discouragement. See the 
correlation matrix in Appendix 4.2. 
 
4.4.3. Incidence of discouraged borrowers 
Table 4.4. reports the estimations regarding the determinants of discouragement.68 
Since our data set includes several specific characteristics of the banking sector and credit 
environment variables, we estimate different specifications to avoid collinearity problems. 
Therefore specifications [1] and [2] discriminate among banking sector characteristics, 
specifications [3] to [6] discriminate among credit environment variables, and specification [7] 
includes the macroeconomic variable. 
The estimations report negative coefficients of Ln(FSize + 1) (p-value < .01 in all 
specifications), ExtAud (p-value < .01 in all specifications), and Ln(TradeCredit + 1) (p-value < 
.05 in specification [5]; p-value < .01 in the remaining specifications). These results are in line 
with the theoretical framework, that is, confirming that less opaque firms have a lower 
probability of being discouraged from applying for credit. In line with Cavalluzzo et al. (2012) 
and Freel et al. (2012), firm age is unrelated to discouragement. Similarly, we do not find a 
statistically significant effect of business ownership concentration on the likelihood of being 
discouraged, contrary to the results of Han et al. (2009). Nonetheless, the results provide strong 
evidence regarding gender discrimination explaining the incidence of discouragement. The 
positive coefficients of M_Woman (p-value < .05 in specifications [2], [4], [6], and [7]; p-value 
< .1 in specifications [1], [3], and [5]) suggest that female managers tend to be more 
discouraged from applying for credit. The negative coefficients of Ln(M_Exp + 1) (p-value < .05 
in all specifications) confirm that firms with experienced managers/entrepreneurs have a lower 
probability of being discouraged. These results seem to confirm that demographic factors (i.e. 
gender and experience) have greater importance in less developed countries to predict 
discouragement, in line with Chakravarty and Xian (2013).69 This result can be justified by the 
                                                          
68 The model specifications control for industry dummy variables. The results are not reported but are 
available upon request. 
69 Despite some authors (e.g. Jappeli, 1990; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Han et al., 2009; Freel et al., 2012) 
predicting that the discouragement problem varies across gender and the experience of 
entrepreneurs/managers, empirical evidence does not report a statistically significant likelihood of 
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privileged access to information of experienced managers/entrepreneurs and by the fight 
against gender discrimination started in the last decades in developed countries. The negative 
coefficients of Innovation (statistically significant in all specifications at the 1% level) and 
business exportations (Ln (Export + 1)) (p-value < .05 in specifications [1] to [3]; p-value < .1 
in specifications [4] and [7]) confirm the results from univariate tests, that is, the likelihood of 
being discouraged from applying for a loan is lower for more innovative firms and firms 
operating in foreign markets. 
The results reported in Table 4.4 show that the quality of the borrower (i.e. Overdue 
and Qualcert) is unrelated with the incidence of discouragement. This evidence seems to 
contradict the theory that discouragement is an efficient self-selecting mechanism, that is, 
riskier borrowers show high probabilities of discouragement (Han et al., 2009), which may 
suggest the prevalence of falsely discouraged borrowers (Diagne, 1999) among self-selected 
businesses operating in less developed countries. We check the robustness of this result in 
Section 4.4. 
 The results on the nature of the banking relationship confirm that overdraft facilities 
are negatively related with discouraged borrowers (p-value < .01 in all specifications). This 
result is compatible with the view that discouragement increases in the absence of a 
relationship between the borrower and the lender. Hence, we confirm that if banking 
relationships pre-exist (e.g. Chakravarty and Yilmazer, 2009; Han et al., 2009), the private 
information about the borrower reduces screening errors and application costs and, 
consequently, the incidence of discouraged borrowers. 
Firms located in big cities (City, p-value < .05 in specifications [1] to [3]; p-value < .01 
in the remaining specifications) have a lower likelihood of discouragement. This evidence 
confirms that the distance between the firm and a lender increases the screening and 
application costs, in line with Peterson and Rajan (2002). The positive coefficient of Ln(Cr + 1) 
(p-value < 0.05-specification [1]) confirms that the degree of difficulty in accessing a loan 
increases with the level of bank market concentration, in line with Brown et al. (2011). 
Contrary to our expectations, the positive coefficient of LegalRights (p-value < 0.05, 
specification [3]) suggests that the strength of the legal protection of creditors and borrowers 
increases the number of discouraged borrowers (we further explore this result in Section 4.5.). 
The results also confirm that borrowers feel less discouraged from applying for a loan in 
countries with high coverage of public and private information sharing instruments ((Ln(Privcbr 
+ 1), p-value < .01, specification [5]; Ln(Pubreg + 1); p-value < .01, specification [6]). These 
results are in line with our predictions. Nonetheless, we do not find that the depth of 
information sharing instruments (CreditInfo, specification [4]) influences the incidence of 
discouraged borrowers. These results suggest that policy makers should direct their efforts in 
increasing the coverage of information sharing instruments to reduce the incidence of 
                                                          
discouragement in developed countries. On the contrary, for developing countries, Chakravarty and Xian 
(2013) report significant effects of experience and gender as predictors of discouragement.  
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discouraged borrowers more than increasing the depth of these instruments, satisfactorily 
developed (for an overview of the differences detected between the coverage and depth of 
information sharing instruments across countries, see DBR, 2010). Furthermore, borrowers 
operating in more developed countries have a lower probability of being discouraged 
(Ln(GDPpcppp + 1,p-value < .01, specification [7]). 
Table 4.4. Determinants of discouraged borrowers: Probit estimations 
This table reports the results of the probit model. The dependent variable is DBorrower. We control for 
industry dummy variables. The results are not tabulated here but are available upon request from the 
author. The variable definitions are reported in Table 4.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Characteristics of the business and entrepreneur/manager   
Ln(Fage+1) 0.051 0.033 0.035 0.041 0.083* 0.036 0.054 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
Ln(FSize+1) -0.231*** -0.226*** -0.229*** -0.232*** -0.245*** -0.242*** -0.235*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Ln(TradeCredit+1) -0.093*** -0.086*** -0.096*** -0.083*** -0.070** -0.074*** -0.075*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
ExtAud -0.196*** -0.210*** -0.190*** -0.182*** -0.210*** -0.157*** -0.180*** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Ln(Ownership+1) -0.082 -0.062 -0.071 -0.069 -0.045 -0.075 -0.070 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
M_Woman 0.117* 0.148** 0.114* 0.121** 0.117* 0.119** 0.125** 
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) 
Ln(M_Exp+1) -0.093** -0.064 -0.099** -0.098** -0.090** -0.087** -0.091** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) 
Innovation -0.152*** -0.143*** -0.154*** -0.148*** -0.141*** -0.149*** -0.141*** 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Ln(Export+1) -0.041** -0.045** -0.041** -0.038* -0.020 -0.030 -0.034* 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Quality of Borrower     
Overdue -0.043 0.024 -0.034 -0.035 -0.026 -0.017 -0.041 
 (0.086) (0.089) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) 
Qualcert -0.058 -0.087 -0.061 -0.057 -0.022 -0.048 -0.044 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) 
Nature of the relationship lending    
Overdrafts -0.603*** -0.613*** -0.644*** -0.624*** -0.574*** -0.635*** -0.607*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) 
Application Costs     
City -0.113** -0.105** -0.131** -0.136*** -0.155*** -0.109** -0.141*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) 
Characteristics of the banking sector      
Ln(Cr+1) 0.206**       
 (0.083)       
Ln(Foreign+1)  0.051      
  (0.037)      
Characteristics of the credit environment      
LegalRights    0.032***     
   (0.010)     
CreditInfo    -0.007    
    (0.016)    
Ln(Privcbr+1)     -0.072***   
     (0.017)   
Ln(Pubcreg+1)      -0.083***  
      (0.024)  
Macroeconomic Conditions     
Ln(GDPpcppp+1)       -0.098** 
       (0.039) 
Constant 0.944* 1.276*** 1.640*** 1.777*** 1.585*** 1.837*** 2.577*** 
 (0.560) (0.495) (0.458) (0.460) (0.480) (0.456) (0.562) 
# 3,475 3,413 3,475 3,475 3,344 3,475 3,475 
Log-Likelihood -1,738.02 -1,645.53 -1,736.41 -1,741.02 -1,691.36 -1,735.16 -1,737.95 
LR chi2 467.48 430.60 470.70 461.48 459.39 473.22 467.64 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Table 4.5. reports the results of parsimonious model. The results broadly confirm the 
estimations of Table 4.4. Based on the parsimonious model and before proceeding to the 
robustness test section, we plot the estimated probabilities of being discouraged for nine 
hypothetical borrowers (with different levels of opacity, traceability, screening errors, and 
application costs) in a subsample analysis (by FSize, ExtAud, Overdraft, and City; see 
Appendices 4.3 to 4.6). These plots show how changes in i) banking concentration (Cr, see 
Appendix 4.3.), ii) strength of creditor and borrower protection in the event of default 
(LegalRights, see Appendix 4.4.), and iii) coverage of private/public information sharing 
instruments (Privcbr, see Appendix 4.5.; Pubcreg, see Appendix 4.6.) affect the probability of 
each business being discouraged as a function of firm-specific characteristics. These plots 
provide a representation regarding the marginal effects of the unitary variation (above the 
mean) of the market variables (i.e. Cr, LegalRights, Privcbr, Pubcreg) in terms of the 
probability of being discouraged. Hence, they provide interesting input for policy makers 
predicting the impact of contextual reforms on the likelihood of discouragement. 
The plots reported in Appendices 4.3. to 4.6. broadly confirm that, for the mean values of 
the variables Cr (Appendix 4.3.), LegalRights (Appendix 4.4.), Privcbr (Appendix 4.5.), and 
Pubcreg (Appendix 4.6.), the estimated probability of being discouraged is higher among 
smaller firms, externally unaudited businesses, firms without overdraft facilities, and firms 
operating in a small city or rural area. Furthermore, Appendix 4.3 confirms that an increase in 
banking concentration increases the estimated probability of being discouraged, with the 
exception of the estimated probability for businesses operating in small cities or rural areas, 
which is negatively related to banking concentration. Interestingly, we find that the most 
notable marginal effects occur for business with overdrafts and borrowers located in big cities. 
We also find that, starting at a given point, these business would be more likely to be 
discouraged than others. This result seems to suggest that in a more highly concentrated 
banking market, those firms with a closer and more intense relationship with a bank are more 
likely to be discouraged from applying for a loan than distant borrowers. This is reasonable if 
we assume that these firms are more likely rely on banks as their primordial source of finance, 
becoming locked in by the superior bargaining power of the credit provider in a context of low 
competition (Sharpe, 1991; Detragiache et al., 2000). In turn, this bargaining power could 
discourage businesses from applying for new loans. 
Appendix 4.4. also confirms the positive relation between the strength of legal rights and 
discouragement. Nonetheless, we find that this effect is very low, especially for businesses 
with overdrafts and firms operating in small cities or rural areas. 
Appendices 4.5. and 4.6. broadly confirm that an increase in the coverage of private 
(Privcbr) and public (Pubcreg) information sharing instruments, respectively, decreases the 
estimated probability of being discouraged, independently of the nature of business quality 
traceability , screening errors, or application costs.
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Table 4.5. Determinants of discouraged borrowers: Probit estimations 
(parsimonious model) 
This table reports the results of the parsimonious probit model based on the 
estimations of Table 4.4. The dependent variable is DBorrower. We control for 
industry dummy variables. The results are not tabulated here but are available 
upon request from the author. The variable definitions are reported in Table 
4.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Characteristics of the business and 
entrepreneur/manager 
  
Ln(FSize+1) -0.213*** -0.213*** -0.223*** -0.225*** -0.216*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ln(TradeCredit+1) -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.046* -0.048* -0.053** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
ExtAud -0.188*** -0.184*** -0.196*** -0.150*** -0.174*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
M_Woman 0.124** 0.119** 0.125** 0.122** 0.131** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) 
Ln(M_Exp+1) -0.061* -0.071** -0.054 -0.058 -0.060* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Innovation -0.174*** -0.177*** -0.162*** -0.169*** -0.164*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Ln(Export+1) -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.028 -0.037** -0.042** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Nature of the relationship lending   
Overdrafts -0.602*** -0.641*** -0.578*** -0.631*** -0.605*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
Application Costs      
City -0.122** -0.136*** -0.159*** -0.112** -0.145*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) 
Characteristics of the banking sector    
Ln(Cr+1) 0.173**     
 (0.078)     
Characteristics of the credit environment     
LegalRights   0.032***    
  (0.010)    
Ln(Privcbr+1)   -0.056***   
   (0.016)   
Ln(Pubcreg+1)    -0.088***  
    (0.023)  
Macroeconomic conditions    
Ln(GDPpcppp+1)     -0.085** 
     (0.036) 
Constant 0.576 1.142*** 1.286*** 1.330*** 2.023*** 
 (0.465) (0.339) (0.355) (0.335) (0.462) 
# 3,808 3,808 3,808 3,808 3,808 
Log-Likelihood -1,922.60 -1,919.69 -1,877.37 -1,917.70 -1,922.35 
LR chi2 483.07 488.88 470.78 492.87 483.58 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




4.5. Robustness tests 
An increase in the legal protection of creditor rights has not been proven an instrument 
to reduce the incidence of discouraged borrowers. Instead, in countries with stronger creditor 
rights, the borrower is more likely to be discouraged from applying for a loan that they need. 
This result is not surprising if we assume that an increase in creditor/lender protection 
facilitates lending activity to SMEs on collateral basis. If we show that this assumption is true, 
we may expect collaterally constrained borrowers to be less encouraged to apply for a loan if 
they expect lenders will offer credit under a collateralized contract. To test such an 
assumption, we investigate the impact of LegalRights on the likelihood of the lender requesting 
collateral to accept the loan application. Based on BEEPS (2008/2009) information regarding 
loan applicants with ultimately approved loans, we built the variable Collateral (a binary 
variable that equals one if the lender requests collateral to approve the loan and zero 
otherwise).70 Then we run a probit model on Collateral over LegalRights and the set of specific 
firm variables included in this study.71 The probit model reports a positive coefficient for 
LegalRights (p-value < .05), suggesting that strong credit rights increase the reliance on 
collateral to extend bank loans. Interpreting this result, we must highlight that this test reports 
only information about firms with approved loan application, which therefore passed the 
lender’s credit evaluation. Hence, it could be argued that the strength of legal rights positively 
affects the approval of loan requests.  
To test this assumption, based on Hanedar et al. (2014), we investigate the impact of 
CreditInfo in extending credit. Hence, we built the variable ProbRejected (a binary variable 
that equals one if the firm reported access to finance as a severe problem and zero otherwise72), 
which is used as the dependent variable.73 Then, we run a probit model on ProbRejected over 
LegalRights and the set of independent variables.74 The probit model reports a negative 
coefficient for LegalRights (p-value < .05), confirming that credit access is less stringent for 
firms operating in countries with better credit protection laws. This result sheds more light on 
the relation between legal rights, credit rationing, and the incidence of discouraged borrowers, 
                                                          
70 We built the final sample on the basis of answers to the following survey questions: ‘At this time, does 
this establishment have a line of credit or loan from a financial institution?’ [Yes, No, Don’t know] and 
‘Referring only to this most recent loan or line of credit, did financing require collateral?’ [Yes, No, Don’t 
know] 
71 These estimations are not reported here but are available upon request. 
72 The question in the survey is as follows: ‘Is access to finance, which includes availability and cost, 
interest rates, fees and collateral requirements, no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, a 
major obstacle or a very severe obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?’ 
73 We assume that the difficulty accessing financing predicts in some way the likelihood of firms being 
discouraged from applying for a loan or having their loan applications rejected. 
74 The estimations are not tabulated here but are available upon request. 
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exp (αj + βjXi) 
exp (αj + βjXi) 
leading us to conclude that reliable credit protection laws decrease banks’ reluctance in 
extending credit under terms that may discourage borrowers from applying for a loan, despite 
the fact that these terms increase the odds of accepted loan applications. 
These results confirm that discouragement exists beyond the fear of rationing. In fact, 
Appendix 4.7. shows that the proportion of loans seekers that do not apply for a loan from fear 
that the loan application would be rejected/rationed in the global sample is lower than the 
proportion of borrowers discouraged by tough loan prices or application procedures. Hence, to 
test if our model fits well in explaining both discouragement due to fear of rationing and 
negative perceptions about loan prices or given the complexity of the loan application’s 
procedures, we re-estimate the results reported in Table 4.4., splitting the sample into two 
types of discouraged borrowers. Hence, using a multinomial logit (ML) model (e.g. Brown et 
al., 2011),75 we extend the test for the self-selection theory for three categories of 
discouragement. In this model let DBorrower_Reasonij = 1 if the ith observation chooses 
alternative j, j = 1, 2, 3, which is treated as an unordered choice set.  
In the situation of interest in this study, i, represents the firm and j represents the 
discouragement status. There are three choices, with probability πf1 (applicants, 65.98% of the 
sample), πf2 (the firm did not apply for a bank loan given its price or procedures, 30.46% of the 
sample), and πf3 (the firm did not apply for a bank loan due to fear of rationing, 3.56% of the 
sample) for individual i. This means that ∑ DBorrower_Reason3j=1 ij = 1 and ∑ π
3
j=1 ij = 1 (Baltagi, 
2002). As in the binary response model, we are interested in how changes in the elements of χ 
(i.e. independent variables) affect the response probabilities πij, j = 1, 2, 3, ceteris paribus. 





The variable DBorrower_Reasonij is a categorical variable that equals one if the firm i 
applied for external funding (i.e. applicant); two if the main reasons for discouragement were 
high interest rates, collateral, the complexity of application procedures, the necessity of 
making informational payments to obtain a bank loan, or other reasons that make the procedure 
the main reason for discouragement; or three if the main reason for discouragement was the 
fear of credit rationing76 (e.g. Brown et al., 2011; Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013). The term X is 
the vector of independent variables and βi is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
                                                          
75 Because of the need to evaluate multiple integrals of the normal distribution, the probit model for 
multiples choices has been found to be of rather limited use in this setting. The logit model for multiple 
choices (i.e. the ML model), in contrast, has been widely used in many fields, including economics, market 
research, and transportation engineering (Greene, 2003).  
76 Here, we define the fear of rationing as the fear of loan rejection or fear that the size of the loan 










Table 4.6. Determinants of discouraged borrowers: ML estimations  
The dependent variable in this table is DBorrower_Reason. The base outcome in the ML model is 
Applied for Credit. The left-hand column provides the determinants of discouragement due to 
tough loan prices or loan application procedures (i.e., DBorrower_Reason = Price/Procedures). 
The right hand-column provides the determinants of discouragement due to fear of rationing. We 
control for industry dummies. The results are not tabulated here but are available upon request. 
The variable definitions are reported in Table 4.1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1. 











Characteristics of the business and entrepreneur/manager   
Ln(Fage+1) 0.100 0.034 0.092 -0.180 0.081 -0.079 
 (0.078) (0.202) (0.080) (0.204) (0.078) (0.198) 
Ln(FSize+1) -0.382*** -0.572*** -0.381*** -0.507*** -0.379*** -0.563*** 
 (0.047) (0.127) (0.048) (0.131) (0.047) (0.125) 
Ln(TradeCredit+1) -0.170*** 0.078 -0.162*** 0.124 -0.173*** 0.059 
 (0.047) (0.150) (0.047) (0.151) (0.047) (0.145) 
ExtAud -0.356*** -0.206 -0.390*** -0.101 -0.351*** -0.153 
 (0.093) (0.245) (0.095) (0.255) (0.092) (0.243) 
Ln(Ownership+1) -0.142 -0.224 -0.100 -0.221 -0.130 -0.141 
 (0.091) (0.228) (0.095) (0.235) (0.090) (0.232) 
M_Woman 0.180* 0.238 0.237** 0.299 0.178* 0.254 
 (0.106) (0.271) (0.108) (0.283) (0.106) (0.270) 
Ln(M_Exp+1) -0.149** -0.199 -0.101 -0.160 -0.156** -0.244 
 (0.072) (0.180) (0.074) (0.189) (0.071) (0.179) 
Innovation -0.215** -0.716*** -0.194** -0.705*** -0.220** -0.719*** 
 (0.089) (0.234) (0.092) (0.245) (0.089) (0.234) 
Ln(Export+1) -0.071** -0.062 -0.074** -0.097 -0.071** -0.060 
 (0.036) (0.099) (0.037) (0.106) (0.036) (0.099) 
Quality of Borrower     
Overdue -0.182 0.552* -0.076 0.737** -0.174 0.646** 
 (0.159) (0.315) (0.162) (0.328) (0.159) (0.316) 
Qualcert -0.163 0.364 -0.201* 0.184 -0.165 0.331 
 (0.117) (0.291) (0.121) (0.309) (0.117) (0.290) 
Nature of the relationship lending     
Overdrafts -1.041*** -1.023*** -1.054*** -1.030*** -1.088*** -1.294*** 
 (0.092) (0.259) (0.093) (0.261) (0.092) (0.257) 
Application Costs       
City -0.234** 0.114 -0.210** 0.063 -0.253*** -0.024 
 (0.092) (0.238) (0.093) (0.247) (0.091) (0.235) 
Characteristics of the banking sector     
Ln(Cr+1) 0.221 1.515***     
 (0.145) (0.398)     
Ln(Foreign+1)   0.049 0.294   
   (0.065) (0.179)   
Characteristics of the credit environment      
LegalRights      0.038** 0.185*** 
     (0.018) (0.049) 
Constant 1.985** -4.767** 2.300*** -13.039 2.713*** 0.623 







Log-Likelihood -1,993.37 -1,880.18 -1,992.97 
LR chi2 507.63 459.51 508.43 







































Table 4.6. Determinants of discouraged borrowers: ML estimations 
(continuation) 






Characteristics of the business and entrepreneur/manager  
Ln(Fage+1) 0.089 -0.039 0.153* 0.077 
 (0.078) (0.197) (0.080) (0.202) 
Ln(FSize+1) -0.383*** -0.573*** -0.403*** -0.602*** 
 (0.046) (0.125) (0.047) (0.126) 
Ln(TradeCredit+1) -0.159*** 0.141 -0.137*** 0.176 
 (0.047) (0.145) (0.047) (0.148) 
ExtAud -0.342*** -0.054 -0.383*** -0.186 
 (0.092) (0.243) (0.093) (0.242) 
Ln(Ownership+1) -0.127 -0.147 -0.089 -0.086 
 (0.090) (0.231) (0.091) (0.235) 
M_Woman 0.184* 0.295 0.175 0.286 
 (0.106) (0.269) (0.107) (0.271) 
Ln(M_Exp+1) -0.155** -0.242 -0.140* -0.207 
 (0.071) (0.178) (0.072) (0.180) 
Innovation -0.211** -0.683*** -0.200** -0.664*** 
 (0.089) (0.232) (0.090) (0.233) 
Ln(Export+1) -0.068* -0.049 -0.038 -0.005 
 (0.036) (0.099) (0.036) (0.099) 
Quality of Borrower   
Overdue -0.175 0.588* -0.164 0.607* 
 (0.159) (0.314) (0.160) (0.316) 
Qualcert -0.164 0.358 -0.113 0.464 
 (0.117) (0.291) (0.119) (0.293) 
Nature of the relationship lending  
Overdrafts -1.064*** -1.185*** -0.986*** -0.974*** 
 (0.091) (0.255) (0.093) (0.260) 
Application Costs     
City -0.259*** -0.025 -0.284*** -0.069 
 (0.091) (0.235) (0.091) (0.237) 
Characteristics of the credit environment    
CreditInfo -0.002 -0.105   
 (0.028) (0.067)   
Ln(Privcbr+1)   -0.107*** -0.262*** 
   (0.030) (0.077) 
Ln(Pubcreg+1)     
     
Macroeconomic Conditions   
Ln(GDPpcppp+1)     
     
Constant 2.857*** 1.681 2.525*** 1.072 





Log-Likelihood -2,000.33 -1,948.81 
LR chi2 493.70 49 .15 





































Table 4.6. reports the estimations of the ML model. There are three outcomes per firm 
in this model: Applied for credit; discouraged-Price/Procedures; and discouraged- Rationing. 
Our base outcome is Applied for credit (not tabulated). The coefficients in this table report 
the impact of each explanatory variable on the relative probability of being discouraged by 
tough loan price, application procedures complexity, and fear of rationing. The different 
specifications ([1] to [7]) control for banking sector characteristics, the credit environment, 
and macroeconomic conditions to avoid potential multicollinearity problems. 
The results reported in the left-hand column of Table 4.6. (i.e. DBorrower_Reason = 
Price/Procedures) broadly confirm the estimations provided in Table 4.4., except for banking 
concentration (Ln(Cr + 1)), which does not relate to the probability of being discouraged by 
Table 4.6. Determinants of discouraged borrowers: ML estimations 
(continuation) 






Characteristics of the business and entrepreneur/manager 
Ln(Fage+1) 0.082 -0.046 0.116 -0.035 
 (0.078) (0.196) (0.078) (0.197) 
Ln(FSize+1) -0.403*** -0.557*** -0.389*** -0.577*** 
 (0.047) (0.126) (0.047) (0.125) 
Ln(TradeCredit+1) -0.139*** 0.119 -0.147*** 0.147 
 (0.047) (0.144) (0.047) (0.144) 
ExtAud -0.286*** -0.139 -0.340*** -0.085 
 (0.093) (0.244) (0.092) (0.241) 
Ln(Ownership+1) -0.141 -0.125 -0.131 -0.141 
 (0.090) (0.234) (0.090) (0.232) 
M_Woman 0.180* 0.284 0.191* 0.290 
 (0.106) (0.270) (0.106) (0.269) 
Ln(M_Exp+1) -0.134* -0.272 -0.141** -0.237 
 (0.072) (0.178) (0.072) (0.178) 
Innovation -0.215** -0.672*** -0.200** -0.661*** 
 (0.089) (0.232) (0.089) (0.232) 
Ln(Export+1) -0.052 -0.066 -0.061* -0.046 
 (0.036) (0.100) (0.036) (0.100) 
Quality of Borrower   
Overdue -0.136 0.570* -0.193 0.604* 
 (0.159) (0.315) (0.159) (0.314) 
Qualcert -0.148 0.326 -0.141 0.345 
 (0.118) (0.291) (0.118) (0.291) 
Nature of the 
relationship 
lending 
    
Overdrafts -1.083*** -1.174*** -1.032*** -1.164*** 
 (0.091) (0.255) (0.092) (0.258) 
Application Costs    
City -0.206** -0.087 -0.269*** -0.036 
 (0.092) (0.239) (0.091) (0.235) 
Characteristics of the credit environment    
CreditInfo     
     
Ln(Privcbr+1)     
     
Ln(Pubcreg+1) -0.172*** 0.143   
 (0.043) (0.106)   
Macroeconomic conditions   
Ln(GDPpcppp+1)   -0.178*** -0.115 
   (0.067) (0.170) 
Constant 3.031*** 1.144 4.358*** 2.246 





Log-Likelihood -1,991.71 -1,997.94 
LR chi2 510.96 498.49 




Pseudo-R2 0.114 0.111 
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tough loan prices or application procedures. Nonetheless, the right-hand column (i.e. 
DBorrower_Reason = Rationing) reports several differences with the estimations provided in 
Table 4.4. 
Namely, only firm size (Ln(FSize + 1)) and innovator status (Innovation) remain 
statistically significant in explaining the incidence of discouraged borrowers. Furthermore, 
contrary to previous results, we confirm that the quality of the borrower is positively related 
to discouragement. We find that firms reporting being past overdue on payments (Overdue, p-
value < .05 in specifications [2] to [4]; p-value < .1 in the remaining specifications) are more 
likely to be discouraged from applying for a loan. This result is in line with Han et al. (2009), 
indicating that discouragement is a self-rationing mechanism for high-risk borrowers only in the 
context of fear of rationing. We also find that the distance between a lender and borrowers 
(City) is not related to discouragement due to fear of rationing. The variables Ln(Pubcreg + 1) 
and Ln(GDPpcppp + 1) lose statistical significance in explaining this profile of discouraged 
borrowers. The positive coefficient of LegalRights (p-value < .01) seems to suggest the 
existence of falsely discouraged borrowers, since we confirm that, contrary to the expectations 
of these discouraged borrowers, the strength of creditor and borrower protection increases the 
likelihood of receiving a loan. 
These results suggest that the determinants of discouragement vary across discouraged 
borrowers. Accordingly, we find that, whereas firm opaqueness, demographic factors (i.e. the 
gender and experience of the manager), and location better explain discouragement due to 
negative perceptions about loan price and/or loan application procedures, firm quality and 
banking concentration explains the incidence of discouraged borrowers due to fear of rationing. 
Innovator status, the legal protection of creditors and lenders in the event of default event, 
and the coverage of information sharing instruments help to explain discouragement in a 
transversal way. 
 
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
Using data from the 2007–2009 BEEPS, we examines the determinants of 
discouragement in less development countries. We use a probit model to analyse which factors 
better explain why borrowers are discouraged from applying for a bank loan when they seek 
capital. We define a business as a discouraged borrower if it does not apply for a loan for 
different reasons, such as tough loan prices or loan contract procedures or fear of rationing, 
that is, the scale of discouragement as a function of bank screening errors, application costs, 
and the difference in interest rates between the bank and other money lenders (Chakravarty 
and Xiang, 2013).  
In addition, we use an ML model to compare the group of borrowers discouraged by 
tough loan prices or loan application procedures to those discouraged by a fear of rationing, 
considering the applicant status as the base outcome. The results show that whereas the firm’s 
opaqueness, demographic factors (i.e. gender and owner experience), and distance between 
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borrower and lender better explain discouragement due to tough loan prices and/or loan 
application procedures, firm risk and banking concentration better explain the incidence of 
borrowers discouraged by the fear of rationing. Namely, the results indicate that a borrower 
discouraged by tough loan prices is more opaque, is managed by a less experienced woman, 
and operates far from the credit provider. Alternatively, a borrower discouraged by fear of 
rationing is riskier and operates in a more highly concentrated banking sector.  
Additionally, the findings report that both types of discouraged borrowers are smaller 
and less innovative, and do not have a pre-existing relationship with the banks. Nonetheless, 
the results suggest that, in a more highly concentrated banking market, those firms with closer 
and more intense relationship with a bank are more likely to be discouraged from applying for 
a loan than distant borrowers. This finding is reasonable if we assume that those firms are more 
likely to rely on banks as their primordial source of finance, becoming locked in by the superior 
bargaining power of the credit provider in a context of low competition (e.g. Sharpe, 1991; 
Detragiache et al., 2000). In turn, this bargaining power could discourage the business from 
applying for new loans. 
Furthermore, we find that the development of the credit environment have mixed 
effects on the probability of being discouraged. In particular, we find that the strength of the 
legal rights index relates positively with the likelihood of being discouraged, despite reducing 
the likelihood of type I and type II credit rationing. This could suggest the existence of falsely 
discouraged borrowers among businesses that do not apply for a loan due to fear of rationing. 
The positive relation between legal rights and discouragement due to tough loan prices 
(including tough interest rates and collateral requirements) can be justified by the positive 
relation between this index and the incidence of collateralized contracts, which may discourage 
assets constrained businesses from applying for a loan. On the other hand, we conclude that 
discouraged borrowers (broadly measured) operate in countries with poor coverage of 
public/private information sharing instruments. These results suggest that the discouragement 
may also act as an efficient mechanism to weed out low-type SMEs (in line with Han et al., 
2009) or informationally opaque borrowers, operating in less developed countries, from 
applying, thus minimizing adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Additionally, the 
results consistently highlight that the dissemination of (public and private) information sharing 
mechanisms acts as a substitute for discouragement as a self-selection tool for opaque firms, 
providing comprehensive insights for policy makers. 
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Appendix 4.1. Identifying discouraged borrowers 
This table summarizes the responses of firms to questions about credit needs in the 2008/2009 BEEPS. 
See also footnote 60. 
 





for a loan? 
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Appendix 4.2 – Correlation matrix 
This table reports the pairwise correlation matrix. In the first row for each variable, we report the rho 
value and above we report the p-value.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FAge 1 1.000          
          
FSize 2 0.212 1.000         
0.000          
TradeCredi
t 
3 0.067 0.065 1.000        
0.000 0.000         
ExtAud 4 0.117 0.279 0.065 1.000       
0.000 0.000 0.000        
Ownership 5 -0.142 -0.139 -0.047 -0.099 1.000      
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000       
M_Woman 6 -0.010 -0.089 0.025 -0.049 0.057 1.000     
0.326 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000      
M_Exp 7 0.254 0.057 0.087 0.043 -0.137 -0.030 1.000    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002     
Innovation 8 0.025 0.078 -0.013 0.074 -0.025 0.000 -0.003 1.000   
0.012 0.000 0.285 0.000 0.012 0.966 0.792    
Export 9 0.054 0.212 0.077 0.127 -0.055 -0.033 0.052 0.036 1.000  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000   
Overdue 10 0.044 0.008 0.006 0.041 0.005 -0.021 -0.004 -0.018 -0.002 1.000 
0.000 0.442 0.635 0.000 0.589 0.029 0.663 0.065 0.865  
Qualcert 11 0.112 0.273 0.095 0.216 -0.093 -0.064 0.058 0.087 0.176 -0.006 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.525 
Overdraft 12 0.055 0.054 0.031 0.043 -0.031 -0.031 0.041 0.066 0.041 -0.040 
0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
City 13 0.057 0.142 0.046 0.109 -0.050 -0.053 0.087 0.099 0.092 -0.013 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.193 
Brpc 14 0.004 0.036 -0.070 0.072 -0.077 -0.021 0.046 0.038 0.004 0.000 
0.680 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.698 0.975 
Cr 15 0.032 -0.003 -0.017 0.052 0.027 0.039 0.012 0.001 0.021 -0.032 
0.002 0.759 0.170 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.233 0.925 0.038 0.002 
Foreign 16 -0.145 -0.046 0.116 0.064 0.147 0.045 -0.149 -0.001 -0.002 0.013 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.903 0.859 0.195 
LegalRights 17 0.064 -0.009 0.192 0.076 0.096 0.044 0.012 0.012 0.071 -0.029 
0.000 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.249 0.246 0.000 0.005 
CreditInfo 18 0.031 -0.012 0.166 0.016 0.050 0.059 0.019 0.016 0.045 -0.003 
0.002 0.235 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.097 0.000 0.756 
Pubcreg 19 0.050 0.039 0.013 0.078 -0.017 -0.018 0.060 -0.023 0.019 -0.037 
0.000 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.096 0.065 0.000 0.022 0.059 0.000 
Privcbr 20 0.206 0.045 0.147 0.037 0.036 -0.019 0.136 0.050 0.065 0.054 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
GDPpcppp 21 0.003 -0.012 0.023 0.154 -0.056 -0.005 0.066 0.009 0.073 0.058 
0.757 0.240 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.588 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.000 
  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Qualcert 11 1.000          
          
Overdraft 12 0.021 1.000         
0.035          
City 13 0.140 0.124 1.000        
0.000 0.000         
Brpc 14 0.100 0.028 0.060 1.000       
0.000 0.005 0.000        
Cr 15 0.034 -0.010 -0.062 -0.040 1.000      
0.001 0.307 0.000 0.000       
Foreign 16 -0.076 -0.118 -0.158 -0.128 -0.004 1.000     
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.661      
LegalRights 17 0.054 0.023 0.029 -0.170 0.363 0.237 1.000    
0.000 0.023 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000     
CreditInfo 18 0.029 -0.099 0.090 -0.080 -0.202 0.120 0.530 1.000   
0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Pubcreg 19 0.097 0.008 0.033 0.009 0.143 -0.233 0.186 -0.224 1.000  
0.000 0.404 0.001 0.371 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Privcbr 20 0.120 0.091 0.187 -0.058 0.033 -0.337 0.270 0.112 0.298 1.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
GDPpcppp 21 0.064 -0.155 0.044 0.203 0.188 0.179 -0.144 -0.021 0.037 -0.132 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 
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Appendix 4.3. Incremental variances of the estimated probability of being discouraged for a 
unit change of Cr above the mean 
 
Appendix 4.4. Incremental variances of the estimated probability of being discouraged for a 
unit change in LegalRights above the mean 
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Appendix 4.5. Incremental variances in the estimated probability of being discouraged for a 
unit change of Privcbr above the mean 
 
Appendix 4.6. Incremental variances of the estimated probability of being discouraged for a 
unit change of Pubcreg above the mean 
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